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Chapter 1. Introduction 
One of recent debatable issues in Egypt is whether privatization could develop and 
improve activities of the financial sector. Since 1991, Egypt aimed at developing the financial 
sector through implementing share issue privatization and privatizing state-owned banks. 
Notwithstanding its expected positive gains in the financial sector, privatization might have 
different impacts on banks compared to financial markets. The purpose of this thesis is to 
scrutinize the different impact of privatization on the development of the financial sector in 
Egypt.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section  1.1 provides facts and background of the 
study. Section  1.2 discusses the objectives and research questions. Section  1.3 examines the 
significance of the study. Section  1.4 demonstrates limitation of the study. Section  1.5 
describes the organization of the study.  
1.1. Facts and Background of the Study 
Identifying and distinguishing roles of the state and the private sector in economic 
activities was debatable issue in modern economic thinking. That debate highlighted the 
significance of the state intervention in economic activities. The state ownership dominated 
most economic activities during 1940s. However, its dominance was gradually diminishing 
during 1970s, when some aspects of privatization appeared. Although a number of practices 
of privatization were found during 1970s, the real practice of privatization began after the 
announcement of Thatcher’s government in Britain the first-known comprehensive plan of 
privatization in 1980s.  
Privatization is a process of transferring ownership and/or management of an 
economic activity from control of a state to private entrepreneurs. The main purpose of 
privatizing state-owned firms is to cure macroeconomic imbalances caused by the increasing 
budget deficits and improve operating performance of firms. 
A number of studies, e.g. Megginson and Netter (2001), emphasized the significant 
role of privatization in enhancing activities and performance of the private sector in both 
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developed and developing countries. The concern of those studies was analysis of the 
macroeconomic impact of privatization on issues of employment, social welfare, and foreign 
direct investment. However, recent studies (Cook and Uchida, 2008; Parker, 2009) began to 
attract the attention to the microeconomic impact of privatization on issues of productivity, 
efficiency gains, and financial performance of privatized firms. 
From an empirical perspective, Egypt was among developing countries that 
implemented an early comprehensive divestiture plan of its state-owned firms (SOEs). State-
owned firms were the main actors in the economy for more than three decades since 1952. 
However, the commitment of establishing a new economic ideology based on market 
principles in early 1990s was a result of the direction of the world bank, IMF, and creditors to 
restructure the Egyptian economy though implementing a structural adjustment program. 
After an expanded public sector that faced major financial losses, Egypt announced 
privatization in 1991 aiming at reducing high levels of the public debt, improving 
productivity of firms, encouraging inflows of capital, and enhancing market competition. By 
adopting privatization, Egypt was able to improve the operating efficiency and managerial 
skills of privatized firms. That helped in fostering economic growth and curing structural 
imbalances. Moreover, Egypt was able to resolve problems associated with the budget deficit 
resulted from the financial losses of is operating state-owned firms1. In addition, privatization 
helped develop the investment climate through improving business regulations, e.g., 
corporate governance. 
Since its start in 1991, the privatization in Egypt witnessed a modest progress due to 
various legal and socioeconomic obstacles. Those obstacles were mainly represented in the 
guaranteed employment schemes formed by elements of the social safety net, which protect 
employees against lay-offs. Thus, employees strongly protested against privatization and the 
                                                
1 Because of privatization, Egypt gained 50% of debt relief from creditors for supporting the new 
structural adjustment plans, which helped reduce the pressure on the fiscal budget (Hinnebusch, 1993). 
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early retirement scheme, which is associated with privatization in order to shrink the number 
of employees prior to divestiture2. In addition, the fear of dominance of foreign investors over 
the national capital was one of the most influential factors limiting the privatization progress. 
Its historical background of colonialism made policy makers and activists afraid of selling 
state-owned properties to foreigners, despite their willingness and financial creditworthiness 
to manage big projects compared to national investors (Pripstein, 1999). Those obstacles 
resulted in poor investment opportunities and adversely affected employees. That, in turn, 
impeded progress of the privatization process. Therefore, institutional change and adoption of 
new legislations were required to cope with negative social consequences resulted from the 
privatization. 
During the second half of the 1990s, the privatization gained a momentum after an 
approval by the constitutional court that allows the government to move on selling state-
owned firms. By June 2002, 190 state-owned out of 314 firms belong to various economic 
sectors were privatized by adopting various privatization methods such as anchor investor, 
initial public offering, employee share associations, liquidation, asset sales, and leases (PCSU, 
2002). Privatization was applied to main economic sectors such as manufacturing, banking 
sector, non-bank financial services, construction, trade, tourism, and utilities.  
The financial sector received a large share in the total privatization proceeds since its 
announcement in 1991. Three aspects of distortions characterized the financial sector in 
Egypt. One is the control of the state over financial services that are represented in banking 
and non-banking services. Two is the dominance of the banking sector over the financial 
market in financing activities. Three is the lack of solid legal and institutional bases and the 
low degree of liberalization required for financial institutions to operate efficiently. 
Amending those distortions within the financial sector before divestiture was important in 
                                                
2 The early retirement scheme was developed by the social development fund and financed by foreign 
donors. 
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order to absorb the increase in number of privately owned firms resulted from the 
privatization. 
Privatization could positively affect the financial sector by improving efficiency and 
enhancing activities of both the financial market and the banking sector. It allows introducing 
new financial innovations, strengthening the banking infrastructure, and enhancing 
competitiveness within the sector. Furthermore, it increases activities within the financial 
market by increasing the number of publicly listed firms3. 
1.2. Objectives and Research Questions 
The purpose of this study is to examine empirically the following: 
1. The impact of privatization on the financial sector development 
2. The relative impact of privatization on the banking sector compared to the financial 
markets 
3. The choices of financing among firms with different ownership structures  
4. The lending and risk-taking behavior of privatized financial institutions 
Privatization is a potential determinant of development of the financial sector. This 
stems from its impact on the private sector participation and activities of both banks and 
stock markets in an economy. The transfer of ownership from the state to private 
entrepreneurs enhances directly development of the financial sector through introducing new 
private firms when divestiture occurs through share issue privatization. In addition, the 
transfer of ownership has a direct influence on the banking sector through the divestiture of 
state-owned banks. However, privatization may have relative different impact on banks 
                                                
3 Since the start of the privatization in Egypt, it significantly improved the volume of trade in the 
financial market. This was due to the increase in numbers of publicly listed domestic and foreign firms. The new 
competitive environment enhanced by privatization helped attract the foreign capital and foreign financial 
portfolios, which was estimated at 30 percent of the total market capitalization in 1997. Until 1997, more than 
700 foreign institutions and funds traded in the Egyptian stock market (Pripstein, 1999). 
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compared to stock markets. Studying the relative impact of privatization on banks as opposed 
to stock markets is important for policy makers when constructing their plans regarding 
privatization and financial sector development.  
Regarding the impact of privatization on choices of financing, although it was proven 
empirically that privatization improves operating performance of firms, its impact on choices 
of financing among firms was largely ignored. Such impact stems from differences of 
information asymmetry across firms with different ownership structures. One factor that 
affects choices of finance of privatized firms is the appointment of new managers. Although 
privatized firms were operated under state ownership, privatization changes their 
management under the new ownership structure. Thus, they differ in their operating activities 
and investment decisions and, in turn, creditors evaluate them differently. Another factor that 
affects choices of financing of privatized firms is their bad reputation in the credit market 
resulted from their low performance prior to divestiture. This causes difficulties in raising 
external funds, especially through stock markets. As a result, they face obstacles in financing 
their projects by facing a costly external finance in post privatization period. 
Moreover, privatization encourages foreign and domestic entry of banks. This 
improves competition within the banking sector, which, in turn, affects the lending and risk-
taking behavior of operating financial institutions. Privatized banks that depend mainly on 
lending activities may lag behind other banks that depend on non-lending activities such as 
treasury bills and government bonds. This is because the former banks are more exposed to 
risks associated with fluctuations of interest rates.  
In order to achieve the previous objectives, the study attempts to answer the following 
questions: 
1. Does privatization positively affect development of the banking sector and stock 
markets? 
2. Does privatization have a significant positive impact on the financial system 
structure? 
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3. Does privatization positively affect development of the overall financial sector? 
4. Do privatized firms depend more on internal finance compared to external finance? 
5. Do privatized firms depend more on bank-based finance compared to market-based 
finance? 
6. What are the main determinants of choices of financing of privatized firms? 
7. Does privatization affect the performance of privatized banks and non-bank 
financial institutions? 
8. Does privatization affect the lending and risk-taking behavior of divested financial 
institutions? 
In order to answer the foregoing questions, this thesis consists of three empirical 
studies. The empirical studies presented in the thesis are based on the neo-Keynesian 
economics, which assume, among others, the following. First, volatilities in the financial 
sector are caused by different macroeconomic factors. Second, the financial sector is 
integrated with economic activities. Third, fiscal and monetary policies are required to 
achieve stability in the financial sector. Fourth, financial structure is driven by choices of 
financing of firms. Fifth, choices of financing depend on the desire of firms to involve in 
riskier activities. Six, diversification of loans among banks affects their lending and risk-
taking behavior by mitigating asymmetry of information and cost of monitoring. In particular, 
the studies utilized theories of neo-Keynesian economics in order to scrutinize the impact of 
privatization on the development of financial sector, choices of financing, and lending and 
risk-taking behavior of financial institutions. By adopting the neo-Keynesian approach, it will 
be possible to examine the demand and supply side of the financial sector. In the demand side, 
the thesis considers choices of financing among privatized firms. In the supply side, it 
considers the development of the financial sector and the efficiency of privatized financial 
institutions in providing financial services. 
Neo-Keynesian economics significantly contributed to the understanding of finance 
and the development of financial institutions through introducing concepts of asymmetric 
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information, agency problem, and adverse selection. They criticized Modigliani-Miller 
theorem (1958), which shows that activities of the financial sector are not connected with real 
economic activities. The neo-Keynesians showed that output and investment are constrained 
by the availability of funds provided by financial institutions. In addition, neo-Keynesian 
economics proposed the theory of credit rationing in relation to principal-agent problem, 
which explains a possible adverse relationship between shareholders and managers. 
The neo-Keynesian economics provided realistic assumptions compared to other 
schools of economic thought. By assuming imperfect capital markets, it replaced unrealistic 
assumptions of neo-classical economics, which led them to consider the market signaling as 
being the main determinant of choices of financing of firms. The assumption of perfect 
capital market by the neoclassical economics ignores the fact that volatility in stock markets 
does not always move with firm’s fundamentals (Blanchard et al., 1993). Contrary, by 
assuming imperfect capital market, the neo-Keynesians were able to scrutinize the financing 
behavior of firms that are located in economies with less sophisticated and inefficient capital 
markets. In addition, neo-classical economics failed to account for the agency problem, 
which results from conflicts between managers and shareholders (Crotty, 1992). Moreover, 
unlike the monetarists, neo-Keynesian economics assume that banking credit, not money, is 
interconnected with the real economic activities. This led them to incorporate the financial 
sector in the analysis of fluctuations of economic activities. Neo-Keynesian economics also 
assumed that monetary variables have short-term effect on output, further providing evidence 
that the interaction between the financial sector and economic activities firmly exits. 
1.3. The Significance of the Study 
This study contributes to the relevant literature in five ways. First, the study provides 
more evidences on how real activities, such as privatization, affect the development of 
financial sector. Second, by examining the impact of privatization on financial structure, the 
study provides more evidence on how privatization has a relative different impact on the 
development of the banking sector compared to the financial market. Third, by applying new 
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theoretical approaches, the study provides a new analysis on the choices of financing of 
privatized firms. In the Egyptian context, this enriches the relevant literature by providing 
new evidence on how privatization affects the financial decisions of privatized firms. Fourth, 
the study contributes to the relevant literature by examining the lending and risk-taking 
behavior of privatized banks. Fifth, a uniqueness of the study is the identification of main 
differences among privatized firms, other publicly listed firms, and state-owned firms. In 
addition, the study identifies the main differences among privatized financial institutions and 
privatized non-financial institutions. The study constructs a new dataset that includes data 
about these firms and institutions.   
Previous empirical studies, e.g. Kikeri, et al., 1994, Torino, 2003, Segal, 2004, Kotler 
and Lee, 2007, focused mainly on the impact of privatization on investments, foreign direct 
investment, employment, budget deficit, market competition, economic growth, the 
performance of the financial sector, and overall economic welfare, in particular in developed 
countries. Those studies ignored another important dimension with respect to the relationship 
between the privatization and the financial structure. In addition, while those studies focused 
on the impact of privatization on the banking sector performance and stock market returns, 
they ignored the different relative impact of privatization on the banking sector compared to 
the financial market. In addition, those studies ignored the choices of financing of privatized 
firms, and if exists, they focused on cross-country analysis and ignored such analysis at 
country-level, in particular in developing countries.  
In the Egyptian context, previous studies, e.g. Heller and Schiller, 1989; Aly and 
Shields, 1999; Awadalla, 2003; Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007; Kenawy, 2009, focused on the 
analysis of the operating performance of privatized firms and the role of privatization in 
enhancing macroeconomic performance. All those studies ignored two main important issues: 
one, the choices of financing among privatized firms and, two, the risk-taking and lending 
behavior of privatized banks. 
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1.4. Limitation of the Study 
The study has certain limitations that need to be taken into account. However, some of 
these limitations can be seen as important elements for future research in the relevant 
literature. These limitations are due to the following issues: 
1. Unavailability of a comprehensive privatization dataset that includes all 
privatization transactions 
2. Unavailability of data that covers socioeconomic indicators 
3. Unavailability of a comprehensive measure of the development of financial sector 
that covers obstacles that are faced by firms in accessing external finance 
4. Lack of data about small size firms in Egypt 
5. Lack of data about privatized firms and financial institutions in Egypt 
This study focuses on analysis of the impact of privatization on financial sector 
development. Examining such impact across countries requires a comprehensive dataset that 
includes all privatization transactions. The most comprehensive data for privatization 
transactions are available in the World Bank Privatization Database. That database includes 
all privatization transactions over USD one million that had been announced officially. For 
developing countries, the impact of privatization might be underestimated due to a disregard 
of the low privatization proceeds. In addition, the database covers only the privatization 
transactions that generate revenues for governments (the World Bank, 2012). However, this 
ignores other aspects of privatization that does not generate revenues for government such as 
voucher privatization and new green-field investments. However, the database has its 
advantages in terms of its coverage. That is because it covers a wide range of developing 
countries, privatization methods, and economic sectors. This helps in mitigating the biases 
that might arise from missing a number of privatization transactions. 
This study focuses on a complex and interconnected phenomenon. This may impose 
certain limitations in the sense that some of the sampled countries are emerging countries. 
Those countries have experienced synchronically different kinds of reforms beside 
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privatization. The lack of data related to such reforms, e.g. the reduction in the prevailing 
corruption in a country, may impose certain biases. However, the study attempts to reduce 
such biases by taking into consideration other reforms in the macroeconomic environment. 
Moreover, analyzing the financial sector development is a multifaceted issue. In 
addition to the macroeconomic environment, other socioeconomic factors should be 
considered such as the tendency of citizens in some countries to deposit less money in the 
banking sector because of religious considerations as in Muslim countries. This study does 
not cover these issues due to difficulty of obtaining such data. 
In pursuing this study, the empirical design depends on some commonly used 
indicators for measuring development of financial sector. However, a more comprehensive 
indicator for the financial sector development that takes into consideration the ability of firms 
to access the financial sector is required. This study attempts to mitigate such issue by using 
different sub-indicators that covers the development of the banking sector, the financial 
market, and the overall financial sector. In addition, the study carries out a separate empirical 
analysis that examines the factors that affect the access of firms to external finance. 
In its analysis of the choices of financing of privatized firms and the lending-behavior 
of privatized financial institutions in Egypt, the study depends on financial statements of 
firms and financial institutions. The study does not include small size firms and financial 
institutions, which might gain or lose from privatization. However, this does not cause any 
significant problem since major privatized firms and financial institutions in Egypt are 
medium to large size. In addition, some data about privatized firms and financial institutions 
are not available due to political concerns of such topic and poor auditing standards. 
Privatizing SOEs is one of major issues that Egyptian’ politicians avoid the public disclosure 
of information, particularly regarding the sales procedures, the amount of sales, and other 
firms’ performance data. This is because privatization faced a number of protests by labors 
after losing their jobs (Khattab, 1999; Pripstein, 1999). Regarding the auditing standards of 
firms, although they have been adjusted recently to meet requirements of enhancing the role 
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of stock market in Egypt, they are still weak and do not meet the international standards. The 
initial steps towards more consistent auditing standards were started by approving the Capital 
Market Law No. 95 in 1992, which aims at reviving the Egyptian stock market. According to 
this law and its comprehensive executive regulations, listed companies were obliged to 
compile their financial data with International Auditing Standards. However, the enforcement 
of these requirements started in 1995 for all publicly listed firms (Abdelsalam et al., 2007). 
With respect to the banking sector, banks were required to disclose their financial statements 
based on the International Auditing Standards starting from 1997 (Bolbol et al., 2005). Due to 
the dominance of state-ownership and the slow progress of privatization during 1990s, few 
financial data about privatized firms, banks, and non-bank financial institutions are available 
during that period4. However, during 2000s, when a number of privatized firms were publicly 
listed and obliged to disclose their financial statements to the capital market authority, 
financial data about privatized firms can be obtained.  
The limitations of this study, however, bring forth various possible issues for future 
research in the relevant literature. The following is a list of various possible research 
improvements: 
1. Taking into consideration socioeconomic factors, in addition to privatization, in 
examining the development of financial sector will enhance the scope of the 
research in the relevant literature 
2. A more comprehensive dataset that includes detailed information about all 
privatization transaction is required. This will enable researchers for better 
elaboration of elements of privatization and its impact on the development of the 
financial sector 
                                                
4  Until 1996, three companies were fully privatized: Coca Cola Egypt, Pepsi Egypt, and Al-Nasr 
Boilers through strategic investors. In addition, ten companies were sold to their employees. Privatization began 
to gain momentum in the second half of 1996 (Khattab, 1999). 
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3. A more comprehensive indicator for the financial sector development is required 
that takes into consideration the ability of firms to access the financial sector 
4. Taking into consideration small size firms, in addition to medium and large size 
firms, will provide precise evidence regarding the impact of privatization on the 
financial sector development 
1.5. Organization of the Study 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. After introduction,  Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature regarding the development of the financial sector, financial institutions, 
choices of finance, and privatization.  Chapter 3 briefly describes main trends of evolution of 
privatization and the financial sector in developing countries, in particular Egypt.  Chapter 4 
demonstrates the theoretical framework of the empirical studies.  Chapter 5 provides the first 
empirical study that examines the impact of privatization on development of the financial 
sector and the financial structure in developing countries.  Chapter 6 provides the second 
empirical study that examines the choices of financing of privatized firms in Egypt.  Chapter 7 
provides the third empirical study that analyzes the impact of privatization on the lending and 
risk-taking behaviors of financial institutions in Egypt.  Chapter 8 shows the conclusion of the 
thesis. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
The development of the financial sector is a signal of economic stability and depth of 
private participation in an economy. Banks and stock markets represent two main pillars of 
the financial sector. Examining the development of the financial sector cannot be done 
without examining the evolution of banks and stock markets simultaneously.  
Stock market is a market where buyers and sellers of financial securities are met and, 
as a result, equilibrium prices of securities are determined through a Walrasian market 
clearing conditions (Boot and Thakor, 1997). This definition underlines the competitive 
nature of stock markets in providing required funds to firms. Four main functions of stock 
markets can be identified (Allen and Gale, 2000; Dailam and Atkin, 1990): pooling and 
efficient allocation of economic resources, solving of the principal-agent problem, managing 
and allocating of risks, and enhancing of economic growth. Stock markets play a major role 
in allocating funds from savers, who have surplus of funds, to investors, who have shortages 
of funds. This occurs when firms issue stocks in the primary market to expand their projects. 
Stock markets solve the principal-agent problem by allowing the separation of ownership 
from management through issuing shares. Stock markets are convenient sources for 
managing and allocating risk by providing various financial instruments with different degree 
of riskiness. Stock markets foster economic growth by mobilizing resources required for 
investment, particularly when businesses are exposed to a liquidity problem.  
With respect to banks, they play major role in enhancing economic growth by 
mobilizing savings required for investments. The development of banks is considered a signal 
of the development of an economy and is an indicator of efficient utilization of economic 
resources. Studies, e.g. Goldsmith, 1969 and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1999, solidly 
provided evidences on the importance of banks in sustaining economic growth and attracting 
investments. In addition, banks play major role in monitoring financial credibility of firms 
(Diamond, 1984). That is, they mobilize required savings for long-run economic growth. 
Furthermore, they transmit market information through their power of monitoring and 
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mitigating the moral hazard and the adverse selection problems. That is, banks sort firms 
based on their credit worthiness, which, in turn, helps in improving capital allocation and 
corporate governance. Given their importance, identifying factors that influence banks and 
stock markets helps in setting required policies for long-run economic growth. 
This chapter reviews theories that scrutinize the impact of fluctuations in real 
economic activities on the structure of the financial sector. In addition, it reviews the relevant 
literature regarding choices of financing between bank-based and market-based finance of 
firms. In a further part, the impact of privatization on the financial sector is reviewed. 
This chapter is organized into five sections. Section  2.1 summarizes the main 
contributions of major schools of economic thought regarding the development of the 
financial sector. Section  2.2 reviews main theories of the financial structure and main 
determinants of the development of financial sector. Section  2.3 reviews main contributions 
of choices of financing of firms. Section  2.4 reviews main contributions of the relationship 
between privatization and the financial sector. Finally, section  2.5 provides concluding 
remarks.  
2.1. The Financial Sector and the Choice of Financing by Schools of Economic 
Thought 
Throughout the twentieth century, different schools of economic thoughts responded 
to major changes in policies of the financial sector. These changes were represented in three 
major events: the creation of the classical gold standard, the rise of the Great Depression 
during 1930s, and the creation of a new international order resulted from the Marshall Plan 
after World War II. Accordingly, by modern standards, financial sectors became more 
institutionalized, especially after the creation of Bretton Woods’s institutions. After 1970s, 
that institutionalization allowed central banks to engage in regulating the banking sector and, 
in turn, led to flexibility in the flow of capital (Flandreau et al., 2003). On the other hand, the 
new international institutions, represented in the World Bank and IMF, began intervening 
significantly in the formulation of policies regarding the financial sector in developing 
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countries. The key elements of these policies included targeting inflation, enhancing 
competition, limiting state-control, and adopting large-scale privatization (Parker, 2006). In 
particular, privatization prompted governments to enhance free market principles and develop 
the financial sector, especially during 1990s5 (Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004).  
Responding to those major changes, school of economic thoughts developed theories 
that explain the influence of the new policies on the financial sector. In particular, they 
examined the impact of elements of the structural and adjustment policies on the financial 
sector. Schools of economic thoughts were split into two approaches. The first approach 
emphasized the dichotomy between the financial sector and real economic policies. The 
second approach emphasized their interconnection. The first approach was mainly adopted by 
the neoclassical School, while the second approach was mainly adopted by the neo-
Keynesian School. According to the latter view, understanding the fluctuations in the 
financial sector cannot be isolated from the changes in real economic policies.  
Although the neoclassical and neo-Keynesian Schools as orthodoxies introduced 
major contributions in that context, other schools as heterodoxies had their contributions, 
namely post-Keynesian School and the Monetarism. In their theories, the post-Keynesians 
incorporated the interaction between the financial sector and the real economic policies 
(Arestis, 1988; Hunt and Lautzenheiser, 2011; Isenberg, 1998). They showed a significant 
role of real economic policies in mitigating exogenous shocks that hit the financial sector 
                                                
5  Although privatization was shown before 1990s, the wide scale implementation of privatization 
occurred during 1990s as a result of the global changes in macroeconomic policies. An early example of the 
implementation of privatization was shown in the Federal Republic of Germany when the Adenauer government 
decided to sell a majority stake in Volkswagen and Veba during the early and mid-sixties through public 
offerings. Some attempts of privatization were also made in Chile and Ireland in the early 1970s. In the late 
seventies and early eighties, Thatcher’s government in the UK, implemented a well-known policy of 
privatization (Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004). 
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through their effect on the available money supply. Thus, they assumed endogeneity of 
money supply (Dow, 1998), which is determined by the demand of private sector rather than 
monetary authorities. They showed that the credit provided by the banking sector is a main 
determinant of the money supply, which, in turn, stimulates the economic growth (Arestis, 
1988). In this context, they proposed two general equilibrium models (Arestis and Driver, 
1988). The first general equilibrium model was illustrated by Eichner (1979) and Forman and 
Eichner (1981), while the second model was illustrated by Coutts et al. (1981). The first 
model identified four compositions of credit of the banking sector, i.e. credit to the public, 
industry, consumers, and the government. The main variable that affects these compositions 
is the amount of available liquidity, which is determined by the ratio of bank credits to 
deposits. The second model distinguished between the domestic credit expansion by banks 
and net acquisitions of financial assets by the private sector. The credit expansion depends on 
the changes in money stock and external finance. The money stock is endogenous and 
determined by short-term interest rates, inflation, real national output, and credit restrictions. 
The external finance depends on the position of external trade and capital flows. The net 
acquisition of financial asset depends on the difference between disposable income and 
expenditure of the private sector. Through the two models, one can observe the critical role of 
net acquisitions of financial assets by the private sector in affecting activities of the financial 
sector.  
With respect to the Monetarism, it considered banks as the only financial institutions 
that are interacted with vulnerability in real economic policies, while ignoring non-banking 
financial institutions (Gertler, 1988). Its ideas were built on the assumption that the demand 
for money is stable. This assumption helped in explaining the link between the financial 
sector and real economic policies. Accordingly, fluctuations in real economic activities, such 
as employment and growth, could be controlled by adjusting the money supply. Thus, the 
stability of money supply is an important factor in achieving economic growth stability 
(Tsoulfidis, 2010). By considering solely money as a key financial variable, the Monetarism 
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ignored the role of other financial institutions such as stock markets in influencing the 
economic growth.  
The following two sections review the dominant ideas arising out of the changes in 
the twentieth century that extended the understanding of financial systems structure and the 
choices of financing. In particular, the study reviews the contributions introduced by the 
neoclassical and the neo-Keynesian Schools, as having the most influential impact on recent 
finance studies.  
The Neoclassical School 
Responding to the previously mentioned global changes, the neoclassical School 
concerned about studies of the competitive market, market equilibrium, and theories of 
finance. Early studies of the integration between the financial sector and real economic 
policies were shown in the debt-deflation theory (Fisher, 1933), which attributed the 
fluctuations in output to the vulnerability of the monetary policy. Although the early 
contribution of the school showed an existence of interconnection between financial variables 
and real economic activities, its mainstream scholars contradicted with such interconnection. 
This was shown in their growth and investment theories, for instance Brock and Mirman 
(1972) in their model of the stochastic competitive equilibrium growth. In these theories, a 
dichotomy between financial and real variables was assumed.  
Such dichotomy resulted from their rigid assumptions concerning the economic 
system, which include rationality of economic agents, perfect foresight, capital market 
perfection, and selfless managers. Additionally, it assumed two more assumptions: the 
objective function of a firm is to maximize its net worth and firms operate with a linear 
homogenous production function (Coad, 2010). As a result, operating decisions of firms are 
independent of the choices of financing. That is, it does not matter whether a firm chooses to 
finance its investment using internal funds or external funds. In addition, it does not matter 
whether a firm choses bank-based or market-based finance. This was clear in the Modigliani-
Miller theorem in 1958 and Tobin’s Q model in 1969. The Modigliani-Miller theorem states 
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that finance is irrelevant to real activities of firms. Thus, the optimization problem of a firm is 
independent of its financial policies. The Tobin’s Q model assumes a perfect capital market 
and, as a result, financial policy of a firm is independent of its real decisions.  
Based on the previously mentioned assumptions, the Modigliani-Miller theorem, and 
Tobin’s Q model, the neoclassical originated their investment theory. In that theory, the 
market valuation of assets is the main determinant of the capital accumulation of firms 
(Fazzari et al, 1988). This is mainly a direct result from the assumption of the capital market 
perfection. As a result, the stock market affects the accumulation of physical assets through 
its effect on the rental price of capital (Bosworth et al. ,1975; Fazzari et al., 1988; Coad, 
2010). That is, price movements in the capital market affect the real decisions of firms 
through their impact on the future prospects of returns. This implies that stock prices 
accurately reflect expected profits of a firm. In this case, the market value is the only 
predictor, while the internal finance has no significant impact on the capital accumulation of 
firms. Thus, there exists a perfect substitutability among the different sources of finance.  
The rigidity of assumptions of the neoclassical theories motivated the neo-Keynesian 
School to build a theory based on assumptions that are more realistic. This is explained in the 
following section.  
The Neo-Keynesian School 
The shortage of the ex-schools, represented by the neoclassical economics and 
monetarism, pushed scholars of the neo-Keynesian School to introduce a new economic 
thought that explained the long-term depression that prevailed during mid-1960s (Tsoulfidis, 
2010). This was done through their introduction of a new explanation for the interaction 
between financial variable and real economic policies. Their main contribution initially 
existed in the demonstration of IS-LM model introduced by Hicks (1937), and its revision of 
the theory of the firm.  
The building of the IS-LM model was based on the Keynesian General Theory, which 
was introduced as a critique of the neoclassical theory (Hunt and Lautzenheiser, 2011), by 
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censuring the dichotomy between real and financial variables6. The IS-LM model is a general 
framework that explains the interaction between real and financial sectors. The model is 
based on assumptions of nominal rigidities and capital market imperfection. It provides an 
explanation for how financial sector reacts to major government policies such as monetary 
and fiscal policies  (Tsoulfidis, 2010). The extensions of the IS-LM model incorporated the 
role of credit in the real-financial nexus (Blinder, 1987; Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Stiglitz, 
1988). The incorporation of the role of credit was a direct result of the introduction of the 
hypotheses of rational expectations and credit rationing in an environment of principal-agent 
conflict, which contradicts with the neoclassical theory7 (Ardeni et al., 1999).  
Regarding their revision of the theory of the firm, they showed a strong linkage 
between financial and real decisions of firms (Dow, 1998). The neo-Keynesians showed that 
managers and shareholders have different objective functions. While shareholders seek for 
short-term gains from distributed dividends, the managers seek for maximizing revenues 
(Crotty, 1992). Accordingly, they attempted to relax the rigid assumptions of the neoclassical 
school by assuming irrationality of economic agents, existence of agency problem, 
asymmetric information, and imperfect capital markets. These assumptions allowed them to 
revise the theory of the firm. Their revision is close to the ideas of other schools of economic 
                                                
6 In the General Theory, Keynes proposed the liquidity preference theory, which distinguished between 
two kinds of demand for money: the demand for money for speculation and for transaction and precaution. The 
demand for money for speculation depends on the interest rate, while the demand for money for transaction and 
precaution depends on the income level. In his theory, the real interest rate equilibrates the real saving and the 
real investment (Samules et al., 2007). The real interest rate is affected by the level of monetary expenditure in 
an economy. Thus, the level of monetary expansion is non-neutral (Ardeni et al., 1999) and is considered a main 
determinant of the economic growth (Tsoulfidis, 2010). 
7 Although neo-Keynesians contradict with the neoclassical ideas about the interaction between real 
and financial variables, they showed a possibility of such dichotomy in the long-run (Sawyer, 1998). 
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thought, e.g. the monetarism, in the context of monetary variables interact with real economic 
fluctuations; However, it is different in the context of these fluctuations are due to credit 
channel not monetary channel (Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983; Dow, 1998). That is, the 
investment decision by a firm is constrained by the available fund provided by financial 
institutions (Ardeni et al., 1999). Contrary to the neoclassical school represented in 
Modigliani-Miller theorem and Tobin’s Q model, they showed that financial decisions 
depend on the degree to which firms are willing to involve into riskier activities. That is, risk-
taking firms prefer market-based finance, while risk-adverse firms prefer bank-based finance 
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993). Therfore, the financial policy is an important determinant of 
investment of a firm and, in turn, the choice between internal funds and external funds has 
differnet impacts on investment decisions (Rotheim, 1998). Accordingly, the neo-Keynesians 
concluded an existence of imperfect substitution8 among sources of finance (Dow, 1998). The 
rationale behind such conclusion is that firms usually do not take into consideration signals of 
stock markets when taking their investment decisions even if those signals are different from 
the evaluation of firm’s fundamentals. Thus, the neo-Keynesians introduced what is so-called 
a fundamental-Q as an alternative to the neoclassicl Q-theory. Blanchard et al. (1993) 
supported this rationale by showing that price fluctuations in stock markets are not always in 
line with firms’ fundamentals (Shiller, 1981). Thus, valuation of stock markets has a limited 
role in real decisions of firms. Various recent empirical studies, e.g. Akerlof (1970); Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), supported the existence of such conclusion.  
                                                
8 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) emphasized one of aspects of imperfect substitution. They showed that 
despite of advantages of market-based finance, efficient firms have more tendency to finance their investments 
using bank-based finance. This is because there is a tendency of less efficient firms to borrow from the market. 
In a rational expectation environment, this gives a negative signal in the financial market and therofore reduces 
the market values of these firms. 
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2.2. Theories of Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial Structures 
Studies on the development of financial sector, e.g. Levine (2002), have examined the 
importance of bank-based as opposed to market-based financial structures. There is no 
consensus, among these studies, that either bank-based or market-based financial structure is 
better for economic growth. Those studies highlighted issues of the long debate regarding the 
impact of financial variables on real economic activities, what is so-called real-financial 
nexus, which refer to the interaction between real economic activities, such as investment and 
output, and financial variables.  
The interaction between real economic activities and financial variables can be 
referred to seminal works of Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1936) for their contributions in 
explaining causes of the great depression during 1930s (Gertler, 1988). Since the great 
depression, scholars explained how financial variables influence economic growth. At this 
time, the focus in writings was the explanation of the impact of poor financial markets in 
deteriorating output, which causes later bankruptcies in financial institution and, in turn, 
causes further deterioration in output (Gertler, 1988). According to Fisher, two causes of 
output deterioration: the high indebtedness of borrowing classes that directly causes a wave 
of bankruptcies and the redistribution of wealth from debtors to creditors that lead to a cut in 
their future investments, a deterioration in the balance sheet of borrowers, a further decline in 
output, deflation and a debt-deflation series (Gertler, 1988). On the other hand, by discussing 
the general equilibrium in an economy, Keynes provided the economic literature with the first 
general framework that correlates financial variables with real economic activities (Chiarella 
et al., 2009). In the Keynesian theory, financial variables and real economic activities are 
integral and work together through the liquidity preferences' channel. That integration occurs 
when interest rate affects real economic activities. In addition, the confidence in financial 
system is a key factor for avoiding vulnerability in the real output (Minsky, 1975; Gertler, 
1988). According to Keynes “the rate of interest on money plays a peculiar part in setting a 
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limit to the level of employment, since it sets a standard to which the marginal efficiency of a 
capital-asset must attain if it is to be newly produced” (Keynes, 1936, p. 222). 
Following the Keynesian General Theory, Hicks (1937) emphasized the role of both 
money and interest rate in causing vulnerability in real economic activities (Gertler, 1988). 
Hicks portrayed this relationship through the IS-LM model, which shows the relationship 
between investment and money supply. His model simplified the Keynesian general 
equilibrium, which helped in examining the simultaneous determination of income, money, 
and interest rate in an economy. Hicks showed that changes in income represented in changes 
in the propensity of investment and consumption cause a shift in the IS curve, while changes 
in the monetary policy represented in money and interest rate cause a shift in the LM curve. 
In a further step, Gurley and Shaw (1955) introduced the idea of the significance of 
credit supply, instead of money supply, in causing fluctuations in real economic activities. 
They showed that in early stages of development, money supply provided by banks has a 
major influence on real economic activities. In later stages of development, money cannot be 
used as a proxy for financial development, while the role for credit emerges as a key source 
of funding aggregate investments. Thus, the overall financial capacity is very important in 
explaining the real-financial interaction (Gertler, 1988).  
Modigliani and Miller (1958), following Gurley and Shaw (1955), proposed a new 
contradicting approach to the Keynesian theory. They showed that financial variables are 
independent of real economic activities (Gertler, 1988). Their approach was the milestone of 
the neoclassical theories such as the neoclassical investment theory (Hall and Jorgenson, 
1967) and the stochastic competitive equilibrium growth theory (Brock and Mirman, 1972). 
Those theories ignored capital market considerations and other financial variables when 
solving investment decisions of firms (Gertler, 1988).  
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) pointed out the existence of a strong correlation 
between money market and output. They considered money as a key financial factor at the 
expense of the role of all other aspects of financial system, e.g. financial markets. 
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Accordingly, banks are the only financial institutions that participate in vulnerability of real 
economic activities (Gertler, 1988).  
Starting from Tobin (1969), the influence of financial markets on real economic 
activities was examined. In his theory, Tobin showed that decisions of sales and investments 
of firms are affected by activities in stock market, measured by stock market value through 
what is so-called Tobin’s Q9. Tobin’s Q, which measures the investment opportunity in the 
financial market, became a major determinant of investment in the neoclassical investment 
theory. According to him, “In a complete equilibrium the two sides of the economy –one is 
tempted to call them “financial” and “real” –must be mutually consistent. That is, the 
financial inputs to the real side must reproduce the assumed values of the real inputs to the 
financial side.” (Tobin, 1969, p. 16). Although Tobin provided a deep explanation to the 
interaction between financial market and output, he did not conclusively show the causal 
direction of this interaction. 
During 1970s, Mishkin (1978) and Akerlof (1970), among others, adopted new 
research questions and assumptions that are more realistic. Mishkin examined the relationship 
between output and financial variables on consumer side through his analysis of output and 
consumer balance sheets (Gertler, 1988). Akerlof introduced “Lemons” problem, which 
distinguishes between low-quality products and good-quality products in the financial sector 
based on the assumption of the information asymmetry. In addition, the assumption of market 
imperfection was introduced as a contradiction to assumptions of Tobin’s Q theory. The latter 
two assumptions became a milestone of neo-Keynesian school in their analysis of the real-
financial nexuses (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Williamson, 1987). 
                                                
9 Tobin’s q theory depends on the neoclassical assumptions of the existence of perfect capital markets. 
Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the value of a firm scaled by the replacement value of its physical assets 
(Spiller, 1985). 
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Building on the previous two assumptions, Blanchard (1981) scrutinized the impact of 
the financial market on real activities by incorporating the idea of Tobin (1969) in the 
conventional IS-LM model. Blanchard adjusted IS-LM model to examine the direct link 
between changes in monetary policy and the financial market. The main difference between 
his model and the conventional IS-LM model is his emphasis on the interaction between 
financial market and output instead of the interaction between interest rate and output. He 
showed an existence of bidirectional relationship between activities of the financial market 
and real activities, in which asset values are the main determinants of aggregate output, which, 
in turn, is considered the main determinants of asset values. Although Blanchard introduced a 
detailed explanation of the real-financial interaction, he did not conclude unquestionably that 
causality relationship between financial variables and real economic activities exists. Yet, he 
explained the main channels that connect the two sides. In addition, he showed that variations 
in financial markets and output could be explained by changes in fiscal policies. According to 
him, “The stock market is not the “cause” of the increase in output, no more than the increase 
in the output is the cause of the initial stock market change. They are both the results of 
changes in policy.” (Blanchard, 1981, p. 141) 
 The contribution of Blanchard paved the way to the examination of the role of other 
financial institutions in the conventional IS-LM. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) adjusted the 
IS-LM model to include factors that affect banking sector loans in their three-asset model, 
which describes the relationship between money, bonds, and loans. In addition, they analyzed 
the impact of government policies such as monetary and fiscal policies on the equilibrium in 
the loan market. Their contribution enriched the relevant literature with a loan-oriented 
framework. In the same line of research, Bernanke and Gertler (1987) contributed to the 
bank-lending channel by assuming endogeneity between financial structure and real 
economic activities (Gertler, 1988).  
Another shift in analysis of real-financial nexus occurred by utilizing behavioral 
theories, which show that banks are working well in an environment of Laissez-Faire policy 
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and solid regulations10. For instance, Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) emphasized on that the 
importance of government intervention in providing deposit insurance against liquidity risk 
within the financial sector (Gertler, 1988). In addition, Thakor (1996) pointed out that 
screening activities, credit rationing, and debt restructuring by banks are mechanisms that 
restrict the role of financial sector in the real-financial nexus. 
Table  2-1 summarizes the main theoretical contributions to the understanding of real-
financial nexus.  
Table  2-1 Main Contributions in the Field of the Real-Financial Nexus 
The Financial System 
Keynes (1936): the Real-Financial Interaction 
Hicks (1937): IS-LM model 
Market-Based Finance Bank-Based Finance 
− Tobin (1969):Stock Market Value (F) (M) 
− Bernanke and Blinder (1988): Bank-Lending 
Channel (M) (F) 
− Blanchard (1981): Adjusted IS-LM model (F) 
(M) 
− Bernanke (1992): Bank-Lending Channel (M) 
− Darrat (1988): Fiscal and Monetary Policy on 
Stock Market Return (M)(F) 
− Kashyap et al. (1993): Loan- Supply Channel (M) 
− Schwert (1989): Causes of Stock Market 
Volatility (M) (IP) (OM) 
− Bernanke and Gertler (1995): Bank Lending 
Channel (M) 
− Boyd et al.(2001): Inflation-Financial System 
Relationship (M) 
− Kashyap and Stein (2000): Bank-Lending 
Channel (M) 
− Beltratti and Morana (2006): Macroeconomic 
and Stock Market Volatility (M) (OM) 
− Boyd et al.(2001): Inflation-Financial Channel 
(M) 
− Jansen et al. (2008): Interdependence between 
Monetary and Fiscal Policies (F) (M)  
Note: F is fiscal variables, M is monetary variables, IP is industrial production, and OM is other 
macroeconomic variables. 
In addition to the shift in the assumptions and theoretical frameworks of the real-
financial nexus, there is another shift in the scope of the empirical analyses. Two main 
empirical analyses were concerned in recent empirical studies (Levine, 2002; Beck and 
Levine, 2004): the analysis regarding the nature of the relationship between bank-based and 
                                                
10 Examples of these regulations are screening and monitoring by the banking sector and regulations 
against liquidity risk and financial panic (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Friedman and Schwartz, 1986; Gorton 
and Haubrich, 1986). 
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market-based financial structures and the analysis regarding the importance of each financial 
structure. Regarding the nature of the relationship, the existing theory presents an ambiguous 
conclusion about the nature of such relationship (Beck and Levine, 2004). This is because of 
the multifaceted aspects represented in different regulations and institutions of the financial 
system.  
Despite the remarkable role of both sources of finance in mobilizing savings required 
for capital accumulation, three different views regarding the relationship between the two 
sources of finance can be identified (Song and Thakor, 2010). The first view sees the 
relationship is competitive (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Allen and 
Gale, 1999). According to this view, stock markets compete with banks in financing growth. 
The second view sees a complementarity between stock markets and banks in fostering 
economic growth (La Porta et al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2002; Antoniou et al., 2008). The 
latter view emphasizes the substantial role of laws and regulations in stimulating activities 
within the financial sector and the development of one source of finance helps in improving 
the other. The third view sees a co-evolutionary between both sources of finance (Merton and 
Bodie, 1995; Levine, 2002). According to this view, both sources grow together and the 
overall financial arrangements are important in financing growth.  
Regarding the importance of banks and stock markets in financing real economic 
activities, there are two main views (Levine, 2002): bank-based view and market-based view. 
Each view has its own solid reasons for supporting and favoring one of these sources of 
finance. The bank-based view gives more priority to banks as sources for mobilizing savings 
especially in the early stages of development. In addition, banks play a major role in 
improving capital allocation, good monitoring, good corporate governance, and investment 
efficiency (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984). In addition, banks eliminate 
market inefficiencies that result from the existence of non-diversifiable risk in an economy 
(Allen and Gale, 2000). On the other side, the market-based view emphasizes the importance 
of stock markets in allocating capital. This is because of their crucial role in the transmission 
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of information about creditworthiness of operating firms (Boot and Thakor, 1997). In 
addition, they allow firms with less probability of financial distress and higher 
creditworthiness to raise funds easily by facilitating asset-risk management through 
diversification of financial portfolios of firms (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1997; Song and Thakor, 2010).  
Determinants of the Development of the Financial Sector  
Analyzing factors that affect the development of the financial sector is essential for 
scrutinizing the economic development (Garcia and Liu, 1999). Based on the previously 
mentioned theoretical models of real-financial nexuses, different factors that influence the 
development of the financial sector were identified. Although the role of the financial sector 
in enhancing the economic development was well studied theoretically and empirically, 
identifying factors, particularly macroeconomic variables, which affect the development of 
the financial sector, was received less attention in empirical studies, with few exception, e.g. 
Boyd et al. (2001), Chinn and Ito (2006), and Hauner (2009). This is due to the 
multidimensional nature of the financial system (Garcia and Liu, 1999) and the variation of 
those factors across countries. In addition, although there are many common characteristics 
among banks and stock markets, there are various prudential regulations that influence their 
activities. This makes the identification of determinants of the financial sector a complicated 
task. For the purpose of this review, these factors can be classified into three main categories. 
The first is monetary and fiscal policies. The second is macroeconomic conditions. The third 
is the institutional background.  
Monetary and Fiscal Policies 
Monetary and fiscal policies affect the development of the financial sector 
development through their influence on market returns. The impact of monetary policy, such 
as interest rates, money supply, and the inflation rate, on the development of the financial 
sector received substantial attention in the relevant literature (Patelis, 1997; Boyd et al., 2001). 
Monetary policies work as a stabilizer for activities of the financial sector. They help 
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diminish the degree of fluctuations of the financial sector during its business cycles. 
Furthermore, they play a major role in affecting returns, efficiency, performance, and growth 
of stock markets. The following empirical studies showed that interest rate is a key factor in 
changes of stock market returns. Jensen (1996) attributed the ability of predicting stock 
market returns to the monetary policy. Thorbecke (1997) emphasized the response of the ex-
ante and ex-post stock returns to monetary shocks. Kholodilin et al. (2009) demonstrated the 
impact of monetary policies on the stock market in the Euro Area. They found that monetary 
policies negatively affect the stock returns on aggregate and sectoral levels. That is, the 
higher the monetary expansion, the lower the overall stock market returns and the sectoral 
returns. Mala and Reddy (2007) found a statistically significant impact of interest rates on 
stock market volatility by utilizing the GARCH model. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) claimed 
that the largest source of volatility of equity prices is due to the monetary policy. Ologunde et 
al. (2006) in their study on the Nigerian stock market found that interest rates had a positive 
and statistically significant impact on stock market capitalization. In addition to interest rate, 
inflation significantly affects activities of stock markets. Huybens and Smith (1999) 
illustrated the impact of inflation on the stock market efficiency. They advocated that higher 
levels of inflation result in less efficient stock markets. Boyd et al. (2001) found a negative 
and statistically significant impact of monetary shocks, which are measured by inflation rate, 
inflation change, and the standard deviation of inflation rate, on the development of the 
banking sector and stock markets.  
Although monetary policy is necessary for predicting stock market returns, it is not 
sufficient factor. Thus, the impact of fiscal policy on the development of the financial sector 
should be included (Patelis, 1997). Differently from monetary policies, fiscal policies have 
relatively less interests literary, and if any, it concentrates on the developed economies. Fiscal 
policies include changes in government expenditures, revenues, and public debt. In his 
empirical study, Darrat (1988) emphasized the significant impact of fiscal policies on the 
financial sector development. He examined the influence of budget deficit used as a proxy for 
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the fiscal policy on growth rate of stock prices in Canada. He found that the lagged values of 
fiscal policy are key determinants of changes of growth of stock prices. He added that the 
better forecasting of the stock returns by investors, which depends on the lagged values of 
fiscal policy, would be diminishing overtime. In turn, this will lead to a market that is more 
efficient. From another perspective, La Porta et al. (2002) and Hauner (2009) showed that the 
public debt hinders the development of the financial sector by reducing the efficiency of 
banks in countries where governments rely mainly on banks in funding loses of their state-
owned firms.  
Furthermore, there might be an interdependence of both monetary policies 
implemented by central banks and fiscal policies implemented by the government on the 
development of the financial sector. Hancock (1989) re-examined the influential role of both 
monetary and fiscal policies on the development of the financial sector. By distinguishing 
between anticipated and unanticipated money growth and budget deficit in USA, he found a 
strong correlation between stock returns and both of fiscal and monetary policies. In addition, 
he found a binding efficient market hypothesis when considering both of fiscal and monetary 
policies. By utilizing semi-parametric model, Jansen et al. (2008) examined the impact of the 
interaction between the fiscal and monetary policies on the US stock markets. They found 
that the impact of fiscal deficits significantly constraints the impact of the monetary policy on 
stock market returns. That is, the impact of the monetary policy, as an impact factor on stock 
market development, depends largely on the fiscal policy.  
Macroeconomic Conditions 
Macroeconomic factors have substantial impact on the development of the financial 
sector. Commonly used factors include income, gross capital formation, foreign direct 
investment, industrial production, and liberalization. Poor performance of these factors, 
directly or indirectly, impedes the performance of financial institutions. Only recently, 
empirical studies, as shown below, have given attention to the impact of macroeconomic 
determinants on the development of the financial sector.  
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By utilizing Cadeleron-Rossell behavioral structural model, Yartey (2008) examined 
macroeconomic determinants of stock market development using a panel of 42 emerging 
markets during the period of 1990-2004. He analyzed the impact of income level, domestic 
investment, private capital flows, and stock market liquidity on stock market capitalization. 
He found a positive and statistically significant impact of stock market liquidity on market 
capitalization within countries with low-developed banking sector and a negative and 
statistically significant impact of stock market liquidity on market capitalization within 
countries with high-developed banking sector. In addition, he found a positive impact of 
income and investment levels on market capitalization and a positive correlation between 
private capital flows and market capitalization. By utilizing data from 15 industrial and 
developing countries, Garcia and Liu (1999) demonstrated the impact of saving and 
investment rates on the development of stock markets. They found a statistically significant 
impact of those rates on stock market capitalization.  
Notwithstanding the substantial role of economic growth on the development of the 
financial sector, empirical studies (Levine and Zervos, 1998b; Thakor, 1996; Levine et al., 
2000; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004) have no conclusive results regarding the causal 
relationship between the development of the financial sector and the economic growth. 
Garcia and Liu (1999) and Yartey (2008) found the economic growth is an important 
determinant of financial sector development. Calderon and Liu (2003) tested the causality 
between economic growth and financial sector development. They found that financial 
development enhances economic growth and, simultaneously, growth enhances the 
development of the financial sector. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) found the economic growth 
is a major factor that affects the demand for credits provided by the banking sector. Baltagi et 
al. (2009) found that the GDP per capita is a key determinant of the banking sector 
development. In their semi-parametric model, Jansen et al. (2008) found the industrial 
production growth has a positive, but statistically insignificant, impact on stock returns. 
However, the impact of the lagged industrial production growth on stock returns is a 
31 
 
 
 
 
statistically significant. Contrary, other empirical evidences showed that there is no strong 
correlation between financial development and economic growth, e.g. Gries et al. (2009).  
Other macroeconomic factors include financial liberalization and the degree of 
openness of a country. Trade and financial liberalization affects the development of the 
financial sector by enhancing the integration with the international capital markets, which, in 
turn, has a positive effect on transparency and accountability within the financial sector. 
Levine and Zervos (1998a) demonstrated the impact of the degree of openness measured by 
capital control liberalization on the stock market development. They found a strong positive 
association between the capital liberalization, from one side, and the size, liquidity, and 
volatility of stock markets, from another side. Do and Levchenko (2004) and Huang and 
Temple (2005) found a positive and statistically significant impact of trade openness on 
financial development. Baltagi et al. (2009) examined the impact of trade and financial 
openness on the development of the financial sector in developed and developing countries. 
They utilized two main indicators as a measure of financial openness. The first indicator is 
the financial globalization constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), which is measured 
as the volume of foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP. The second indicator is 
capital account openness constructed by Chinn and Ito (2006), which is measured as a binary 
dummy that equals unity in case of absence of capital account restrictions. They found that 
both trade openness and financial liberalization are statistically significant determinants of 
the development of the financial sector. However, financial liberalization solely may harm 
the financial sector if not accompanied with other economic reforms. Consistent with Baltagi 
et al. (2009), Naceur et al. (2008), found a positive impact of financial liberalization on stock 
market development under a certain economic and regulatory conditions in the Middle East 
and North Africa. These conditions involve precedent comprehensive financial reforms 
before liberalizing the financial sector.  
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Institutional Background 
Institutional factors affect the development of the financial sector through their effect 
on regulations that govern financial institutions. Institutional factors include improvements in 
legal systems, property rights of shareholders, corporate governance, and accounting 
standards. The extent to which the financial sector can sustainably grow depends on 
prevailing legal environment in a country (La Porta et al., 1999; Beck et al., 2000). Levine 
and Zervos (1998a) analyzed the impact of the legal system on enhancing market size, 
liquidity, and volatility through their positive impact on the dissemination of the information. 
They found emerging countries with better information disseminations, accounting standards, 
and investor protections have large, liquid, and more volatile stock markets. By examining 
cross-country differences, Levine et al. (2000) found a strong correlation between legal and 
accounting reforms, from one side, and boosting activities of the financial sector, from 
another side. Claessens and Laeven (2003) emphasized the role of protecting property rights 
in enhancing banking sector financing. Billmeier and Massa (2007) found a positive impact 
of the quality of institutions and financial sector development in Middle East and Central 
Asia. By utilizing indicators included in the International Country Risk Guide as measures of 
institutional quality, Baltagi et al. (2009) found a positive impact of institutional quality on 
the private credit but a negative impact on the stock market capitalization.  
2.3. The Choice of Sources of Financing 
Two different approaches explain the relationship between choices of financing and 
real decisions of firms. The first approach supports the neutral effect of choices of financing 
on real decisions of firms. This approach is based on the assumption of capital market 
perfection. This implies a perfect substitutability among different sources of finance. That is, 
it is neutral for a firm to choose internal, bank-based, or market-based finance. That neutrality 
is supported by Modigliani-Miller Theorem (1958), which is the cornerstone of the 
neoclassical theory. The second approach supports the interdependence between choices of 
financing and real decisions of firms. In this approach, firms compare among alternative 
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sources of finance based on a hierarchical or a tradeoff pattern, which contradicts the 
neoclassical hypothesis of perfect substitutability among sources of finance 11 . The 
hierarchical pattern implies that internal finance has a cost advantage over external finance 
and bank-based finance has a cost advantage over market-based finance (Fazzari et al., 1988). 
The tradeoff pattern implies that firms choose among different sources of financing after 
comparing their costs and benefits.  
Based on the two patterns, two main theories were developed in order to explain 
financing decisions by firms: the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984); Fama and 
French, 2005) and the tradeoff theory (Jensen, 1986). The two theories presume insufficiency 
of internal finance because of budget constraints and heavy burdens of initial setup cost. As a 
result, firms resort to external sources of finance represented in bank-based and market-based 
finance.  
With respect to the pecking order theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) added assumption 
of asymmetric information in scrutinizing choices of financing of firms. According to the 
theory, managers are well informed about firm’s value compared to shareholders. The theory 
shows that firms choose among different sources of financing in an ascending order. That is, 
if sufficient internal funds exist, firms will prefer internal than external finance. If external 
finance is required, firms will prefer bank-based than market-based finance (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). The rationale of the theory stems from the preference of firms for safer 
financial instruments than riskier ones.  
                                                
11 Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that there are two motivations for a firm to invest. The first 
motivation occurs when investment increases net profits of owners. The second motivation occurs when 
investment increases the market value of the firm. Under assumption of perfect capital market, authors showed 
that both market value and net profits are independent of their financial policies. This implies that regardless of 
possible alternative sources of funds, firms are going to invest more, if the rate of return on investment is larger 
than or equal the average cost of capital. 
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Regarding, the tradeoff theory, (Jensen, 1986) added assumptions of the agency 
theory, which describes the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders 12 . 
According to the tradeoff theory, firms mix bank-based and market-based finance in their 
financing decisions, by comparing costs and benefits of each source. Bank-based finance 
mitigates agency cost. In addition, it has advantage in terms of tax reductions for firms with 
large cash flow and low growth prospects. However, it causes higher bankruptcy cost. On the 
other hand, market-based finance increases market value of firms with low cash flow and 
high growth prospects. However, it increases the agency cost of firms.  
In addition to the asymmetric information assumed in the pecking order theory and 
agency problem assumed in the tradeoff theory, the market imperfection and uncertainty were 
assumed in modern corporate finance theories. Hite (1977) developed a general framework 
that analyzes links between the choices of financing and real decisions of firms under 
conditions of uncertainty. He found that firms optimize their financing and real decisions, 
such as investment simultaneously. Fazzari et al. (1988) modified the pecking order and 
tradeoff theories by incorporating assumptions of market imperfections and uncertainty, 
which contradicts assumptions of Tobin’s Q theory that shows investment opportunities are 
influenced by stock market signals, which, in turn, affects the market value of a firm. 
Therefore, stock market signals are not important determinant of financing decision. The 
latter assumptions led to the emphasis of the fragile impact of signals of the stock market on 
financing decisions of firms.  
The latter assumptions directed Blanchard et al. (1993), who were influenced by 
Bosworth (1975), to introduce the fundamental-Q theory as a replacement for the Tobin’s Q. 
By investigating the impacts of stock market signal on financing decisions, the authors found 
                                                
12 This conflict mainly arises because the cash payout to shareholders reduces available resources that 
are under control of managers. As a result, a cost of monitoring by the capital market rises when managers 
require new capital (Jensen, 1986). 
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a limited influence of market valuation on financing decisions. In addition, the market 
valuation might deviate from fundamentals when average and marginal profit fluctuate. 
Fundamental-Q theory emphasized the substantial impact of firms’ fundamentals, such as 
operating performance, on financing decisions. As an alternative measure to Tobin’s Q, the 
authors used the ratio of the sum of after-tax profits, interest payments, and depreciation 
divided by capital valued at replacement cost. Given that managers are better informed about 
a firm than shareholders are, they concluded that fundamental-Q, as a measure of investment 
opportunities, performs better than Tobin’s Q13. Moreover, Tobin’s Q might get statistically 
wrong sign. This is because, in an environment of credit market imperfections, profit 
significantly affects financing decisions of firms through its effect on cash flows. Cleary 
(1999) supported the previous conclusion by showing that in an environment of incomplete 
information and imperfect capital markets, firms’ fundamentals matter more for financing 
decisions than stock market signals.  
As mentioned, two theories explain the interdependence between the choice of 
sources of financing and real decision. Nevertheless, what are the channels that cause such 
interdependence? Literary, two channels link financing and real decisions of firms. The first 
channel is a balance sheet channel (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). The second channel is a 
bank-lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Romer and Romer, 1990; Friedman and 
Kuttner, 1993; Kashyap et al., 1993; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The two channels, which 
are represented in modern corporate finance theories, take into consideration four main 
assumptions: informational asymmetry, costly state verification, adverse selection, and moral 
hazard (Berger and Udell, 1998).  
                                                
13 The market valuation represented in Tobin’s q could be relevant to financing decisions under two 
unrealistic assumptions: if the sole function of stock markets is to the value of the firm and if shareholders never 
sell their shares (Blanchard et al., 1993). 
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In the balance sheet channel, financing decisions depend on healthiness of the balance 
sheet of a firm. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) showed that firms with relatively higher net 
worth are able to get funds from stock markets, while firms with a relatively low net worth 
depend on banks. Moreover, the financial healthiness of the banking sector affects their 
supply of funds. Bougheas et al. (2006) theoretically modeled the relationship between 
characteristics of firms and choices of financing. They emphasized the importance of these 
characteristics when firms compare between the bank-based and market-based finance. They 
concluded that smaller firms and firms with lower value of intangible assets are more likely 
to depend on bank-based finance. In addition, they showed that changes in monetary policy 
and economic cycle affect their access to external finance.  
In the bank-lending channel, financing decisions depend on the cost of obtaining 
external funds, which is mainly affected by size and age. This is because larger firms have 
easier access to external finance, while small firms are financially constrained. This is due to 
the limited ownership structure and lack of information disclosure within small and young 
firms (Berger and Udell, 1998; Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008). Small firms are less 
transparent in terms of information, which discourages banks to finance them. This is due to 
two main factors. First, the ownership structure of small and young firms reduce the agency 
problem through which firms are owner-managed. Second, the degree of informational 
deficiency, which results from inadequate audited financial statements, hinders small firms 
from access to external finance (Berger and Udell, 1998). The latter factor leads to negative 
evaluation of creditworthiness of firms. Accordingly, small and young firms depend more on 
internal finance. In a recent analysis, Torre et al. (2010) demonstrated the bank-lending 
channel of small and medium firms. They found that both small and large banks are eager to 
finance small and medium firms and those firms are their strategic clients. Their conclusion is 
contradictory to the consensus that states that only small banks finance small and medium 
firms, while large banks abstain from financing them. That new view stems from changes in 
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funding capacity of banks because of the evolutions in technologies, risk management, and 
new financial innovation within the banking sector.  
2.4. Privatization and the Economic Activities 
Distinguishing the role of the state and the private sector in economic activities was a 
debatable issue in modern economic thinking. According to Megginson and Netter (2003), 
the state ownership dominated most of economic activities after World War II. This was due 
to nationalization campaigns implemented in order to meet the needs of the reconstruction 
and development during that period. However, after three decades, countries encourage 
private participation in economic activities representing some aspects of privatization14.  
 During 1980s, a number of countries adopted structural reforms in order to tackle 
financial losses of state-owned firms (SOEs) and enhance competition and free market 
principles15. Consistent with these reforms, governments started transferring ownership from 
state to private entrepreneurs and deregulating SOEs in order to improve management and 
productivity before divestiture (Kikeri et al., 1994; Megginson and Netter, 2001). In late 
1980s, the second conservative government leaded by Thatcher in United Kingdom 
                                                
14  There are few exceptions during 1950s and 1960s. During that period, West Germany, United 
Kingdom, and Taiwan adopted limited actions of privatization by divesting some state-owned properties 
(Megginson and Netter, 2003; Parker, 2006).  
15 Before 1980s, it was not clear when researchers had started using the concept of privatization. In the 
context of divestment of public properties, the concept of “denationalization” was used to reflect selling the 
state-owned firms to private entrepreneur. It is claimed that Peter Drucker used the concept of privatization in 
early 1969 when he published his book “the Age of Discontinuity”. However, this does not mean that the 
transfer of ownership from state to private entrepreneur emerged once the modern economy had established. It 
was found that both of state ownership and private ownership were as old as the ancient world, i.e. in ancient 
Near East, ancient Greece, ancient Egypt, and ancient Rome (Megginson and Netter, 2003). 
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announced the first comprehensive plan of privatization16. Following United Kingdom, a 
number of countries in Western Europe during 1990s adopted massive privatization plans 
(Parker, 2006). Constantly, privatization was adopted all over the world in developed and 
developing countries covering all economic sectors.  
Because of the increased private participation during 1990s, privatization became a 
debatable issue among economists and politicians in modern economic thought. This led to 
three debating views. The first view favors planned economies and state intervention. This 
view supports the state intervention in all economic activities and believes that the role of the 
state should be maximal. In addition, the private sector should not involve in providing 
strategic services. The second view favors laissez fair policies and privatization. This view 
supports restriction of state intervention. In addition, private sector can participate in all 
economic activities including public utilities such as water, sanitation, prisons, energy etc. 
The third view compromises the above-mentioned views by showing that the role of the state 
and private sector should be complementary. In addition, public services could be provided 
by both the state and private sectors in forms of public private partnership. 
Privatization is a process of transferring ownership or control rights from state to a 
private entrepreneur17. Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) showed that under the state ownership, 
                                                
16 In general, the mainstream economists, e.g. Bortolotti, et al. (2003), Willner (2003), Hodge (2006) 
and Parker (2006), refer to the massive use of privatizations as practical phenomenon started in 1980s after the 
second conservative government leaded by Thatcher in UK announced a comprehensive privatization plan 
(Parker, 2009). 
17 It is important to differentiate between “privatization” and other close concepts such as liberalization, 
deregulation, and marketization. Liberalization means, “The establishment of competitive product markets” 
(Robinson, 2003, p. 45). Deregulation means, “The removal of government rules that hinder competition” 
(Robinson, 2003, p. 45). Marketization refers to the transformation of state-owned firms into state-owned 
corporations constructed in the first stage of divestiture (Trupiano, 1993). 
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the state intervenes directly in major aspects of production and financial decisions of firms. 
Under private ownership, private creditors and financial agents have most of the control over 
the firm. In the latter case, governments have a limited intervention in the operation of private 
firms, which includes setting regulations aiming at diverting resources from private firms for 
better serving of social interests and rescuing private firms from bankruptcy. Furthermore, 
privatization can be extended to include all aspects of private intervention in all stages of 
production processes, which includes a transfer of control rights and cash flows from state 
toward private entrepreneurs (Bortolotti et al., 2003; Boyck et al., 1996). In addition, it can 
involve all aspects of contracting agreement between state and private entrepreneur (Dudley 
et al., 2006). From the previous definition, all economic activities can be privatized such as 
production, delivery of services, and monitoring of production. This was the emphasis of the 
economic thinking during 1990s and 2000s, when private sector participation covers 
approximately all economic sectors, such as transportation, railways, energy, 
communications, finance, and manufacturing.  
Countries adopt privatization as prescription of the Bretton Woods institutions in 
order to tackle the macroeconomic disequilibrium and to enhance the financial sector. 
Motivations for privatization are different among countries. In general, a government tends to 
privatize in order to reduce public deficit, alleviate external debt, and enhance activities of the 
financial sector. By undertaking privatization, a government takes into consideration its 
various consequences on the economy such as unemployment and investment climate. 
Literary, privatization has various impacts on an economy. It can significantly influence 
economic development, operating and financial performance of firms, and financial sector 
development. The following section briefly previews these impacts.  
Privatization and Economic Development  
Privatization can positively enhance economic development of a country through its 
effects on budget deficit, competition, and investment. Privatization helps in recovering 
imbalances of the budget deficit caused by losses of state ownership. This results from the 
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inefficiency of SOEs in utilizing economic resource. In addition, it enhances the market 
competition by allowing new entries of private firms. Kikeri, et al. (1994) emphaized the 
negative influences of state ownership on market competition, even if market failure does not 
exist. By suppressing state monopoly in operating industries, market competitions 
significantly improves within those industries (Segal, 2004). Resulting from its positive 
impact on market competition, privatization encourages local and foreign investments and 
increases the aggregate demand, which, in turn, enhances institutional innovation and market 
development (Torino, 2003). As a result, competition among investors increases leading to 
better utilization of economic resources, which creates a healthy environment for both local 
and foreign investment. In their study about Egypt, El-Mahdy et al. (2007) showed that 
privatization increases the overall efficiency and competition by better utilization of capital 
and human resources. In addition, by enlarging the consumer access of varieties of better 
services resulted from privatization, the well-being of people is improved (Segal, 2004). This 
increases the long-run economic growth rate and spurs the economic development. 
Notwithstanding its positive outcomes, privatization has various economic and social 
costs (Hastings and Levie, 1983). Particularly in developing countries, state control is 
considered a way of protecting the social obligation of the central government in providing 
public services, especially the following services. First, those are critical to the public interest 
such as defense and internal security. Second, those are important to manage essential public 
services such as sanitation, education, and healthcare facilities. Third, those are considered by 
the private sector as non-profitable or non-operational projects such as infrastructure (Kotler 
and Lee, 2007). Thus, the economic costs from privatization are represented in reducing the 
provision of the previously mentioned public services. In addition, negative economic 
outcomes from privatization may result from selling profitable state-owned firms. Given that 
the private entrepreneur will refuse to buy losing firms, governments opt for selling only 
profitable SOEs. This may result in inefficiency in utilizing economic resources (Hastings 
and Levie, 1983). From developmental perspectives, the social costs of privatization may 
41 
 
 
 
 
exceed the expected economic efficiency. Those social costs are represented in increasing 
number of idles in an economy, widening the income gap between rich and poor, and 
reducing available social services, which is previously provided by the state prior to 
privatization. Empirical evidences showed various aspects of accelerating violence between 
labors and government as a result of privatization (Hastings and Levie, 1983). However, the 
economic and social costs associated with privatization can be mitigated by good regulations 
introduced before privatization. That is, the extent to which privatization could spur 
economic development in an economy is constraint by the quality of those regulations 
(Trupiano, 1993).  
To sum up, privatization has positive as well as negative outcomes for economic 
development. The positive outcomes stem from the role of privatization in curing 
macroeconomic imbalances caused by the increasing budget deficit. Once the government 
starts divestiture, the budget deficit will slightly decrease. In addition, the quality of provided 
goods and services will be enhanced by improving efficiency of utilizing economic resources. 
Moreover, privatization improves the investment climate in an economy. This attracts new 
investors and improves the national credit ratings of a country. The negative outcomes stem 
from its economic and social costs, which can be mitigated by introducing good regulations 
prior to privatization.  
 Privatization and Performance of Firms 
According to the fundamental theorem of privatization (Sappington and Stiglitz, 
1987), the performance of privatized firms exceeds SOEs if externalities or natural 
monopolies resulted from the market failure dilemma do not exist (Yoder et al., 1991). There 
are two main reasons of the deficiency of the SOEs in operation. The first reason stems from 
the inertia in operation of SOEs (Chong et al., 2003). This is caused by the imperfect 
monitoring, poor incentives of managers, and poor corporate governance that characterize 
SOEs. According to Boycko et al. (1996) and Chong et al. (2003), that inertia results from the 
ineffective production plans and the political economy aspect in running SOEs, which can be 
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shown in the conflict of interest and the soft budget constraint in managing SOEs. Managers 
aim at maximizing their political capital even if they make inefficient decisions. This leads to 
inefficient strategies related to employment, production, and investments. By pursuing 
privatization, an effective restructuring of firms can be achieved. Such restructuring improves 
operating and financial efficiencies of privatized firms. This can be observed in a number of 
empirical evidences, which are reviewed as follows. 
By surveying 452 Russian small firms privatized during 1992-1993, Barberis et al. 
(1996) found that the Russian firms implemented a significant positive restructuring after 
privatization. In particular, they replaced old human capital by new human capital. This 
caused an improvement in the operating performance of firms by introducing new ideas and 
replacing the old capital. However, authors suggested that the extent to which privatization 
can lead to improvement in restructuring depends on the existence of free operating financial 
markets and good corporate governance. By testing the impact of privatization on Turkish 
Cement industry, Okten and Arin (2006) found a significant improvement in productive 
efficiency of privatized firms. This improvement was due to reductions in the workforce. In 
their analysis, they distinguished between divestiture of SOEs to local or foreign investors. 
They found that only firms divested to foreign investors achieved significant improvements 
in investment and capital intensity. In their study, El-Mahdy et al. (2007) found privatization 
increases investment opportunities, output, net sales, and exports of privatized firms in Egypt. 
This was because privatized firms modernized their management by establishing new 
departments for research and development. In addition, privatized firms restructured their 
usage of labor. Although a number of privatized firms fired labors, particularly in financial 
and managerial departments, they hired more efficient and educated ones. In addition, the 
study found an increase in the real wages of labors. By replacing less skilled for high skilled 
labors, who gain higher wages, the negative impact on employment was reduced. 
However, these gains from privatization may depend on the economic environment 
surrounding privatized firms and the industry, where privatized firms belong. Kikeri et al. 
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(1994) set three main obstacles to the good performance of privatized firms. First, there is a 
tendency of central governments to put various constraints in front of the private sector 
competing SOEs. Second, there is a crowd-out effect in the credit market, which occurs when 
large SOEs compete privatized firms in obtaining credit, especially in large-scale industries. 
Third, a high cost of restructuring firms after privatization, which is resulted from the 
misallocation of production inputs by SOEs before divestiture, increases operating costs of 
privatized firms. The previous obstacles imply that the expected efficiency gains from 
privatization are conditional to the adopted economic policies and the type of industry, where 
privatized firms belong. This can be observed in a number of empirical evidences, which are 
reviewed as follows.  
Robinson (2003) limits the potential benefits of privatization based on trade policies 
such as the degree of liberalization. Parker (2006) lists a number of conditions necessary for 
the efficacy of privatization: the existence of corrupt-free government, the existence of 
competitive product and capital market, and the existence of efficient state regulations. In a 
recent study, Cook and Uchida (2008) doubted the expeced improvement in operating and 
fianncial performance of privatized utilities in developing countries. In their analysis, authors 
compared the performance measures of a sample of privatized utilities and non-utilities. By 
utilizing non-parametric tests, the study found a reduction in the profitability, sales, 
employment, and capital investment among privatized firms. However, the reduction in 
profitabilty was statistically significant among privatized utilities but statistically insignifcant 
among non-utilities. The reduction in sales was statistically insignificant among all privatized 
firms. The reduction in number of emplyees was higher among privatized utilities compared 
to privatized non-utilties. The privatized utilities witnessed highest reductoin in capital 
investment. In addition, the study found a statistically insignificant reduction in the sale 
efficiency among privatized non-utilites. On the other hand, 67% of privatized utilities 
witnessed rises in their sale efficiency. 
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To sum up, privatization helps in improving efficiency of privatized firms. However, 
the gains from privatization are constrained by regulations and economic policies set up after 
privatization. In number of industries, the ability of privatized firms to perform efficiently 
was suspected. That is because free markets cannot perform well in those industries without 
government intervention in order to cure market failures. 
Privatization and Financial Sector Development 
The dominance of the SOEs caused inefficiency in operations of the financial sector. 
Such inefficiency resulted from the dependence of SOEs on state-owned banks in financing 
their losses causing a distortion in the financial sector. This can be observed from increasing 
volumes of bad loans within the banking sector (Chong et al., 2003). Countries that started 
resolving the structural imbalances within the financial sector adopted certain reforms within 
their financial system. One of these reforms is liberalizing their financial services through 
privatization in order to encourage the flow of private capital. As mentioned in the previous 
section, privatization improves efficiency of operating firms in different economic sectors. 
Moreover, privatization has a significant impact on performance of the financial sector. 
Boutchkova et al. (2000) considered the period of 1980s and 1990s as golden age of the 
financial market. This is due to the significant increases in volume of trades of international 
stock markets. Such increases in volume of trades were due to the gradual increase in 
privatization around the world, particularly during 1990s. By adopting share issue 
privatization and privatizing state-owned banks in a number of developing countries, 
international financial markets were activated.  
Two impacts of privatization on the financial sector can be distinguished: the impact 
on development of stock markets and the impact on development of the banking sector. With 
respect to stock markets, privatization directly affects liquidity, volume of trades, number of 
listed companies, and market capitalization. Subrah et al. (1999) showed that privatization 
increases liquidity in stock markets, through public share offering. This is due to two main 
reasons. First, it increases diversification of investment because of the improved 
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informational efficiency resulting from enhanced market competition. Privatization improves 
access to costless and useful information in stock markets through what is so-called 
‘serendipity’ effect resulted from increased number of listed firms. This leads to higher 
assimilation of information and liquidity within stock markets. Second, privatization 
mitigates the political risk and increases market confidence, which, in turn, encourages firms 
to list their shares in stock markets. The analysis of the impact of privatization on the stock 
market is observed in a number of empirical evidences, which is reviewed as follows.  
Boubakri et al. (2007) emphasized the significant influence of privatization on 
developing local stock markets. By using a sample of 61 emerging and developed markets 
during 1980-2003 and utilizing 2SLS, they found that neither method of privatization nor the 
intensity of privatization has a contemporaneous effect on the development of stock markets. 
Despite that, they found a statistically significant inter-temporal effect of intensity of 
privatization on the size and liquidity of stock markets in both emerging and developed 
markets. However, they found a statistically significant inter-temporal effect of privatization 
method on the size and liquidity in emerging markets but no inter-temporal effect in 
developed markets. In a different line of research, Abdel-Shahid (2002) assessed the stock 
market performance of privatized firms in Egypt during the period of 1995-2001, by 
comparing their market prices with offering prices. The author found a fall in price valuation 
of majority of privatized firms. Farinós et al. (2007) examined the stock market performance 
of privatized firms during the period of 1993-2001 in Spain. By utilizing the calendar-time 
portfolio approach, they compared the performance of privatized firms with privately owned 
firms. They showed that privatized firms were underpriced as a way to increase number of 
shareholders. Moreover, they did not find any statistically significant abnormal returns of 
privatized firms. Moreover, privatization could indirectly enhance the development of local 
stock markets through its impact on market confidence and resolution of the political risk. 
Perotti et al. (2000) showed that privatization gradually improves trust and increases 
confidence in the financial system. Together with financial liberalization, these conditions 
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enhance the growth of stock markets. Perotti and Oijen (2001) showed that privatization 
indirectly affects liquidity of stock markets through its effect on credibility and political risk. 
It provides signals of financial credibility and builds up public confidence regarding activities 
of operating firms, which, in turn, affect the growth of stock markets.  
While the previous studies showed causality from privatization towards the 
development of stock markets, the development of stock markets can promote privatization 
progress. Bortolotti et al. (2003) showed that deep and liquid stock markets facilitate 
divestiture of large SOEs, which, in turn, helps in further evolution of stock markets leading 
to more privatization progress.  
Although the previous studies showed a positive impact of privatization on local stock 
markets, its impact might be constrained by good regulatory and institutions in a country. In 
their study, Bortolotti et al. (2003) emphasized that the impact of privatization on stock 
markets is limited in civil law countries, which are characterized by poor protection to 
shareholders, a powerful banking system, and less developed stock markets.  
With respect to its impact on the banking sector, privatization significantly affects the 
banking sector through its influence on performance of divested banks. Although the impact 
of privatization on the performance of divested banks is debatable, the empirical evidences of 
such impact are limited, particularly in developing countries (Otchere, 2005). While a 
number of existing empirical evidences support improvement of financial and operating 
performance of privatized banks, other declined such improvement. The changes in financial 
and operating performance stem from the impact of privatization on efficiency, capitalization, 
lending behavior, and risk-taking behavior of banks. In addition, privatization affects the 
stock market performance of privatized banks in terms of changes of their returns in stock 
markets. Not only privatization affects the performance of privatized banks, but also it has a 
significant influence on other operating banks, what is a so-called competitive effect or 
positive information effect hypothesis introduced by Otchere (2005). The changes in the 
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performance of privatized banks is observed in a number of empirical analyses, which are 
reviewed as follows. 
Beck et al. (2005) examined the changes in performance and lending behavior of nine 
privatized banks in Nigeria during 1990-2001. The study found a statistically significant 
improvement in performance measured by profitability. Moreover, the study found that 
privatized banks that invest more in government bonds and other non-lending activities 
outperform banks that mainly depend on lending activities. Boubakri et al. (2005) examined 
the post privatization performance of 81 banks from 22 developing countries. By utilizing 
univariate and regression techniques, they found a significant marginal improvement in their 
operating performance measured by profitability and credit risk exposure of privatized banks 
over time. Despite that, they showed that on average privatized banks have lower economic 
efficiency and solvency ratio compared to state-owned banks. By distinguishing between 
domestic and foreign ownership, they found that privatized banks controlled by domestic 
investors are exposed to higher risk and have lower economic efficiency. Alternatively, 
privatized banks controlled by both domestic and foreign investors are exposed to lower risk 
and have higher economic efficiency. Otchere (2005) examined both operating and stock 
market performance of privatized banks in middle and low-income countries. In their 
qualitative analysis, the author found a statistically significant marginal improvement in 
operating performance of privatized banks measured by capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management efficiency, profitability, and employment. In addition, privatized banks are 
better capitalized compared to rival banks. Despite that, public shares of privatized banks lag 
behind the average market and rival indices. With respect to the competitive effects 
hypothesis, the author found a negative and statistically significant association between 
privatization and abnormal returns of rival banks. On the other hand, other empirical 
evidences showed that privatization has a negative impact on operating performance of banks. 
Bonin et al. (2005) assessed the impact of privatization on efficiency of banks in eleven 
Eastern European countries during 1996-2000. By applying stochastic frontier estimation, 
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they found that privatization could not guarantee the improvement in efficiency measured by 
profit and cost functions. By comparing efficiency of privatized and state-owned banks, they 
found no statistically significant difference. In addition, the remaining banks expected to be 
privatized are less efficient than those are already privatized. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that governments in transition countries start first privatizing best performing 
banks. In Egypt, Omran (2007) examined the operating and financial performance of 13 
privatized banks during the period of 1996-1999. By utilizing a non-parametric test and bank-
level regression, they found a significant deterioration in some profitability and liquidity 
ratios of privatized banks. They found a statistically significant decline in both return on 
equity ratio, as a measure of profitability, and securities to total assets ratio, as a measure of 
liquidity. In addition, there is a decline, although statistically insignificant, in other measures 
of profitability, capital risk, and asset quality such as return on equity ratio, loans to total 
capital ratio, and asset growth ratio. On the other hand, there exists a slight increase, although 
statistically insignificant, in asset quality, measured by the loan losses to total loans ratio, and 
capital risk, measured by the capital to asset ratio. By comparing the performance of 
privatized banks and other operating banks, they found that privatized banks lag behind other 
private banks but they outperform majority of state-owned banks.  
Regarding the impact of privatization on lending behavior of banks, Clarke et al. 
(2005a) analyzed the impact of privatization on sectoral lending and foreign bank entry in 
Argentine during 1990s. By utilizing bank-level regression, they found a temporary reduction 
in available credit in provinces that privatized their banks. Over time, available credit in those 
provinces grows up to their pre-privatization level. In addition, it was observable that those 
provinces have higher level of foreign bank entry compared to other provinces. With respect 
to the sectoral lending, they showed that privatized bank reduced their lending for the 
agriculture and mining sector.  
Although the previous studies showed a potential impact of privatization on the 
performance of banking sector, it may depend on the prevailing institutional and regulatory 
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backgrounds of a country. As Boubakri et al. (2005) showed the prevailing macroeconomic 
and institutional conditions have an important influence on the performance of banks after 
privatization.  
To sum up, privatization affects the development of the financial sector through its 
impact on activities of stock markets and banks. Privatization affects stock markets directly 
through its impact on liquidity, volume of trades, number of listed companies, and market 
capitalization and indirectly through its impact on market confidence and resolution of the 
political risk. With respect to the banking sector, there is no common consensus on the 
expected gains from privatization. It affects the operating and financial performance of banks 
through its impact on efficiency, capitalization, lending behavior, and risk-taking behavior. 
Notwithstanding the potential impacts of privatization on the financial sector, those impacts 
might be dependent on the prevailing macroeconomic and institutional backgrounds of a 
country.  
2.5. Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has reviewed the main contributions of schools of economic thought 
concerning the real-financial nexuses. Mainly, two schools have been reviewed: the neo-
classical School and neo-Keynesian School. In addition, the chapter has reviewed main 
contributions regarding the development of the financial sector, choices of financing of firms, 
and privatization.  
The neo-classical School built their views on the contributions of Modigliani-Miller 
theorem and Q-theory, which are based on assumptions of perfect capital market, rational 
expectations, and optimization of firm’s value. This led them to ignore the impact of financial 
variables on real decisions of firms. In addition, those assumptions clearly ignore the 
possibility of capital market imperfections and the existence of asymmetric information and 
selfless managers. By ignoring the latter assumptions, the school disregarded the fact that 
mangers and shareholders are different in their information about the firm. While managers 
are well informed about their firm, the shareholders are less informed. By assuming a perfect 
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capital market, this implies that capital markets are efficient and the changes of stock market 
prices could be used as signals for real decisions of firms. However, recent evidences showed 
an inefficiency of capital market in both developed and developing countries. By assuming 
selfless managers, who seek for optimizing firm’s value, the school ignored the possible 
conflict that might arise between managers and shareholders. By doing so, the school 
assumed that managers are working for the sake of shareholders and their main target is to 
maximize the market value of a firm as emphasized by Crotty (1992). Although, on the 
empirical level, its assumptions might be applicable to a number of developed countries, in 
developing countries, where intensity of capital market imperfection is higher, those 
assumptions are inapplicable. For instance, a number of studies, e.g., Akerlof (1970), 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), provided evidences on invalidity of the neoclassical 
assumption of perfect capital market and the absence of asymmetric information. Although 
the Q-theory has many theoretical advantages, other models empirically perform better, for 
instance models that are based on the sales accelerator principle, e.g. Abel and Blanchard 
(1986) and Bierlen and Featherstone (1998). The latter models are based on the idea that 
firm’s fundamentals are more important.  
On the other hand, the neo-Keynesian School showed that the financial sector and real 
activities are integral. They work together through the liquidity preferences' channel. In 
addition, the school attracted the attention to the significant role of credit markets, instead of 
money supply assumed by the Monetarism, and financial markets as an important factor in 
their analysis of real-financial nexuses. In addition, the school provided a more appealing 
theory of a firm, which takes into consideration more realistic assumptions such as agency 
conflict, imperfect capital market, and asymmetric information. Through those assumptions, 
they emphasized the important interaction between choices of financing and firm’s 
fundamentals such as the profitability. Although the neo-Keynesian theory is based on 
assumptions that are more realistic, it has deficiencies, which are emphasized by Sawyer 
(1998). One of their deficiencies is their assumption of exogeneity of the money stock. 
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Although the latter assumption helped them in introducing models of real-financial 
interactions, it ignores the fact that money is driven by the private sector demand.  
Regarding the performance of firms with private and state ownership, various 
researchers supported the improved efficiency of privatized firms after divestiture. Two main 
reasons explain the deficiency of the SOEs: the inertia in operation of SOEs and the political 
economy aspect in running SOEs. However, the performance of SOEs can be improved if 
they adopted the same tools that the private firms use in marketing, purchasing, leadership, 
entrepreneurship, strategy, and operations as discussed in Kotler and Lee (2007). According 
to the fundamental theorem of privatization, the performance of privatized firms exceeds 
SOEs in an environment where externalities and natural monopolies do not exist. Although 
this was supported by a number of empirical evidences, there exist a number of exceptions in 
cases of strategic industries in France, Britain, Indonesia, and other few countries as 
discussed in Kikeri et al. (1994). 
Although privatization could improve allocation of resources, it may cause various 
social costs. Moreover, a number of conditions restrict the potential gains from privatization: 
the existence of market competition and perfect information as emphasized by Bortolotti and 
Siniscalco (2004). On the empirical level, there may be an overestimation of the gains from 
privatization. As, those gains may result from different sample selection bias. There are three 
sources of biases in the relevant empirical research as discussed in Chong et al. (2003). The 
first bias results from the choice of politicians to privatize the healthiest SOEs. The second 
bias results from the focus on developed countries in analysis. The third bias results from the 
exclusion of sampled firms that were bankrupted in post privatization periods.   
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Chapter 3. Evolution of Privatization and the Financial Sector in 
Developing Countries: Facts and Trends 
In developing countries, the state ownership dominated most of economic activities 
such as investment, industrial production, international trade, and the banking and insurance 
services. During late 1980s and early 1990s, number of developing countries, among them 
Egypt, adopted structural reform programs in order to tackle the macroeconomic imbalances 
faced by their economies. In Egypt, the foremost outcome from the nationalization campaigns 
after 1952 revolution was the dominance of state-owned firms over majority of economic 
sectors during 1950s and 1970s. However, starting from early 1990s, Egypt followed major 
trend in developing countries by adopting privatization in order to enhance activities of the 
private sector in major economic sectors, in particular the banking and non-bank financial 
services. As its target to enhance activities within the financial sector, Egypt adopted various 
privatization methods since the first half of 1990s, among them share issue privatization. By 
adopting those methods, Egypt was able to promote competition, activities, and performance 
of its financial market, operating banks, and non-bank financial institutions. That was shown 
in increasing values of domestic credit, market capitalization, returns on financial assets, and 
liquidity ratios.  
This chapter reports recent trends of the evolution of privatization and activities 
within the financial sector in developing countries, particularly Egypt. This chapter is 
organized as follows. Section  3.1 briefly reports recent trends of privatization and the 
financial sector in developing countries. Section  3.2 details recent trends of privatization and 
the financial sector in Egypt. Finally, section  3.3 provides concluding remarks.  
3.1. Privatization and Evolution of the Financial Sector in Developing Countries 
Major privatization transactions were implemented in developing countries in early 
1990s because of the prescription of the World Bank and IMF to tackle their macroeconomic 
imbalances. The divestiture of SOEs was one of major policies that were adopted by 
developing countries in order to alleviate, mainly, their budget deficits.  
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In developing countries, the upper middle-income countries followed by lower 
middle-income countries implemented most of privatization transactions during the period of 
1988-2008 with average proceeds per country estimated at USD 584.7 and USD 363 million, 
respectively. That represented about 78 % of the total average privatization proceeds 
occurred during that period. As shown in Table  3-1, the average growth rates of privatization 
proceeds were higher among the upper middle-income group with an estimated growth rate at 
6.5% compared to the other income groups. This was mainly due to the high growth rates of 
privatization proceeds in Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia, Turkey, and Venezuela.  
Table  3-1 Average Privatization Proceeds and Associated Growth Rates by Income 
Groups in Developing Countries, 1988-2008 
Income group Proceeds (USD Million) Growth Rate (%) 
High 228.9 5.3 
Upper Middle  584.7 6.5 
Lower Middle 362.7 4.2 
Low 31.8 5.2 
Total 1208.1 5.3 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the World Bank Privatization Database, 2010 
The average annual proceeds per country of privatization during 1990s were 
estimated at USD 223.1 million. As shown in Figure  3-1, although the average annual 
proceeds per country were low during the first half of 1990s, they gradually increased during 
the second half of 1990s before starting to decline significantly in early 2000s.  
Figure  3-1 Average Annual Privatization Proceeds per Country in Developing 
Countries, 1988-2008  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Development Indicators, 2010 
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The average annual privatization proceeds per country during the first half of 1990s 
were estimated at USD 175 million, while they were estimated at USD 372 million during the 
second half of 1990s. Compared to the period of 1988-2000, the average annual privatization 
proceeds per country doubled during 2000-2008, which exceeded USD 405 million. This was 
because of the large annual proceeds of privatization achieved during the second half of 
2000s, which were estimated at USD 663 million during that period.  
Regarding privatization methods, in the early stages of the implementation of 
privatization, they were mainly captured by using initial public offering and voucher schemes. 
This was shown in the large volumes of proceeds using those methods during the period of 
1988-1995. The large usage of voucher schemes was due to the large number of privatization 
transactions implemented among Eastern European countries. During the second half of 
1990s, as Table  3-2 shows, privatization proceeds were mainly captured by using the 
following methods: auction, bids, tenders, and initial public offering. Although most of 
privatization proceeds were captured by using auctions, bids, and tenders during 1990s, 
which were estimated at USD 100 billion, during 2000s, privatization proceeds were mainly 
captured by using initial public offering and secondary market, which were estimated at USD 
114 billion. 
Table  3-2 Average Privatization Proceeds in Developing Countries by Method, 1988-
2008 
Privatization Method (USD Billion) 1988- 1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 
Auction, Bids, and Tenders 12.45 87.14 11.15 4.23 
Concessions, Lease, Future Investments 17.57 14.30 18.58 30.57 
Employee Share Association  0.04 0.16 0.07 0.00 
IPO and Secondary Market 42.20 40.77 15.01 99.32 
Debt-Equity Swap 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Partial Share Issue Sales 0.16 0.84 1.15 78.72 
Private and Direct Sale 6.77 36.18 38.68 0.85 
Voucher 41.06 6.61 20.23 9.31 
Others 13.81 32.42 29.37 47.76 
Total 134.27 218.42 134.22 270.76 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Bank Privatization Database, 2010 
Table  3-3 reports major countries that adopted privatization since its start. In those 
countries, privatization proceeds evolved significantly from USD 0.69 billion during 1988-
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1994 to USD 1.6 billion and USD 1.9 billion during the periods of 1995-2000 and 2001-2008, 
respectively.  
Latin American countries, namely Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil had the larger 
volumes of proceeds, while Russia, Egypt, and Morocco had the lowest volumes of 
privatization proceeds during the first half of 1990s. On the other hand, during the second 
half of 1990s, the largest volumes of privatization proceeds were captured by Latin American 
countries, namely Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. In addition, China and a number of eastern 
European countries increased their privatization transactions significantly during the second 
half of 1990s. Although China, Russia, Turkey, Check Republic, and Egypt had witnessed a 
modest start of privatization plans, they crucially increased the volumes of transactions 
during 2000s. 
Table  3-3 Average Privatization Proceeds in Selected Developing Countries, 1988-
2008 
Country (USD Billion) 1988-1994 1995-2000 2001-2008 
Argentina 3.098 3.816 0.001 
Brazil 1.294 11.932 0.947 
Chile 0.183 0.286 0.130 
China 0.907 4.087 20.057 
Colombia 0.105 0.992 0.619 
Czech Republic 0.366 0.628 1.489 
Egypt 0.073 0.662 1.406 
Hungary 0.815 1.480 0.890 
India 0.628 0.770 1.197 
Indonesia 0.283 0.711 0.351 
Malaysia 0.948 0.595 0.279 
Mexico 3.881 1.278 0.761 
Morocco 0.089 0.765 0.726 
Pakistan 0.220 0.075 0.944 
Peru 0.454 0.875 0.141 
Philippines 0.458 0.163 0.500 
Poland 0.288 2.722 1.241 
Russia 0.033 1.393 6.522 
South Africa 0.331 0.318 0.095 
Thailand 0.149 0.379 0.340 
Turkey 0.358 0.832 3.983 
Venezuela 0.353 0.600 0.000 
Total 0.696 1.607 1.937 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the World Bank Privatization Database, 2010 
Figure  3-2 shows the relationship between the changes of ratios of market 
capitalization of stock markets as percentages of GDP and the changes of ratios of domestic 
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credit provided by the banking sector to the private sector as percentages of GDP. For a 
number of countries, increases in ratios of the market capitalization were associated with 
increases in ratios of the domestic credit. 
Figure  3-2 Association between Average Ratios of Credit to Private Sector and 
Market Capitalization in Developing Countries, 1988-2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Development Indicators, 2010 
Figure  3-3 and Figure  3-4 show the relationship between the changes in average ratios 
of the privatization proceeds as percentages of GDP and the changes in average ratios of both 
the market capitalization and the domestic credit provided to the private sector.  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Development Indicators, 2010 
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For a number of countries, increases in average ratios of the privatization proceeds as 
percentages of GDP were associated with increases in average ratios of the market 
capitalization as percentages of GDP, as shown in Figure  3-3. In addition, for a number of 
countries, increases in average ratios of the privatization proceeds as percentages of GDP 
were associated with increases in average ratios of the domestic credit as percentages of GDP, 
as shown in Figure  3-4. This could be explained by the increases in the participation of the 
private sector associated by adoption of privatization in economic activities.  
By exploring variations of ratios of privatization proceeds among different income 
groups durring the period of 1988-2008, as shown in Figure  3-5, it is noted that average ratios 
of privatization proceeds as percentages of GDP were highest in the high-income group, 
followed by the upper middle-income group. Notably, the higher the income, the higher the 
ratio of privatization proceeds. The average ratios of privatization proceeds as percentages of 
GDP were estimated at 6.9% and 6.7% for the high-income group and the upper middle-
income group, respectively. 
Figure  3-5 Average Ratios of Domestic Credit, Market Capitalization, and 
Privatization Proceeds as Percentages of GDP by Income Groups, 1988-2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Development Indicators, 2010 
On the other hand, financial indicators, which are measured by ratios of market 
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income and upper middle-income groups. The high-income group achieved the highest 
domestic credit ratio provided to the private sector, which was estimated at 46%. It was 
followed by upper middle-income and lower middle-income groups, which was estimated at 
45% and 45%, respectively. With respect to the market capitalization ratio, the upper middle-
income group achieved the highest ratio, which was estimated at 42%, followed by the high-
income group, which was estimated at 35%. 
3.2. Privatization and Evolution of the Financial Sector in Egypt 
The Evolution of the Privatization in Egypt 
Although before 1952, the private sector controlled major economic activities in 
Egypt, a crucial change in the structure of the Egyptian economy occurred after the 
revolution of 1952, which changed the ruling system from a kingdom into a presidential 
system. This led to a drastic change in the economic system in favor of state intervention. The 
government controlled the majority of the economic activities, in particular within the 
strategic industries. This led to a creation of large numbers of state-owned firms that were 
characterized by losses, inefficiency, and lack of competitiveness.  
A step towards encouraging the participation of the private sector in economic 
activities was taken in mid-seventies when Egypt adopted an open door policy, i.e. the so-
called “Infetah”. This policy led to improvements in various macroeconomic indicators, such 
as GDP growth, and major liberalization of activities of the financial sector. In addition, as 
shown in Figure  3-6, Egypt witnessed a significant increase in the contribution of the private 
sector in GDP.  
Despite that, the economy in late eighties suffered from major macroeconomic 
imbalances in the mid-eighties. That was represented in low output growth rates, high budget 
deficit, high inflation rate, and deficit in the balance of payment. All those imbalances 
compelled the government to accept the prescription of the World Bank and IMF for 
economic reform and adjustment program in early 1991. Then, the government started 
implementation of the privatization in late 1990. 
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Figure  3-6 Percentages of the Contribution of the Private Sector and State in GDP, 
1982-2010 
Source: Ministry of State for Economic Development, Egypt, 2010 
 According to the Egyptian Ministry of Investment (2008), the government announced 
five main objectives from privatization. The first objective was to improve operating 
efficiency of firms. The second objective was to enhance the contribution of the private 
sector in GDP. The third objective was to restructure the remaining state-owned firms 
regarding their financial policies, technical activities, and managerial capacities. The fourth 
objective was to increase revenues of the central government by stopping the incremental 
financial losses of SOEs, which were resulted from the increased number of loss-making 
SOEs18. The fifth objective was to develop the financial sector. 
Consistently, the government distributed privatization proceeds in order to achieve the 
previously mentioned objectives. Regarding the objective regarding increasing revenues of 
the central government, as shown in Table  3-4, most of the proceeds were directed to the 
ministry of finance and then to the bank of debt settlements. These proceeds were estimated 
at 45% and 31%, respectively. These proceeds were used mainly to finance the budget deficit 
and debt arbitration. 
                                                
18 According to PCSU (2002), by 1990, there were around 56 SOEs classified as loss-making firms. 
Their accumulated volume of losses was about LE 2.37 billion and their indebtedness was about LE 47 billion. 
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
%
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Private Conribution State Contribution
60 
 
 
 
 
Table  3-4 Privatization Proceeds and their Percentages by Usages in Egypt since 1991 
The Institutions Proceeds (LE Billion) Percentage 
Transfer to Ministry of Finance 6.628 45% 
Bank of Debt Settlements 4.488 31% 
Early Retirement, Pensions, and Salaries 2.683 18% 
Advances to Holding Companies for Restructuring 0.554 3% 
Balance of Restructuring Fund 0.307 2% 
Total 14.660 100% 
Source: PCSU (2002) 
Regarding the objective of restructuring the remaining state-owned firms, 5% of the 
proceeds were directed to restructure SOEs before their divestiture in forms of advances to 
holding companies and balance of restructuring fund. The main purpose of those amounts of 
proceeds was to deregulate SOEs by gathering them under the control of main holding 
companies. Notwithstanding the efforts done for restructuring the remaining SOEs, they 
suffered from losses. Table  3-5 shows losses of the state-owned firms in main holding 
companies. During 2005-2008, the largest volumes of the losses were borne by textile and 
fabric industries, which were estimated, on average, at LE 2061 million. Followed by textile 
and fabric industries, the chemical and mineral industries were borne big volumes of losses, 
which were estimated, on average, at 155 million and 117 million, respectively. 
Table  3-5 Annual Losses of State-Owned Firms in Egypt, 2005-2008 
The Holding Company (LE Million) 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mineral industries 159.5 86.4 64.7 158.8 
Textile and fabric industries 2184.4 2298.2 1750.9 2011.3 
Chemical industries 163.5 195.0 112.4 147.7 
Food industries 17.4 12.2 20.5 20.7 
Pharmaceutical industries 0.0 24.5 0.0 0.0 
Building and Construction 88.8 65.0 86.4 72.5 
Tourism, hotel and cinema 143.8 143.5 2.8 0.0 
Sea and land transportation 104.2 142.5 93.4 80.2 
Retail or commercial industry 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 2861.7 2967.3 2131.0 2491.1 
Source: Business Sector Information Center, Egypt, 2010 
Other proceeds were directed to face the socio-economic cost of privatization 
represented in compensations of the early retirement scheme, which were estimated at 18% of 
the privatization proceeds, as shown in Table  3-4. 
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In order to achieve the previously mentioned objectives, various legal reforms were 
required. Thus, number of new laws, sub-laws, and amendments were enacted in order to 
replace the old ones19, which hindered the participation of the private sector in the economy. 
According to PCSU (2002), the first step was the Law No. 203 in June 1991, which paved the 
way for privatization. According to that law, the notion of holding companies was introduced 
as a replacement for state-owned firms. It was determined that 314 state-owned firms were 
under authority of 27 holding companies, with total assets about LE 104 billion and LE 1.08 
million employees. Egypt aimed at expanding privatization by implementing it to all state-
owned holding companies and their subsidiaries20. Figure  3-7 shows the number of state-
owned firms and associated number of holding companies since 1992. All those state-owned 
firms were candidates for privatization. According to Awadalla (2003), Eighty-five firms that 
operated in strategic industries were banned from privatization. The second step was the 
approval of the Capital Market Law No. 95 by the parliament in 1992. Accordingly, the 
Capital Market Authority was established in order to monitor the legal, institutional, and 
operational rules of the stock market. 
 
 
                                                
19 Among those laws was Law No. 258 in 1956, which organized nationalization of private entities, and 
Law No. 20 in 1957, which introduced the notion of public projects (PCSU, 2002).  
20  According to the Egyptian Ministry of Investment (2008), the state-owned firms, which were 
candidates for privatization, were subjected to the following three criteria. The first criterion included all 
companies that were owned by the holding companies and established under the Law No. 203 in 1991. The 
second criterion included all companies that possessed shares owned by the holding companies or their 
subsidiaries, which were established under the Law No. 159 in 1981 and the Law of Investment Incentives, No. 
8 in 1997. The third criterion included all properties that were possessed by the holding companies and 
subsidiaries such as land, production lines, etc. 
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Figure  3-7 Annual Changes in the Total Number of Holding Companies and State-
Owned Firms in Egypt, 1992-2009 
Source: Business Sector Information Center, Egypt, 2010 
With regard to the evolution of the privatization in Egypt, it could be split into four 
phases based on its progress. Phase one covered the period from 1991 to 1995. During that 
phase, the privatization encountered a slow start21. Phase two covered the period from 1995 
until 2000. During that phase, the privatization began a new dynamic stage by enhancing the 
                                                
21  This was because of its early implementation faced a number of difficulties, which can be 
represented in the following four obstacles (Khattab, 1999; Pripstein, 1999). The first obstacle is represented in 
difficulties in setting the privatization strategy, which resulted from the lack of political cooperation among 
different authorities at ministerial level. The second obstacle is represented in difficulties in getting the public 
acceptance due to the negative social cost of privatization. The third obstacle is represented in difficulties in 
legislation due to the lack of proper legal framework. The fourth obstacle is represented in the fear of foreign 
intervention in the economy, which was a major obstacle to the implementation of the privatization. That fear 
stemmed from the long history of colonialism in Egypt. 
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transactions within the stock market through share issue privatization. Phase three covered 
the period from 2000 until 2004. During that phase, the privatization was negatively affected 
by the international macroeconomic imbalances that hit the world in early 2000s. The last 
phase covered the period from 2004 until 2011. During that phase, privatization was 
reactivated because of the appointment of a new liberal government in 2004. That new 
government committed to adopt a comprehensive reform of the financial sector and achieve 
progress in the divestiture of the remaining SOEs. Table  3-6 shows the annual evolution of 
the number of privatized firms, privatization proceeds, and their associated percentages since 
the beginning of the privatization. 
Table  3-6 Evolution of the Number of Privatized Firms and Privatization Proceeds in 
Egypt, 1991-2010 
LE Million 
Year 
Firms- Law No.203 Joint venture* Total 
NO. %** Proceeds %** NO. %** Proceeds %** NO. %** Proceeds %** 
1991-1994 11 3.3 418 1.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 11 2.7 418 1.0 
1995 14 4.1 867 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 14 3.4 867 2.0 
1996 12 3.6 977 4.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 2.9 977 2.3 
1997 29 8.6 4595 19.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 29 7.1 4595 10.8 
1998 23 6.8 2487 10.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 23 5.6 2487 5.8 
1999 33 9.8 1824 7.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 33 8.0 1824 4.3 
2000 39 11.5 4694 19.6 1 1.4 14 0.1 40 9.7 4708 11.1 
2001 11 3.3 252 1.1 7 9.5 118 0.6 18 4.4 370 0.9 
2002 7 2.1 73 0.3 3 4.1 879 4.7 10 2.4 952 2.2 
2003 6 1.8 49 0.2 1 1.4 64 0.3 7 1.7 113 0.3 
2004 9 2.7 428 1.8 4 5.4 115 0.6 13 3.2 543 1.3 
2005 16 4.7 824 3.4 12 16.2 4819 25.9 28 6.8 5643 13.3 
2006 47 13.9 1843 7.7 17 23.0 7647 41.1 64 15.6 9490 22.3 
2007 45 13.3 2774 11.6 7 9.5 1559 8.4 52 12.7 4333 10.2 
2008 20 5.9 745 3.1 16 21.6 3238 17.4 36 8.8 3983 9.4 
2009 15 4.4 1130 4.7 2 2.7 83 0.4 17 4.1 1213 2.8 
2010 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 5.4 50 0.3 4 1.0 50 0.1 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Egypt, 2011 
* All figures of joint venture firms represent values of public sector share. 
** These ratios represent percentages out of the total numbers or proceeds. 
As mentioned during the period of 1991-1995, i.e. phase one, Egypt witnessed a 
modest start of privatization. Until 1995, Egypt privatized 11 SOEs that were subject to the 
Law No. 203 in 1991 with volumes of proceeds estimated at LE 418 million. During the 
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second phase of privatization, i.e. during 1995-2000, the volumes of privatization proceeds 
were estimated at LE 10750 million and gathered from selling 111 SOES subjected to the 
Law No. 203 in 1991. During the third phase, i.e. during 2000-2004, government began 
selling joint venture companies in addition to SOEs subjected to the Law No. 203. Despite 
that, the prevailing macroeconomic imbalances that hit the world during that period caused a 
drop in the proceeds, which were estimated at LE 6143 million gathered from selling 12 joint 
venture companies and 63 SOEs. By an appointment of a new liberal government in 2004, i.e. 
the fourth phase, the ministerial cabinet aimed at reviving the privatization by selling 152 
SOEs subjected to the Law No. 203 and 62 joint venture companies. As a result, the 
privatization proceeds rose to LE 25255 million. 
Figure  3-8 shows annual privatization proceeds and their associated growth rates. It is 
noted that the annual growth rates of privatization proceeds significantly increased during 
2003 and 2004. This was due to the appointment of the new liberal government, which 
adopted a comprehensive reform in the financial sector and announced new plans of 
privatization. However, the annual growth rates of privatization proceeds begun to decline 
again starting from 2005.  
Figure  3-8 Annual Privatization Proceeds and Associated Growth Rates, 1994-2010 
Source: Ministry of Investment, Egypt, 2010 
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Regarding the privatization methods, Egypt applied number of privatization methods 
since 1991 such as sales to an anchor investor, employee share associations, and initial public 
offering. However, in terms of volumes of proceeds, privatization through an anchor investor 
performed well compared to other methods of privatization like initial public offering or 
privatization through employee share associations.  
Figure  3-9 shows percentages of the number of transactions for each privatization 
method during 1991-2009. The contribution of the method of sales to an anchor investor, out 
of total privatization proceeds, was estimated at 30.1% followed by the method of asset sale, 
which was estimated at 15.6%. With respect to the method of majority and minority IPO, 
their contributions, out of the total privatization proceeds, were estimated at 13.5% and 8.2%, 
respectively. The contribution of the method of employee share associations, out of the total 
privatization proceeds, was estimated at 11.7%. 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data collected from Egypt for Information Dissemination 
Center, monthly bulletins, 2009 
Regarding the sectoral distribution of the privatization, privatization was applied to 
main economic sectors in Egypt such as manufacturing, banking sector, non-bank financial 
services, construction, trade, tourism, and utilities. Among these sectors, the financial sector 
Figure 3-9 Percentages of the Accumulated 
Privatization Proceeds in Egypt by Method, 
1991-2009 
Figure 3-10 Percentages of the Accumulated 
Privatization Proceeds in Egypt by Sector, 
1991-2009 
13.5%
8.2%
12.1%
15.6%
11.7%
8.9%
30.1%
Majority IPO Minority IPO Liquidation
Asset Sale Employee Share Association Leasing
Anchor Investor
29.8%
12%
6.95%
22.7%
5.73%
6.4%
1.97%
14.4%
Banks Construction Food&Beverages
Manufacturing Non-Bank Financial Services Retail Trade
Travel&Leisure Utilities
66 
 
 
 
 
received a large share in the total privatization proceeds during the period 1991-2009. As 
shown in Figure  3-10, the contribution of privatization proceeds obtained from privatizing 
state owned and joint venture banks, out of the total proceeds, was estimated at 30%. 
Following the banking sector, the manufacturing sector was in the second rank with estimated 
ratio estimated at 22.7%. Sectors of travel and non-bank financial services received the 
smallest shares out of the total privatization proceeds, which were estimated at 1.9% and 
5.7%, respectively. 
The Evolution of the Financial Sector in Egypt 
The financial sector leads the economic growth in Egypt by mobilizing savings and 
credits required for investment. Egypt represents a typical case of an emerging economy, 
which financial system is a bank-based. That is, the banking sector dominates most of its 
financial activities.  
On the other hand, the stock market plays a significant role in providing required 
funds for investment. The Egyptian stock exchange was established in 1883, namely 
Alexandria Stock Exchange. It is considered one of the oldest stock exchanges in the Middle 
East. In 1903, Egypt established Cairo Stock Exchange to operate together with Alexandria 
Stock Exchange. According to the Egyptian Exchange (2011), the stock exchanges in Egypt 
in early 1900s were among the fifth most active stock exchanges worldwide; however, after 
the nationalization campaign during 1960s, their pace slowed down drastically.  
Before analyzing recent trends in the financial sector in Egypt, it is useful to introduce 
main reforms that were implemented and obstacles that were faced by the sector since early 
1950s. Before the revolution of 1952, the banking sector was dominated by foreign private 
ownership. However, after 1952, the move was towards a state control economy. As a result, 
according to Bahaa-Eldin and Mohieldin (1988), activities of banks were controlled and 
concentrated in main five state-owned commercial banks and three state-owned specialized 
banks. In 1975, the government approved the Law No. 120 in order to allow private banks to 
operate within the banking sector. However, the latter reform did not participate in enhancing 
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the contribution of the private sector in the banking sector. According to Arestis (2003), the 
five state-owned banks continued to dominate around 80 percent of activities of the banking 
sector until early 1990s, when the government aimed at liberalizing activities of the banking 
sector by committing to privatize state-owned banks. According to Abu-Bader et al. (2008), 
the state control over the financial sector was responsible for gradual increments of bad loans, 
i.e. non-performing loans, and inefficiencies in the operation within the financial sector.  
On the other hand, stock market activities witnessed a slow progress after 1952, 
which continued until early 1990s, when the government aimed through privatization at 
reviving its major role in financing investments (Bolbol et al., 2005).  
Notwithstanding its vital role in providing funds, a number of obstacles hindered the 
progress of the sector (Nasr, 2009). First, inefficiency of financial reports of financial 
institutions prevents financial analysts from evaluating their progress, which, in turn, 
hampered the access to credit. Second, creditors were not confident about the quality of 
reporting data of operating firms. That was due to the poor auditing standards, which are not 
compatible with the international standards. As a result, there was a difficulty in obtaining 
reliable information concerning the creditworthiness of operating firms. Third, significant 
entry and exist barriers harmed competition within the financial sector, which resulted from 
the control of the state over the financial sector through owning the largest shares in 
operating banks.  
The previously mentioned obstacles hindered financial institutions from making 
efficient credit decisions. In addition, those obstacles were considered as main barriers for 
firms to access the credit market. According to the World Bank (2011), access to credit was 
one of the major constraints that were faced by operating firms in Egypt, which is ranked no. 
84 in 2008 in terms of the ease of access to the credit worldwide.  
Consequently, a reform of the financial sector was necessary for restructuring and 
curing distortion within the sector. By curing its distortions, the financial capacity of firms 
could be improved.  
68 
 
 
 
 
With respect to the recent reforms implemented in the financial sector since 1990s, 
according to Arestis (2003), three stages of reforms could be identified. The first stage was 
during the first half of 1990s in accordance with the structure reform program of IMF. That 
reform included three main pillars: reducing monetary restraints, liberalizing financial sector, 
and structuring the Egyptian stock market. In addition, a new capital market law, i.e. Law No. 
95 in 1992, was approved in order to pave the way to facilitate public listing in the stock 
market. The second stage was during the second half of 1990s. During that stage, state 
continued liberalizing the financial sector and promoting the private sector participation 
through privatizing state-owned banks. The government aimed at restructuring the financial 
sector by reducing the high concentration and market power of state-owned banks. This 
occurred by selling shares of 14 joint venture banks22. In addition, according to Bolbol et al. 
(2005), the government announced a plan of selling shares of the remaining joint venture 
banks. Moreover, share issue privatization was adopted for reviving the financial activities in 
the stock market. The third stage was during the second half of 2000s. During that stage, the 
government adopted a comprehensive reform of the financial sector. According to Nasr 
(2009), the later reform had five main pillars: reforming the banking sector, restructuring the 
insurance sector, deepening the capital market, developing the mortgage market, and 
activating non-bank financial services. Those reforms covered issues of mergers and 
acquisitions, quality of services, cost reduction, improving capital adequacy, and privatization. 
In 2005, the government established Misr for Central Clearing, Depository, and Registry, 
where all transactions of Cairo and Alexandria stock exchange were unified. In 2006, the 
government privatized Bank of Alexandria, which was the fourth largest state-owned bank in 
                                                
22 Those banks are Credit International d’Egypt, Export Development, Alexandria Commercial and 
Maritime, Bank du Caire, Egyptian American, Misr Exterior, Misr International, NSGB, Suez Canal, 
Commercial International, Misr Romania, National Bank for Development, and Cairo Barclays and Egyptian 
Commercial Bank (Omran, 2007). 
69 
 
 
 
 
Egypt. In 2010, the Egyptian market authority launched a market of medium and small firms, 
namely Nilex, which permitted small and medium firms to access the stock market. In the 
latter market, according to the Central Bank of Egypt (2011), ten companies were listed with 
total value traded of shares and market capitalization estimated at LE 83 million and LE 407 
million in 2010, respectively. 
All the previously mentioned reforms partially helped in facilitating activities of the 
banking sector and stock market during 1990s and 2000s. Figure  3-11 shows the annual 
values of real domestic credit, real market capitalization, domestic credit ratio as percentages 
of GDP, and market capitalization ratio as percentages of GDP. The total real domestic credit 
provided by banks increased during 1992-2000. However, since 2001, it started to slightly 
decline until 2003. After 2003, its volumes, on average, were around USD 400 million.  
Figure  3-11 Evolution of the Real Domestic Credit and Market Capitalization in 
Egypt, 1991-2009 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the World Development Indicators, 2011 
On the other hand, the value of the real market capitalization increased during the 
period under consideration. Furthermore, the gap between the value of total domestic credit 
and market capitalization was diminishing gradually. In addition, the share of market 
capitalization in GDP increased and the gap between the share of market capitalization and 
total domestic credit in GDP was tightened.  
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In 2007, the share of market capitalization in GDP exceeded the share of the total 
domestic credit in GDP, before it started to decrease again during the period of 2008-2010. 
Moreover, the financial sector reform affected concentration, lending, and financial 
and operating performance of the banking sector. Regarding the concentration of the banking 
sector, Egypt had three types of banks: commercial, specialized, and investment banks23. 
Table  3-7 describes the structure of the banking sector in Egypt.  
Table  3-7 The Structure of the Egyptian Banking System, 1990-2009 
Year 
No. of Commercial Banks* 
Total** 
State-owned Banks Joint Venture Banks 
Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches 
1990 4 663 40 221 81 1882 
1991 4 663 40 221 81 1882 
1992 4 772 40 254 81 2121 
1993 4 811 26 253 66 2150 
1994 4 831 24 261 64 2191 
1995 4 851 24 273 64 2241 
1996 4 866 24 288 64 2285 
1997 4 883 24 298 64 2325 
1998 4 908 24 312 63 2391 
1999 4 918 24 323 63 2434 
2000 4 913 24 340 62 2481 
2001 4 921 24 367 62 2536 
2002 4 919 24 375 62 2561 
2003 4 917 24 383 62 2582 
2004 4 2153 35 571 61 2783 
2005 4 2185 34 607 52 2841 
2006 3 2222 29 674 43 2944 
2007 3 2074 28 930 41 3056 
2008 3 2089 27 1145 40 3297 
2009 3 2088 27 1270 39 3443 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, annual economic reviews, various issues 
* Egyptian banks abroad are not included; also, two banks established under private laws are not registered with 
CBE, namely the Arab International Bank and Nasser Social Bank. 
** The total includes specialized banks. 
                                                
23 Commercial banks are those that mainly deal with deposits payable on demand. They are prohibited 
from undertaking activities in properties or owning shares in more than 40% of the paid-up capital of any joint-
venture firms. Specialized banks undertake financing activities of real estate, agriculture, and manufacturing. 
Investment banks undertake foreign trade operations, and any operation related to promoting savings required 
by national development plans (Bahaa-Eldin and Mohieldin, 1988). 
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By examining the recent trends of the number of operating banks, the banking sector 
became partially concentrated in a lower number of banks. By 2009, the banking sector 
consisted of 39 banks, of which 30 banks were commercial and nine banks were non-
commercial. The state-owned banks included Banque du Caire, Banque Misr, and National 
Bank of Egypt. The drop in the total number of operating banks since 1990 was due to 
numerous cases of mergers and acquisitions. In addition, the cases of exists of foreign banks 
participated in the decline in the total number of operating banks. For example, according to 
the Central Bank of Egypt (2011), fifteen development banks were merged into the National 
Bank for Development in 1992 and 1994. In addition, in 1993, Bank of Credit and Commerce 
was merged into Misr Bank in 1993. The Egyptian Real Estate Bank was merged into the 
Arab Real Estate Bank in 1999. In 2005, seven foreign banks ended their business. 
Regarding the contribution of the credit of banking sector in GDP versus the 
contribution of financial activities of insurance companies in GDP, in general, the operating 
banks had higher contribution in GDP compared to the insurance companies. As shown in 
Table  3-8, in general, state-owned banks and state-owned insurance companies had bigger 
share in GDP compared to other private counterparts.  
Table  3-8 Annual Percentages of the Contribution of the Financial Sector in GDP in 
Egypt, 2000-2010 
During the period 2000-2010, state-owned banks witnessed negative growth rate of its 
contribution in GDP, which was estimated, on average, at -6%, compared to positive growth 
Year 
Private Ownership (%) State Ownership (%) 
Banks Insurance Banks Insurance 
2000 2.97 0.12 12.57 0.21 
2001 3.16 0.07 11.31 0.43 
2002 3.15 0.08 10.10 0.39 
2003 3.01 0.08 9.21 0.35 
2004 2.95 0.08 8.88 0.33 
2005 2.87 0.08 8.12 0.31 
2006 2.19 0.12 6.54 0.69 
2007 2.09 0.12 6.23 0.67 
2008 2.00 0.19 6.28 0.55 
2009 1.95 0.18 6.32 0.59 
2010 1.80 0.18 6.10 0.57 
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt, monthly statistical bulletins, various issues 
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rate of the contribution of other private banks, which was estimated, on average, at -4.5%. 
However, state-owned insurance companies witnessed a higher increase in its growth rate of 
the contribution in GDP, which was estimated, on average, at 18%, compared to the growth 
rate of the contribution of the private insurance companies, which was estimated, on average, 
at 7.5% during the period under consideration. 
Regarding the lending activities of the banking sector, Table  3-9 shows volumes of 
lending and non-lending activities of the banking sector during the period of 2000-2008. 
Banks granted credits for both state-owned firms and privately owned firms. The volume of 
credit provided by banks for private firms exceeded the volume provided for state-owned 
firms. It is noted that the annual growth rate of the volume of loans directed for state-owned 
firms decreased by -12% and -25% in 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
Table  3-9 Annual Volumes of Lending and Non-Lending Activities of the Banking 
Sector in Egypt, 2000-2010 
LE Million   
Year  
Directed for SOEs Directed for Private Sector 
Securities Loans Total Securities Loans Total 
2000 264 32119 32383 11705 150467 162172 
2001 245 28940 29185 13591 165006 178597 
2002 252 30891 31143 15114 185116 200230 
2003 101 34886 34987 14361 199946 214307 
2004 158 35430 35588 17265 205831 223096 
2005 179 37242 37421 22500 205695 228195 
2006 246 32642 32888 24662 214676 239338 
2007 258 24188 24446 29294 239312 268606 
2008 245 26652 26897 33633 258086 291719 
2009 266 32880 33146 36585 267885 304470 
2010 173 29812 29985 39202 287148 326350 
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt, monthly statistical bulletins, various issues 
In addition to the lending activities of the banking sector, securities portfolio within 
banks, which consists of shares belong to private firms, was bigger compared to the security 
portfolio that consists of shares belong to state-owned firms. Table  3-10 shows the shares of 
the security portfolio of banks that belong to SOEs and private firms during the period of 
2000-2010. In general, banks held larger volumes of securities that belong to private firms 
compared to securities that belong to SOEs. During that period, the growth rate of holding 
securities that belong to both SOEs and private firms was estimated, on average, at 22%.  
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Table  3-10 Securities Portfolio at Banking Sector, Except CBE in Egypt, 2000-2010 
LE Million 
Year State-Owned Firms Private Firms Others* Total Securities 
2000 939 14825 45054 60818 
2001 927 16397 53818 71142 
2002 814 18131 68781 87726 
2003 648 17203 93487 111338 
2004 630 19691 103778 124099 
2005 666 25009 144984 170659 
2006 859 28380 164726 193965 
2007 761 32042 143295 176098 
2008 1414 36523 163921 201858 
2009 1338 39287 291972 332597 
2010 1052 39991 364852 405895 
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt, monthly statistical bulletins, various issues 
* Others include notes of government, external sector, and CBE. 
The annual financial performance indicators of banks, which are represented in 
domestic credits and deposits as percentages of GDP, as shown in Table  3-11, dropped 
gradually after 2004. Moreover, the annual gap between domestic credits and deposit was 
declining at increasing rates. This was associated with high annual liquidity ratios during that 
period. The annual profitability ratios are represented in return on assets and return on equity. 
Those ratios were estimated, on average, at 0.7 and 12.7, respectively, during the period 
under consideration. However, in 2003 and 2004, those returns witnessed a significant drop. 
After 2004, the average returns on assets and equity increased. During the period of 2005-
2010, the average return on assets and return on equity were estimated at 0.8 and 13, 
respectively, compared to 0.7 and 12 during the period of 2000-2004, respectively.  
Table  3-11 Performance Indicators of the Banking Sector in Egypt, 2000-2010 
% 
Year 
Domestic 
Credit/GDP 
Domestic 
Deposits/GDP 
Equity to 
Assets 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Liquidity 
Ratio 
Deposits / 
Assets 
2000 86.20 78.65 5.40 0.90 16.00 24.70 67.10 
2001 90.78 82.52 5.20 0.80 13.70 25.70 68.00 
2002 92.18 87.67 4.80 0.70 12.40 28.40 68.80 
2003 84.91 88.79 5.30 0.50 8.90 31.00 69.80 
2004 83.32 91.52 5.10 0.50 9.80 28.50 72.90 
2005 80.32 89.78 5.30 0.60 10.60 34.90 73.70 
2006 71.73 80.44 5.60 0.70 12.30 38.00 74.70 
2007 62.12 76.96 5.10 0.80 14.30 27.90 69.30 
2008 57.44 76.02 6.20 0.80 14.10 34.50 78.40 
2009 60.43 71.28 6.40 0.80 13.00 43.40 82.40 
2010 59.19 62.61 6.70 1.00 14.30 44.70 81.00 
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt, monthly statistical bulletins, various issues 
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With respect to the Egyptian stock market, the implemented reforms, particularly 
share issue privatization, supported activities of the stock market. This could be observed 
from various performance indicators, as shown in Table  3-12. On average, the total value 
traded ratio as a percentage of GDP had positive rate of growth during the period of 2000-
2010, which was estimated, on average, at 49.7%. In particular, growth rate of the value-
traded ratio increased after 2004, compared to the period from 2000-2003. Moreover, the 
market capitalization ratio as a percentage of GDP witnessed an average positive growth rate 
during the period of 2000-2010, which was estimated, on average, at 3.3%. After 2004, the 
annual growth rate of the market capitalization increased gradually. The annual price 
earnings ratios grew during the period of 2000-2010, which was estimated, on average, at 
8.5%. The latter ratio, which is a good measure for predicting the expected earnings growth 
in stock market, increased during the period of 2004-2010, compared to the period of 200-
2003. 
Table  3-12 Ratios of Performance Indicators of the Stock Market in Egypt, 2000-2010 
% 
Year Total value Traded/GDP Market Capitalization/GDP Price Earnings Ratio 
2000 0.81 36.01 8.01 
2001 0.89 31.11 7.4 
2002 0.98 30.38 7.36 
2003 1.13 32.92 7.18 
2004 0.38 34.13 11.81 
2005 1.99 58.00 15.19 
2006 1.74 53.08 14.31 
2007 3.81 70.36 21.87 
2008 4.80 81.82 15.73 
2009 5.32 40.30 11.47 
2010 3.23 31.31 12.64 
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt, monthly statistical bulletins, various issues 
3.3. Conclusion 
Since the start of privatization in developing countries, upper middle-income 
countries followed by lower middle-income countries implemented most of privatization 
transactions during the period of 1988-2008. The latter two groups achieved relatively higher 
growth rates of volumes of privatization proceeds compared to the high-income group and 
low-income groups.  
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In developing countries, most of privatization proceeds, which occurred during the 
second half of 1990s, were captured by adopting a certain privatization methods, namely 
auction, bids, tenders, and initial public offering.  
On the other hand, developing countries witnessed a positive improvement in their 
activities of the financial sector, which were represented in two main financial indicators: 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector and stock market capitalization.  
Egypt was considered among developing countries that witnessed an economic 
structural change since 1991. This was represented in the implementation of the privatization 
and various reforms of its financial sector. The progress of privatization was not stable since 
its start in 1991. That is, periods of momentums and slowdowns could be observed.  
One of the major obstacles that faced the progress of the privatization was the fear of 
foreign intervention. Although foreign investors owned enough capital to expand capital of 
privatized firms, the fear from foreign intervention caused a national worry against 
privatization. As a result, the government divested majority of its SOEs to Egyptian investors 
who lack of sufficient funds. In addition, other legal, political, social, and regulatory 
obstacles hindered the progress of the Egyptian privatization. 
Regarding the sectoral distribution of privatization, privatization was applied to main 
economic sectors such as manufacturing, banking sector, non-bank financial services, 
construction, trade, tourism, and utilities. Among those sectors, the financial sector received a 
large share in the total privatization proceeds since its start. 
Regarding the financial sector, the reform, e.g. privatization, within the sector 
participated in improving the financial activities within the sector. This was observed in a 
number of financial indicators, such as the reduction in the degree of concentration and the 
increase in lending and non-lending activities.  
In addition, one of the objectives of privatization was to participate in enhancing the 
financial activities within the stock market. Privatization participated in improving the 
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financial activities of the stock market. This was observed in a number of financial indicators, 
such as the increase in the total value traded and market capitalization. 
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Chapter 4. Theoretical Framework for Empirical Studies 
In order to examine the impact of privatization on the development of the financial 
sector, the empirical studies in this thesis utilize a variety of theoretical models, empirical 
techniques, and datasets. In particular, the studies aim at scrutinizing the impact of 
privatization on the development of the banking sector, the development of the stock market, 
the financial sector structure, the overall financial sector performance, choices of financing, 
and the performance of individual banks and non-bank financial institutions.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section  4.1 demonstrates the theoretical models. 
Section  4.2 illustrates the empirical analysis. Finally, section  4.3 describes the datasets.  
4.1. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework is based on the neo-Keynesian approach by assuming 
interconnection between privatization and the financial sector. The framework consists of 
three parts. The first part reviews theories of the financial sector development, which are 
utilized in  Chapter 5. The second part reviews theories of the determinants of choices of 
financing, which are utilized in  Chapter 6. The third part reviews theories of financial 
intermediaries, which are utilized in  Chapter 7.  
Theories of the Development of the Financial Sector 
Various macroeconomic factors and government policies affect development of the 
financial sector. As mentioned in  Chapter 2, the impact of those factors is controversial 
among schools of economic though. In order to scrutinize the impact of privatization on 
development of the financial sector, various theoretical models, which are based on the neo-
Keynesian approach, are utilized. Those models are based on modified versions of IS-LM 
model, which incorporate financial institutions into its framework.  
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, those models are categorized into three 
groups. The first group analyzes factors that affect the stock market development, which 
include Blanchard (1981) and Rajan and Zingales (2003). The second group analyzes factors 
that affect the banking sector development, which include Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and 
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Boyd et al. (2001). The third group analyzes factors that affect the financial structure and 
overall financial sector development, which include Boyd and Smith (1998) and Calderon 
and Liu (2003). Furthermore, two main hypotheses regarding factors that affect the 
development of banks and stock market are explained, namely the hypothesis of Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) and the hypothesis of Song and Thakor (2010). 
Model of Blanchard (1981) 
Theoretical analyses of the development of the financial market are based on the IS-
LM model and its extensions. These models emphasize the significant role of economic 
policies on variations of stock market. Among them is the model of Blanchard (1981), which 
demonstrates the impact of level of income and monetary policy on the value of the stock 
market. Blanchard built his general framework on two important premises: one, aggregate 
demand determines the output level and, two, prices move to their equilibrium levels. For 
simplicity, his model, initially, is based on a number of assumptions: a closed economy case, 
a constant physical capital stock, perfect substitutability of non-monetary financial assets24, 
and a rigidity of prices. In addition, his model allows further relaxations of these assumptions 
for more realistic ones such as cases of an open economy and flexible prices. According to 
his model, the changes in the level of income and monetary policy are main determinant of 
the value of stocks traded in the financial market. In his model, the stock portfolio balance is 
described by the conventional LM curve in an inverse form, which is described as follows: 
 =  − ℎ − 	
,						 > 0; ℎ > 0, .………………………………………………..….… (1) 
 where   is the short-term interest rate,  is the income level,  is nominal money 
supply, and 	 is the price level.  
In addition, the short-term real interest rate equals the short-term nominal interest rate 
minus the anticipated inflation rate, which is described as follows: 
                                                
24 This assumption implies that the non-monetary financial assets have the same short-term rate of 
return (Blanchard, 1981). 
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∗ ≡  − ∗ ,…………………………………………….…………………………………… (2) 
 where ∗ is the anticipated short-term real interest rate,  is the short-term nominal 
interest rate, and ∗ is the anticipated inflation rate. 
By assuming fixed prices and rational expectations, the real interest rates equals 
nominal interest rates (), i.e. (∗ ≡  ≡ ). From (1), this implies that:  
 =  − ℎ − 	
,   ….………………………………………………….…………….….. (3) 
By assuming perfect substitutability among non-money assets, the expected real rate 
of return of holding shares equals:  
∗ = 
∗
 +

,  ..…...………………….………………………………..…………..…………. (4)  
where q is the real value of the stock market,  ∗ is the anticipated value of the stock 
market, and	 is the real profits. 
In his model, the real profits 
 from holding shares are assumed an increasing 
function of income. That is, the real profit 
 is described as follows:  
 =  + ,								 ≥ 0……..….…….…………..………..………………….……….… (5) 
From (4) and (5), the expected return of holding shares equals: 
 ∗ = 
∗
 +
 !"
 ,  .....…………….……………….………………….……………………. (6) 
In the steady state, where ( ∗ = 0
, and by assuming rational expectations, which 
implies that anticipated values equal the actual values, i.e. ∗ = 
, the expected real rate of 
return from holding shares equals: 
 =  !" ,  .....…………………………….…………….………….…….……….……..… (7) 
From equation (7) and (5), the value of the stock market equals: 
 =  =
 + 
  
The previous equation represents the equilibrium condition in the stock market. That 
is, the stock market value depends on the ratio of profits π
 and the interest rate (r), which is 
a function of the level of income 
 and interest rate (r). Therefore, two structural equations 
are identified:  
q = fy, r
, 
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 = (,  − 

. 
Consequently, the nominal money supply negatively affects the interest rate, while the 
price level positively affects it. The effect of output is ambiguous as the output increases 
profits and, synchronically, output increases the interest rate. The impact of output on stock 
market value depends on whether the impact of output on the interest rate is higher or lower 
than the output effect on profits.  
Model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) adjusted the IS-LM model to incorporate the impact of 
bank loans on the LM function. In their three asset model (i.e. money, bonds, and loans), they 
assumed a perfect substitutability among financial assets. They showed that the demand on 
loans is determined by the gross national product and the interest rates, which is described as 
follows:  
)* = )+, , 
,  ..………………...…………………………………………………………. (1) 
 where )* is the demand for loans, + is the interest rates on financial assets,  is the 
interest rate on loans, and  is the GNP.  
They showed that the interest rate on financial assets (+) is negatively associated with 
the demand for loans. The higher interest rate on loans 
 is positively associated with the 
demand for loans. In addition, the gross national product 
 is positively associated with the 
demand for loans. On the other hand, the supply function of loans is a function of interest 
rates and liquid reserves, which is described as follows:  
), = -+, , 
.1 − 0
.………………………….…………………..………………………. (2) 
where ), is the supply of loans, . is bank deposits, 0 is the required reserves ratio, 
and .1 − 0
is the total available reserves.  
They showed that higher interest rate on financial assets (ρ) increases the supply of 
loan by banks, while the interest rate on loans 
 reduces the supply of loans. In addition, the 
supply of loans is an increasing function in the total available reserves.  
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From (1) and (2), the equilibrium condition of loans provided by banks is described 
by the following equation: 
)+, , 
 = -+, , 
.1 − 0
. ……………………………….……………………………..(3) 
Thus, from equation (3), the equilibrium condition of loans is a function of prevailing 
interest rates on loans and shares, gross national product, and total available reserves. The 
impact of gross national product reflects the transactions demand for credit. With respect to 
the impact of monetary policy, they showed that the significant impact of the monetary policy 
on bank loans is realized through its impact on bank available reserves.  
Model of Boyd et al. (2001)  
Following Blanchard (1981) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Boyd et al. (2001), in 
their comprehensive analysis of the impact of inflation on financial sector, found a significant 
nonlinear impact of inflation on the development of the stock market and banking sector. 
This nonlinearity is due to the adverse impact of inflation on real rate of return on financial 
assets, which, in turn, adversely affects banks and stock market activities. However, the 
impact of inflation on banks and stock markets is gradually diminishing. That is, up to 
moderate levels of inflation, the inflation has a negative significant impact on both stock 
markets and the banking sector. They proposed two possible ways for treating nonlinearity: 
one, by integrating different thresholds of inflation into the regression model and, two, by 
taking the inverse of inflation as an explanatory variable25.  
Model of Boyd and Smith (1998) 
In their growth model, Boyd and Smith (1998) showed an increasing role of stock 
markets as economy grows. By scrutinizing components of the evolution of the financial 
system, the authors showed that access to stock markets is limited in early stages of economic 
                                                
25  The nonlinearity impact of inflation on the financial sector is supported by other studies, e.g., 
Azariadas and Smith (1996), Choi et al. (1996), Boyd and Smith (1998), and Huybens and Smith (1999). 
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development26. In general, countries with higher GDP per capita and low level of state 
intervention have larger activities in stock markets compared to countries with lower GDP 
per capita and higher state intervention. The premises of their model are based on the 
following sequence. As an economy moves along its growth path, capital is accumulated. As 
a result, the relative price of capital is falling. Due to the presence of costly state verification27, 
higher monitoring costs arise as a result of the capital expansion. That implies large resources 
are devoted to the requirement of state verification. As a result, investors will employ more 
volumes of high return capital technology. Due to the incremental increases in the monitoring 
cost, it will be cheaper for investors to issue equities. In that situation, the economy will 
detect positive level of activities in the equity market at the expense of the debt market. In 
general, the previous sequence characterizes developed economies. Contrary, countries with 
lower GDP per capita heavily utilize investment projects with low return capital technology, 
which are associated with low monitoring costs and higher debt finance.  
Consistent with Boyd and Smith (1998), Chakraborty and Ray (2006, 2007) identified, 
in their theoretical growth model, the growth rate of GDP per capita as a main determinant of 
the changes in financial structure. According to the authors, as an economy goes through its 
growth path, there is a tendency of being more market-based financial structure.  
Calderon and Liu (2003) 
Calderon and Liu (2003) showed that higher economic growth stimulates financial 
sector development. The economic growth affects the financial sector development through 
the demand-following hypothesis introduced by Patrick (1966). According to the latter 
                                                
26 This was noted in the empirical studies of Levine and Zervos (1998b), Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(1999), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). 
27 Costly state verification might arise in the financial sector due to the cost of monitoring by financial 
institutions due to costly information disclosure about debtors. One can expect that as an economy grows, the 
monitoring cost increases (Boyd and Smith, 1998). 
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hypothesis, as an economy grows, the demand for financial services increases, which, in turn, 
ehnahces the development of the financial sector. 
Hypothesis of Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
In addition to the impact of level of income and real money supply on the stock 
market, the degree of openness, through its impact on capital flows, is an important 
determinant of the development of the stock market. This was emphasized by Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) in their hypothesis concerning the influence of trade on the development of 
local stock markets. The authors showed that trade and financial openness are key 
determinants of the development of the banking sector and stock markets. However, they 
emphasized the importance of the financial openness, e.g. openness of the capital account, 
together with trade openness in order to capture the gains from liberalization. 
Hypothesis of Song and Thakor (2010) 
 This hypothesis shows an existence of coevolution between the banking sector and 
stock markets. According to the hypothesis, the development of the banking sector has a 
spillover effect on stock market through improving bank screening, which, in turn, enhances 
the credit quality in stock markets. On the other hand, the development of stock markets has a 
spillover effect on the banking sector by reducing the cost of bank equity capital. That leads 
banks to hold more capital, which, in turn, results in more lending. 
Theories of Determinants of Choices of Financing 
As mentioned in  Chapter 2, two different approaches explain the relationship between 
choices of financing and real decisions of firms. The first approach is based on The 
Modigliani and Miller theorem (1958), which assumes perfect capital market. As a result, 
there is no association between financing decisions and real activities of firms. The second 
approach is based on either the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or the tradeoff 
theory (Jensen, 1986), which supports the interconnection between financing decisions and 
real activities of a firm. The latter theories are based on assumptions of asymmetric 
information and agency conflict between managers and shareholders. The latter assumptions 
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are results of the premise that managers have better information about the firm than 
shareholders do 28 . Thus, firm’s fundamentals, e.g. value of the assets, investment 
opportunities, growth of sales, and availability of internal cash, matter for financing decisions, 
even though these decisions may contradict with the preferences of shareholders.  
Building the frameworks of the tradeoff and the pecking order theories, Brav (2009) 
scrutinized factors that influence financing decisions of firms. The author combined the two 
theories in order to compare the choices of financing among private and publicly listed firms. 
Two main effects on choices of financing are identified: a level effect and a sensitivity effect. 
The level effect reflects the fact that the cost of raising funds through stock markets is higher 
than the cost of raising funds from banks. According to this effect, firms with less 
information disclosure and limited ownership structure depend more on bank-based finance. 
The sensitivity effect reflects the fact that the choice of bank-based finance is more sensitive 
to operating performance of firms.  
The author identified six major variables that affect choices of financing among firms: 
size, asset tangibility, growth, profitability, capital expenditure, and age. By comparing the 
choices of financing of private and publicly listed firms, variations of choices of financing are 
explained by differences in ownership structure and asymmetric information. The extent to 
which each type of firms is controlled by their shareholders affects choices of financing. This 
is because limited ownership structure, i.e. few shareholders, raises an agency conflict 
between managers and major shareholders, which, in turn, lead to a higher monitoring cost 
from the financial market. Thus, the fewer number of shareholders are, the more dependence 
of a firm on bank-based finance, and the less dependence on market-based finance. In 
addition, the access to market-based finance for limited ownership firms depends mainly on 
their operating performance.  
                                                
28 In addition, managers have a tendency to allow their firms to grow beyond its optimal size. As 
growth increases, the available resources under control of managers decrease (Jensen, 1986). 
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Moreover, asymmetric information and lack of information disclosure increase the 
cost of raising funds from market-based finance. This is because equity issue is very sensitive 
to information asymmetry between insider, i.e. managers, and outsider, i.e. shareholders, of a 
firm compared to the debt issue (Myers and Majluf, 1984). On the other hand, firms with 
wider ownership structure, lower information asymmetry, and better information disclosure 
depend more on market-based finance. 
These previous relationships are consistent with the predictions of the pecking order 
theory, which predicts that firms with less asymmetric information depend more on market-
based finance, and the tradeoff theory, which predicts that the operating performance of firms 
affects their access to market-based finance.  
Theories of Financial Intermediaries 
Theories of financial intermediaries scrutinize the lending behavior of banks by 
analyzing their financial portfolio structures. These theories showed how diversification of 
bank lending is essential for reducing the exhibited economic risks. This is because loan 
diversification among different sectors works as a stabilizer against sectoral business cycles. 
In addition, diversification among different sectors reduces their chances of costly financial 
bankruptcy. These effects of lending diversification were demonstrated by two main theories: 
financial intermediary theory of Diamond (1984) and financial intermediary theory of Cerasi 
and Daltung (2000). 
The financial intermediary theory introduced by Diamond (1984) provided 
implication for the portfolio structure of banks. Building on an agent-single principal model 
and assumption of imperfect information, the theory predicts that well-diversified banks with 
a capital structure consisting of deposits are exposed to a low probability of default. In 
addition, the theory shows that diversification is a key element for improving the 
performance of banks by minimizing costs. Providing loans by banks as delegated monitors is 
subject to costs of monitoring. The latter costs could be reduced through diversification, 
which mitigates the incentive problem between borrowers and lenders. That is, the less 
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diversified a bank is, the higher the delegation cost incurred by banks, while the higher 
diversified a bank is, the lower the expected delegation costs. In addition, diversification 
allows better gathering of information required for granting credit. As a result, it helps in 
reducing the asymmetry of information between entrepreneurs and lenders. The latter 
findings are also emphasized by Boyd and Prescott (1986). They showed that given the 
tradeoff between risk sharing and incentive problem, and the tradeoff between incentive 
problem and asymmetric information, the reduction in the asymmetric information reduces 
risk sharing with entrepreneurs. Furthermore, diversification increases the probability that 
banks have sufficient resources to repay claims by depositors. As a result, it reduces the 
bankruptcy cost. On the other hand, diversification increases the costs that are incurred by 
monitoring more projects.  
Building on Diamond (1984), Cerasi and Daltung (2000) provided a theory of 
diversification of banks. They compared between gains and losses from diversification. They 
showed that gains from diversification stem from improving incentives of monitoring by 
banks. This causes an increase in the number of projects that are monitored by banks. The 
costs from diversification stem from the growing size of portfolios needed to achieve 
diversification. The cost of diversification can be shown in the cost disadvantage of large 
banks. This is because of the growing number of projects that have to be monitored by these 
banks. In addition, they distinguished between the consequences of diversification on the 
asset side, i.e. lending diversification, and the liability side, i.e. sources of financing 
diversification, of banks. The diversification on the asset side increases the size of a bank, 
which, in turn, increases the ability of a bank to repay its debt. Regarding the diversification 
on the liability side, they showed that the best financial structure of banks is to depend on 
deposits rather than other sources of financing in their portfolio. That is, they limited the 
gains from diversification to a case of a financial structure that depends more on deposits.  
In line with Cerasi and Daltung (2000), Rossi et al. (2009) showed that diversification 
positively affects performance of banks in terms of risk reduction and profit efficiency. In 
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addition, diversification across industries reduces capital requirements. Notwithstanding its 
benefits, diversification can generate losses in terms of a reduction in cost efficiency 
compared to the focus in the same line of business. The reduction in cost efficiency is due to 
the deterioration in managerial efficiency29.  
4.2. Empirical Analysis 
In establishing the methodologies for the empirical studies, a variety of empirical 
techniques are considered.  
In the empirical study of  Chapter 5, a dynamic panel estimator is considered. The 
study applies two generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators: system GMM and 
orthogonal deviation GMM. The study uses GMM for its advantages over other methods. It 
incorporates both unobserved individual-specific effects and time-variant disturbances in the 
regression model. It is considered a superior method used for examining the dynamics of 
adjustment in panel data with no strong assumption regarding the distributions of 
disturbances and the unobserved panel-level effects. Differently from other formulations of 
panel data analysis30 , GMM works well for panel models where heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation exist (Baltagi, 2009). Two main versions of GMM can be distinguished: 
system GMM introduced by Arellano and Bond (1995) and orthogonal GMM introduced by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Building on Hansen (1980) and 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981), who developed an estimator based on moment conditions, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed an asymptotically efficient first-differenced GMM 
estimator. This estimator includes a finite number of moment restrictions and control for 
serial correlation in both balanced and unbalanced panel data sets. The advantage of the first-
                                                
29 For more analysis about the advantages and disadvantages of diversification, refer to the following 
papers: Jensen (1986), Berger and Ofek (1996), Denis et al. (1997), and Servaes (1997). 
30  Those formulations include error-component regression models, seemingly unrelated regressions 
with error-components, and simultaneous equations with error-components (Biglaiser and Brown, 2003). 
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differenced transformation is the elimination of the individual-specific effects. The resulting 
estimator will be consistent even if the autocorrelation and heterogeneity among panels exist; 
however, there is no guarantee for efficiency. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) proposed an improvement on the standard first-differenced GMM estimator. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) developed an efficient IV estimator based on forward orthogonal 
deviation by specifying an IV matrix, which is not correlated with the individual effects by 
including all individual moment restrictions. Blundell and Bond (1998) extended the linear 
GMM estimator by proposing an asymptomatic efficient estimator that has good finite sample 
properties and does not require homoscedasticity assumption. In addition, it can be adopted 
with existence of weak or strong exogenous variables and weak assumption of stationarity.  
Since the empirical study of the chapter uses panel data, two kinds of statistical 
problems may arise, namely heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. This is because of 
subgroup differences among countries represented in different income groups, which may 
lead to a standard error bias. In addition, the choice of explanatory variables in the study may 
raise endogeneity problem due to the potential bidirectional relationship between some of 
those variables and the dependent variables. Specifically, with respect to the main variable of 
interest, i.e. privatization, governments consider prevailing economic conditions, particularly 
the healthiness of its financial system, before taking the divestiture decision as emphasized by 
Bortolotti et al. (2007). That is, privatization might be determined simultaneously with 
activities of the financial sector. This can be explained by the following two cases. One, 
governments might divest during periods of high stock prices, while avoid divesting during 
periods of low stock prices. Two, the increase of confidence in the financial sector in post 
privatization period, which is resulted from the effect of privatization on the degree of 
liberalization and capital flows, stimulates further privatization transactions. In that case, 
GMM estimation can solve the potential simultaneity and endogeneity biases by allowing for 
incorporating lagged dependent variables and endogenous variables, while getting robust 
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standard errors after controlling for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors 31 
(Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Baltagi, 2009). 
The empirical study of  Chapter 6 adopts three strategies to examine the differences of 
financing decisions of privatized firms. In particular, the study is divided into three parts. The 
first part uses an exploratory analysis to identify the main differences in choices of financing 
among firms with different ownership structures. The study claims that these differences can 
be explained partially by differences in the ownership structure. The second part uses 
nonparametric tests, namely the Wilcoxon signed-rank and Jonckheere-Terpstra tests, to test 
whether there is a statistically significant difference of the mean of choices of financing 
among firms with different ownership structure. Three groups of firms are examined: 
privatized firms, well-established publicly listed firms, and SOEs. In particular, the study 
tests two questions. One, is there a statistical significant difference of the mean short-term 
debt, long-term debt, and total liabilities among firms with different ownership structure? 
Two, is there a statistical significant difference of the mean access to external finance among 
firms with different ownership structure? The third part of the empirical study uses fixed 
effect (within) regression to identify main determinants of choices of finance among the 
different types of firms. 
The empirical study of  Chapter 7 uses operating and financial indicators in order to 
describe, measure, and compare performance of privatized banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. In addition, the study compares these indicators with other privatized firms that 
belong to other economic sectors. The empirical study of that chapter is divided into three 
                                                
31 Another two alternatives that deal with endogeneity problems are two stage least square regression 
with instrumental variables (Bortolotti et al., 2007; Boubakri and Hamza, 2007) and regression with panel-
corrected standard errors (Biglaiser and Brown, 2003). However, the empirical study of  Chapter 5 uses GMM-
estimation for its advantages over the other mentioned alternatives in serving the purpose of the study (Baltagi, 
2009). 
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parts. The first part applies a qualitative analysis in order to analyze the evolution of activities 
of privatized banks. The second part qualitatively scrutinizes the lending behavior of banks 
and their usage of financial instruments. The third part measures performance indicators of 
privatized banks, non-bank financial institutions, and privatized non-financial institutions. In 
the latter part, the study uses a non-parametric test, namely Kruskal-Wallis test, in order to 
test whether there is a statistically significant difference of the median of performance 
indicators among banks, non-bank financial institutions, and privatized non-financial 
institutions. In particular, the study tests whether there is a statistically significant difference 
of the median of return on assets, return on equity, debt-asset, debt-equity, sales-asset, and z-
scores among the different institution groups. 
4.3. Data Collection 
In order to examine the impact of privatization on development of the financial sector 
and the financial system structure, which will be analyzed in  Chapter 5, the study collects 
data from the following sources: World Development Indicators, financial indicators’ dataset 
of Beck et al. (2010), and the World Bank Privatization Database. Data includes developing 
countries from six geographical regions: East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. See Table I-1 in Appendix-I for more details about the sampled countries and their 
respective income group. 
For analyzing choices of financing of privatized firms, which will be examined 
in  Chapter 6, the study constructs a unique dataset that includes data collected from annual 
balance sheets and income statements of Egyptian firms during the period of 2004-2009. The 
data are collected for the following firm groups32: privatized firms, well-established publicly 
                                                
32 Following common practice in literature, e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995), of examining determinants 
of choices of financing, the study eliminates banks (SIC Codes 6000–6299), insurance companies (SIC Codes 
6300–6400), and regulated utilities (SIC Codes 4900–4971). 
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listed firms, and state-owned firms. The dataset is constructed based on the following 
sources: Emerging Markets Information Services (EMIS), the Arab Capital Market Resource 
Center, and the Egyptian for Information Dissemination Center. Data about state-owned 
firms are collected from the Egyptian Business Sector Information Center. 
In order to accomplish the research objectives of  Chapter 7, the study constructs a 
unique dataset that includes a sample of Egyptian banks and non-bank financial institutions 
during the period of 2000-2009. In addition, in order to compare the performance of 
privatized banks and financial institutions with their counterparts in other economic sectors, 
the study collects data about privatized non-financial firms, which belong to the following 
sectors: construction, telecommunication, manufacturing, trade, and utilities. The latter data, 
which are constructed based on financial statements, are collected from three main sources: 
Arab Capital Market Resource Center, Thomson Reuters33, and the Egyptian for Information 
Dissemination Center. Table II-1 in Appendix-II describes the list of sampled banks, financial 
institutions, and privatized non-financial firms that are used in the study. 
In all the previously mentioned empirical studies, the method of blocked adaptive 
computationally efficient outlier nominators (BACON) is used for detecting outliers at 10th 
percentile. The method was developed by Billor et al. (2000). It detects multivariate outliers 
in multivariate models. Compared to other standard methods, BACON provides more reliable 
and robust outlier detection for multivariate models.  
                                                
33 The data from Thomson Reuter, which are used in the comparison between privatized financial 
banks and non-bank financial institutions versus non-financial privatized firms, are collected from Takada, 
Tomomi’s lab, Kobe University. 
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Chapter 5. The Impact of Privatization on Development of the Financial 
Sector: Evidence from Developing Countries 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter empirically examines the impact of spread of privatization on enhancing 
the development of the financial sector and the financial system structures across developing 
countries. From a sample of developing countries, financial indicators are used to evaluate 
the impact of privatization on the development of stock markets and banks. In addition, the 
study demonstrates the impact of privatization on the financial system structures as well as 
overall financial sector performance. Dynamic panel models are used to scrutinize these 
impacts.  
Studying the relative dominance of banks as opposed to stock markets within the 
financial sector has been long debated in the economic literature, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (1999). Nevertheless, studying different determinants of development of the financial 
structure has received less attention. Recent interest on the determinants of the financial 
structure arises because of the growing role of private participation in economic activities, 
which, in turn, could enhance the development of the financial sector. In general, the freer an 
economy is, the more developed the financial sector is. Thus, privatization could enhance the 
activities of the financial sector by freeing economic resources out of the control of the state. 
In other words, privatization encourages new private capital inflows in an economy. 
Privatization affects the financial sector through three channels. The first channel occurs 
when governments choose share issue privatization as a method of divestiture. The second 
channel occurs when governments perform direct sales to a private entrepreneur, who, in turn, 
expands his business by issuing shares or bonds. The third channel occurs when the state sells 
state-owned banks. 
However, the growing participation of the private sector might lead to greater 
improvement in stock markets than banks. This is because one of the substantial targets of the 
private sector is profit maximization through efficiently allocating economic resources and 
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diversifying investments. This pushes the private sector to undertake riskier economic 
activities to reap rapid and instant profits. Although stock markets encompass high-risk 
financial instruments, it may become more attractive to private entrepreneurs to finance their 
projects using such instruments (Song and Thakor, 2010). This is because financial markets 
provide various alternatives of financial instruments with various degrees of riskiness, which 
could be attractive for private firms with various degrees of credit worthiness. On the 
contrary, SOEs have higher tendency to borrow from bank, particularly state-owned banks, in 
order to finance their losses. This is because of the guarantee provided by the central 
government for those firms regardless of their operating and financial performance. This can 
be observed in relatively high volumes of non-performing loans in countries with powerful 
state intervention.  
Given the rationale mentioned above, this empirical study questions the followings. 
(1) Does privatization enhance the development of the banking sector and stock markets? (2) 
Does privatization benefit more stock markets at the expense of banks? (3) Does privatization 
enhance the development of the overall financial sector? 
The study contributes to the relevant literature in two ways. First, by examining the 
impact of privatization on the financial system structure, the study provides more evidence on 
how privatization might benefit more either stock markets or banks. Previous empirical 
evidences focused mainly on the impact of privatization on the development of stock markets 
through share issue privatization and the performance of individual banks. However, those 
evidences did not investigate such impact on the financial system structure. Second, this 
study provides more evidences on the real-financial nexus through a privatization channel.  
This study is organized as follows. After introduction, section  5.2 demonstrates the 
methodology of the study. Section  5.3 describes the data and variables. Section  5.4 reports 
the results of the study. Section  5.5 analyzes the implications of the study. Section  5.6 shows 
the conclusion of the study.  
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5.2. Methodology 
The study argues that privatization enhances the development of the financial sector 
and affects the financial system structure. However, it might benefit more either stock 
markets or banks. The study attempts to answer the following questions. (1) Does 
privatization enhance the development of the banking sector and stock markets? (2) Does 
privatization benefit more stock markets at the expense of banks? (3) Does privatization 
enhance the development of the overall financial sector? In order to answer these questions, 
the study uses different specifications based on the theoretical models explained in  Chapter 4.  
This study is based on number of assumptions of the neo-Keynesian approach. Three 
main assumptions are assumed: (1) the volatilities in the financial sector are caused by 
different macroeconomic factors; (2) the financial sector is integrated with economic 
activities; and (3) fiscal and monetary policies are required to achieve stability in the financial 
sector. Those assumptions are good for representing the important role of the macroeconomic 
policies in developing country on facing their macroeconomic imbalances. By considering 
those assumptions, the study is able to examine the development of the supply side of the 
financial activities. 
In the empirical analysis, the study uses log-linear model by employing GMM 
estimators. Two main GMM estimators are used: system GMM and orthogonal deviation 
GMM. The study treats explanatory variables as endogenous in order to avoid the potential of 
bidirectional relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables, as discussed 
in  Chapter 4.  
For the purpose of the study, the empirical analysis is divided into four specifications. 
The first specification analyzes the impact of privatization on the stock market development. 
The second specification analyzes the impact of privatization on the banking sector 
development. The third specification analyzes the impact of privatization on the financial 
system structure. Finally, the fourth specification analyzes the impact of privatization on the 
overall financial sector development.  
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Stock Market Development - Specification I 
Specification I attempts to examine the impact of privatization on the stock market 
development. According to the discussion in  Chapter 4, different theoretical models are used 
to examine the development of the stock markets. In his model, Blanchard (1981) identified 
interest rate and income level as main determinants of the stock market value. The value of 
stock market is descripted as follows: 
 = 2 =
 !"
2 , 
where  is the value of profits from holding shares,  is the interest rate, and  is the 
income level. 
Following Scott (1966) in his procedures in estimating LM curve, the study 
transforms the previous equation into a linear form by taking natural logarithm and assuming 
 = 0 for simplicity. Thus, the empirical equation is described as follows: 
34 = 34 − 534, 
where  is the value of the stock market, y is the income level, and r is the interest 
rate. 
However, the interest rate () is a function of the level of income 
 and the real 
money supply. This imposes an endogeneity problem. Following Scott (1966) and Arellano 
and Bond (1991), the study solves that by treating   as an endogenous variable. This is 
considered by using the lagged income level and real money supply as instrumental variables. 
Thus, the empirical equation is described as follows: 
ln8 = ln8 − 5ln89 − : ln ;<=>8, 
where 8 is the current value of the stock market, 89 is the one-year lagged income 
level, and ;<=>8 is the real money supply.  
In order to extend the previous model, the study takes into consideration the 
hypothesis of Rajan and Zingales (2003), which shows that the trade openness is a key 
determinant of the development of stock markets. This is because of the importance of trade 
openness in enhancing liberalization in an economy, which, in turn, stimulates activities in 
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the stock market. In addition, the study adds a measure of banking sector development as 
hypothesized by Song and Thakor (2010). The latter hypothesis shows that the development 
of the banking sector has a spillover effect on stock markets. That is, as banks develop, credit 
screening in the financial system is enhanced, which, in turn, boosts high quality credit in 
stock markets. That causes increments in the number of firms that participate in stock 
markets. The study adds annual privatization proceeds ratio as the variable of interest. 
On the basis of the previous studies (Blanchard, 1981; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; 
Song and Thakor, 2010), the empirical equation (1) is used as Specification I in order to 
examine the relationship between the value of the stock market and privatization, which is 
described as follows:  
ln?@A8 = 34B + Bln?@A89 + B5lnC.	_A8 + B:lnC.	_A89 + BElnFG
A8 + BHln
F
G
A89 +
BIln	J8 + BKln	J89 + BLln.@A8	 + BMln.@A89 + BlnN8 + BlnN89 + OA8,  (1) 
where ?@ is the market capitalization used as a proxy for stock market value, C.	_ 
is the GDP per captia, <=  is the real money supply ratio that equals aggregate money supply 
over inflation, 	J is the ratio of annual privatization proceeds to GDP, .@ is total domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector, and N is the trade ratio.  
In the previous specification, there are two main control variables: the GDP per capita 
and the real money supply. The trade ratio and the total domestic credit are commonly used 
variables. Privatization ratio is the variable of interest. 
Banking Sector Development - Specification II 
Specification II attempts to examine the impact of privatization on the banking sector 
development. As mentioned in  Chapter 4, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) adjusted the IS-LM 
model to incorporate the role of bank credits. They incorporated bank loans with economic 
activities through what is so-called bank-loan channel. According to their model, the 
equilibrium condition in the banking sector is determined by: 
)+, , 
 = -+, , 
.1 − 0
, 
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where ) is the lending by the banking sector, + is the interest rate of government 
bonds,   is the lending interest rate,   is the changes in GDP, and .1 − 0
  is the total 
available reserves within the banking sector.  
Thus, the equilibrium condition depends on three main variables: GDP growth, 
interest rates, and available reserves within the banking sector. The log-linear transformation 
of the previous model can be described as follows: 
ln ) =  + lnP + 5ln)P, 
where ) is the volume of loans provided by the banking sector, P is the real interest 
rate that reflects the real changes in the prevailing interest rates, and )P is the available liquid 
reserves within the banking sector.  
In order to extend the previous model, the study adds the impact of inflation as 
suggested by Boyd et al. (2001). The inflation affects the supply of loans within the banking 
sector through their impact on real rate of return on the financial assets. In addition, the study 
adds the impact of stock market development as suggested by Song and Thakor (2010). That 
is, the development of stock markets has a spillover effect on the banking sector. The 
development of stock markets enhances supply of loans by allowing banks to raise their 
equity capital easily to meet their capital requirements. The study adds annual privatization 
proceeds ratio as the variable of interest. 
On the basis of the previous studies (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Boyd et al., 2001; 
Song and Thakor, 2010), the empirical equation (2) is used as Specification II in order to 
examine the relationship between the credit provided by the banking sector and privatization, 
which is described as follows:  
ln.@A8 = B + Bln.@A89 + B5lnC.	_Q8 + B:lnC.	_Q89 + BElnPA8 + BHlnPA89 +
BIln)PA8 	BKln)PA89 + Bln	J8 + Bln	J89 + BLln?@8 + BMln?@89 + B5ln	8 +
B:ln	89 + OA8,       (2) 
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where DC is the domestic credit provided by the banking sector, GDP_g is growth 
rate of GDP, R is real interest rates, LR is bank liquidity reserves, Priv is annual privatization 
ratio, MC is the market capitalization, and P is inflation.  
In the previous specification, there are three main control variables: GDP growth rate, 
interest rates, and bank liquid reserves. Inflation and market capitalization are commonly 
used variables. Privatization ratio is the variable of interest. 
Financial Structure (FS) - Specification III 
Specification III attempts to examine the impact of privatization on the financial 
system structure. The financial system structure measures the relative dominance of stock 
markets compared to banks over financial activities in an economy. According to the 
discussions in  Chapter 4, Boyd and Smith (1998) and Chakraborty and Ray (2006) showed 
that as an economy goes through its growth path, there is a tendency for relying more on 
stock markets, i.e. market-based finance. As an economy moves along its growth path, capital 
is accumulated. As a result, the relative price of capital falls and the monitoring cost arises. 
This implies that large resources are devoted to the requirement of monitoring process. In 
turn, investors will employ more volumes of high return capital technology and it will be 
cheaper for them to issue equities instead of debts. In that situation, the economy will detect 
positive level of activities in the equity market at the expense of the debt market. Thus, in 
general, countries with higher GDP per capita heavily utilize investment projects with high 
return capital technology, which are associated with higher monitoring costs and higher 
market-based finance. Accordingly, GDP per capita is a main determinant of the changes in 
the financial system structure.  
On the basis of the previous studies (Boyd and Smith, 1998; Chakraborty and Ray, 
2006), the relationship between the financial system structure and GDP per capita is 
described as follows: RSy
 = λy
, where FS is the financial system structure, and y is the 
GDP per capita. 
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In order to extend the previous model, the study adds other potential factors that affect 
both stock markets and banks. That is, the study adds inflation as suggested by Boyed et al. 
(2001) and trade as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003). Inflation is an impact factor on 
the financial system structure through its effect on real rate of returns of financial assets, 
which, in turn, adversely affects activities of banks and stock markets. Moreover, the degree 
of openness is an important determinant of the development of the financial system structure 
through its impact on enhancing capital flows. In addition, the study adds annual privatization 
proceeds ratio as the variable of interest.  
On the basis of the previous studies (Boyd and Smith, 1998; Boyed et al., 2001; Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003; Chakraborty and Ray, 2006), the empirical equation (3) is used as 
Specification III in order to examine the relationship between the financial system structure 
and privatization, which is described as follows: 
lnRSA8 = B + BlnRSA89 + B5lnC.	_8 + B:lnC.	_89 + BEln	JA8 + BHln	JA89 +
BIln	8 + BKln	89 + BLlnN8 + BMlnN89 + OA8,                     (3) 
where FS is financial structure ratio, GDP_c is GDP per capita, Priv is annual 
privatization ratio, P is inflation, and T is trade ratio.  
In the previous specification, three indicators measure the financial structure ratio: 
structural activity ratio (SAR), structural size ratio (SSR), and structural efficiency ratio 
(SER) The definition of the previous variables will be described in section  5.3. 
In the specification, GDP per capita is the control variable. Inflation and trade ratio 
are commonly used variables. Privatization ratio is the variable of interest.  
Overall Financial Sector Development (FD) - Specification (IV) 
Specification IV attempts to examine the impact of privatization on the overall 
financial sector development. As discussed in  Chapter 4, Calderon and Liu (2003) showed 
that higher economic growth stimulates financial sector development. The authors showed 
that the economic growth affects the financial sector development through the demand-
following hypothesis introduced by Patrick (1966). According to the latter hypothesis, as an 
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economy grows, the demand for financial services increases, which, in turn, ehnahces the 
development of the financial sector. That is the development of the financial sector is demand 
driven by increases in the demand for the finanical services resulted from the growth of an 
economy.  
In addition, the study adds the degree of financial and trade openness as main 
determinants of the overall financial sector development as suggested by Baltagi et al. (2009). 
The financial and trade openness enhances activities within the financial sector through its 
impact on capital flows.  
Accordingly, the empirical study uses GDP growth, trade ratio, and financial 
liberalization as main determinants of the overall financial sector development. In addition, 
the study adds annual privatization proceeds ratio as the variable of interest.  
On the basis of the previous studies (Calderon and Liu, 2003; Baltagi et al., 2009), the 
empirical equation (4) is used as Specification IV in order to examine the relationship 
between the overall financial sector development and privatization, which is described as 
follows: 
lnR.A8 = B + BlnR.A89 + B5lnC.	_Q8 + B:lnC.	_Q89 + BElnNA8 + BHlnNA89 +
BIlnR)8 + BKlnR)89 + BLln	J8 + BMln	J89 + OA8.        (4) 
where FD is the overall financial sector development, GDP_g is the growth rate of 
GDP, T is the trade ratio, FL is the financial liberalization, and Priv is the privatization ratio.  
In the previous specification, three indicators measure the overall financial sector 
development: finance activity ratio (FAR), finance size ratio (FSR), and finance efficiency 
ratio (FER). The definition of the previous variables will be described in section  5.3.  
In the specification, GDP growth, trade ratio, and financial liberalization are the main 
control variables. Privatization is the variable of interest. 
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5.3. Data and Variables 
Data  
The study uses a sample of 66 developing countries from six geographical regions: 
East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, 
Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. All these countries have adopted 
various privatization plans. For more details about the sampled countries and their respective 
income group, see Table I-1 in appendix-I. 
Data are collected from the World Development Indicators, financial indicators’ 
dataset of Beck et al. (2010), and the World Bank Privatization Database.  
The selection of countries is based on three criteria: the geographical spread and 
privatization history. All those countries have adopted various privatization methods, among 
them share issue privatization. The study examines the link between privatization and the 
development of the financial sector during the period of 1988-2009.  
Variables Definition and Descriptive statistics 
Empirically, measuring financial sector development might be a complicated issue 
due to the multidimensional nature of the financial sector, whose size, activities, and 
efficiency are influenced by various factors (Ang and McKibbin, 2007; Calderon and Liu, 
2003). In order to measure the impact of privatization on the development of the financial 
sector, the study decomposes indicators of financial sector development into four 
components: stock market development, banking sector development, financial system 
structure, and overall financial sector development.  
The study analyzes the impact of privatization on each of the previously mentioned 
components separately. In the forgoing specifications described in section  5.2, there are four 
main dependent variables: stock market development, banking sector development, financial 
system structure, and overall financial sector development. The study uses measures of bank 
and stock market development as suggested by Levine and Zervos (1998a) and Beck and 
Levine (2004). In particular, the study uses market capitalization and domestic credit as 
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measures of stock market and banking sector development, respectively. Market 
capitalization, which is used as a measure of the stock market development, has advantage in 
reflecting the overall size of the market. Market capitalization as defined in Beck et al. (2010) 
equals the value of traded securities divided by GDP. As defined in Beck et al. (2010), the 
total domestic credit includes demand, time, and saving deposits as share of GDP. As 
suggested by Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), Calderon and Liu (2003) and Baltagi et al. (2009), 
the domestic credit is a better proxy for the development of the banking sector than other 
monetary aggregates such as M1 and M2. 
Regarding measuring the development of the financial system structure and the 
overall financial sector development, as indicated in Specification III and Specification IV, 
respectively, the study uses measures included in the framework of Levine (2002). These 
measures reflect three aspects of the financial system (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1999; 
Levine, 2002): activities, size, and efficiency. Activities within the financial sector show the 
volume of credit provided by banks and stock markets to entrepreneurs. Two main measures 
reflect the activities within the financial sector: total value traded and bank credits as 
percentages of GDP, which show the volume of financial instruments provided by stock 
markets and banks, respectively. Regarding the size of the financial sector, market 
capitalization and bank credits as percentages of GDP are used to reflect size of stock 
markets and the banking sector, respectively. With respect to measuring the efficiency within 
the financial sector, the turnover ratio and overhead cost ratio are widely used as measures of 
market efficiency and bank efficiency, respectively. The turnover ratio is defined as the value 
of traded securities as a percentage of market capitalization. Overhead cost is a measure of 
banking sector efficiency calculated as the operating expenses divided by total assets of 
banks. Based on the previously mentioned measures of activities, size, and efficiency, 
indictors of the financial system structure and overall financial sector development are 
defined  as suggested in Levine (2002).  
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With respect to the financial system structure, it measures the relative dominance of 
stock markets compared to the banking sector within the financial sector. According to 
Levine (2002), three main indicators identify it: structure activity ratio (SAR), structure size 
ratio (SSR), and structure efficiency ratio (SER). Structure activity ratio measures activities 
of stock market relative to activities of the banking sector, which is described as follows: 
SUP = ln ;VWVXY >, where SUP is the structure activity ratio, NZN is the total value traded of 
shares in the stock market, and .@ is the total domestic credit provided by the banking sector. 
Structure size ratio measures size of stock markets relative to size of the banking sector, 
which is described as follows: SSP = ln ;<YXY>, where SSP is the structure size ratio, ?@ is 
the market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and .@  is the total domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector. Finally, structure efficiency ratio measures efficiency of 
stock markets relative to efficiency of the banking sector, which is described as follows: 
S[P = lnNZN ∗ \@
, where S[P  is the structure efficiency ratio, NZN  is the total value 
traded of shares in the stock market, and \@ is the overhead cost within the banking sector.  
With respect to the overall financial sector development, it measures the overall 
evolution of both banks and financial markets in terms of activities, size, and efficiency. 
According to Levine (2002), three main indicators identify it: finance activity ratio (FAR), 
finance size ratio (FSR), and finance efficiency ratio (FER). Finance activity ratio is a 
conglomerate measure of activities of stock markets and the banking sector, which is 
described as follows: RUP = lnNZN ∗ .@
, where RUP is the finance activity ratio, NZN is 
the total value traded of shares in the stock market, and .@  is the total domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector. Finance size ratio is a conglomerate measure of size of stock 
markets and the banking sector, which is described as follows: RSP = ln?@ ∗ .@
, where 
RSP is the finance size ratio, ?@ is the market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and .@ 
is the total domestic credit provided by the banking sector. Finally, finance efficiency ratio is 
a conglomerate measure of efficiency of stock markets and the banking sector, which is 
described as follows: R[P = ln ;VWV]Y >, where R[P is the finance efficiency ratio, NZN is the 
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total value traded of shares in the stock market, and \@  is the overhead cost within the 
banking sector.  
With respect to the explanatory variables used in the forgoing specifications of the 
study, they are describes as follows. The study uses real interest rate, which explains big 
variations in activities of the banking sector. This is consistent with the hypothesis of 
McKinnon-Shaw, which states that the real interest rate reflects the scariticy of the capital in 
a country (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). In addition, real intrest rates stimulate savings and 
the credit provided by the banking sector. Although nominal interest rates may have poor 
explanatory power for variations of activities within the banking sector, real interest rates 
perform better. That is because nominal interest rates do not take into account other factors 
that affect the marginal productivity of capital, e.g., changes in inflation and lack of 
credibility of economic policies, while real rates take into consideration those factors 
(Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995). Following Ang and McKibbin (2007), the study uses real 
GDP per capita as a proxy for the status of economic development in a country. Year 2000 is 
used as a base year in the calculations of the real values. The study controls for the impact of 
the degree of openness by using the trade ratio calculated as the sum of export and imports 
relative to GDP of a particular country. As suggested by Baltagi et al. (2009), the study uses 
net foreign assets ratio, which is defined as foreign assets held by monetary authorities and 
deposit money banks minus foreign liabilities (Beck et al., 2010). By considering changes in 
deposit money banks, the latter variable reflects the status of financial liberalization and gives 
a better measure for financial liberalization than the gross private capital flows.  
In addition, the study uses bank liquid reserves as suggested by Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) and Giorgio (1999). Bank liquid reserves as in Beck et al. (2010) includes available 
currency holdings and claims on governments, non-financial public firms, the private sector, 
and other banking institutions. Following Blanchard (1981), the study uses the real money 
supply, which is calculated as the aggregated money supply adjusted by the inflation. The 
real money supply is important factor in explaining variations in stock markets. Inflation as 
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suggested by Boyd et al. (2001) is considered because of its potential negative impacts on 
activities of the banking sector. Following Bortolotti et al. (2003) and Kikeri et al. (1994), the 
study uses annual privatization proceeds ratio, which is calculated as percentages of GDP, as 
the main variable of interest. This measure reflects the volume of transaction that generates 
revenues to governments.  
The tables below describe the definitions of variables and summary statistics of 
variables used in the previously mentioned specifications34.  
Table  5-1 Definition of Main Variables Used in Examining the Development of the 
Financial Sector 
Variable Definition 
Market Capitalization Ratio Total Stock Market Capitalization/GDP  
Domestic Credit 
Demand, Time and Saving Deposits in Deposit Money Banks 
and other Financial Institutions as a Share of GDP 
Trade Ratio (Exports-Imports)/GDP 
Real Money Supply Aggregate Money Supply/Inflation 
Inflation  Inflation Rate 
Annual Privatization Ratio Annual Privatization Proceeds/GDP 
Lending Interest Rate Lending Interest Rate 
Bank Liquid Reserves 
Currency Holdings and Deposits/Claims on other Governments, 
Non-financial Public Firms, the Private Sector, and other 
Banking Institutions 
Net Foreign Assets 
Foreign Assets Held by Monetary Authorities +Deposit Money 
Banks-Foreign Liabilities 
Structure Activity Ratio Ln(Total Value Traded Ratio/the Bank Credit Ratio) 
Structure Size Ratio Ln(Market Capitalization Ratio/the Bank Credit Ratio) 
Structure Efficiency Ratio Ln(Total Value Traded Ratio*Overhead Cost) 
Finance Activity Ratio Ln(Total Value Traded Ratio*the Private Credit Ratio) 
Finance Size Ratio Ln(Market Capitalization* the Private Credit Ratio) 
Finance Efficiency Ratio Ln(Total Value Traded Ratio/Overhead Cost) 
 
                                                
34 Various tables for the summary statistics are required. This is because the study adopts a method of 
multivariate outlier detection, namely blocked adaptive computationally efficient outlier nominators (BACON), 
as described in  Chapter 4. 
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Table  5-2 Summary Statistics of Main Variables Used in Examining the Impact of 
Privatization on the Development of the Stock Market 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Ln Stock Market Capitalization 2.66 1.41 -5.49 5.80 983 
Ln GDP Per-Capita 7.46 1.08 4.87 10.17 983 
Ln (M/P) 22.58 3.60 1.39 31.61 983 
Ln Domestic Credits by Banks 3.76 0.66 1.59 5.41 983 
Ln Trade Ratio 4.22 0.53 2.61 5.40 983 
Ln Annual Privatization/GDP 0.68 1.52 0.00 12.81 983 
Table  5-3 Summary Statistics of Main Variables Used in Examining the Impact of 
Privatization on the Development of the Banking Sector 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Ln Domestic Credits by Banks 3.77 0.68 1.59 5.40 730 
Ln GDP Growth 1.49 0.77 -3.55 2.93 730 
Ln Real Interest Rate 0.86 0.81 -1.54 4.68 730 
Ln Bank Liquid Reserves  2.23 0.83 -0.95 4.36 730 
Ln Stock Market Capitalization 2.75 1.40 -2.29 5.80 730 
Ln Annual Privatization/GDP 0.69 1.53 0.00 11.77 730 
Ln GDP Deflator 2.02 0.95 -3.09 5.94 730 
Table  5-4 Summary Statistics of Main Variables Used in Examining the Impact of 
Privatization on the Development of the Financial Structure 
The Dependent Variable is the Structural Activity Ratio 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Structural Activity Ratio -3.13 1.97 -12.80 1.08 965 
Ln GDP Per-Capita 7.46 1.08 4.87 10.17 965 
Ln GDP Deflator 2.19 1.21 -3.09 8.83 965 
Ln Annual Privatization/GDP 0.66 1.43 0.00 11.31 965 
Ln Trade Ratio 4.22 0.54 2.61 5.40 965 
The Dependent Variable is the Structural Size Ratio 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Structural Size Ratio -1.09 1.22 -8.74 1.81 982 
Ln GDP Per-Capita 7.46 1.08 4.87 10.17 982 
Ln GDP Deflator 2.20 1.21 -3.09 8.83 982 
Ln Annual Privatization/GDP 0.65 1.43 0.00 11.31 982 
Ln Trade Ratio 4.22 0.53 2.61 5.40 982 
The Dependent Variable is the Structural Efficiency Ratio 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Structural Efficiency Ratio 2.18 2.04 -6.93 6.53 817 
Ln GDP Per-Capita 7.50 1.07 4.87 10.17 817 
Ln GDP Deflator 2.12 1.16 -3.09 8.03 817 
Ln Annual Privatization/GDP 0.70 1.45 0.00 11.31 817 
Ln Trade Ratio 4.23 0.53 2.62 5.40 817 
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Table  5-5 Summary Statistics of Main Variables Used in Examining the Impact of 
Privatization on the Development of the Overall Financial Sector 
The Dependent Variable is Finance Activity Ratio 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Finance Activity Ratio 4.48 2.61 -4.24 10.47 784 
Ln GDP Growth 1.54 0.69 -3.55 2.93 784 
Ln Trade Ratio 4.26 0.53 2.61 5.40 784 
Ln Net Foreign Assets 2.36 1.00 -3.66 4.30 784 
Ln Annual Privatization/GDP 0.67 1.44 0.00 11.31 784 
The Dependent Variable is Finance Size Ratio 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Finance Size Ratio 6.52 1.82 -0.13 10.99 793 
Ln GDP Growth 1.54 0.69 -3.55 2.93 793 
Ln Trade Ratio 4.26 0.53 2.61 5.40 793 
Ln Net Foreign Assets 2.36 1.00 -3.66 4.30 793 
Ln Annual Privatization/GDP 0.66 1.44 0.00 11.31 793 
The Dependent Variable is Finance Efficiency Ratio 
Variable  Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Finance Efficiency Ratio -0.54 2.38 -8.29 5.39 681 
Ln GDP Growth 1.56 0.68 -3.55 2.93 681 
Ln Trade Ratio 4.27 0.52 2.69 5.40 681 
Ln Net Foreign Assets 2.42 0.91 -3.11 4.30 681 
Ln Annual Privatization/GDP 0.71 1.44 0.00 11.31 681 
5.4. Results 
As outlined in section  5.2, the empirical analysis of the impact of privatization on the 
development of the financial sector consists of four specifications. Table  5-6 reports the 
results of Specification I, which describes the determinants of the development of the stock 
market. The study has found that one-year lagged value of market capitalization is 
statistically significant and positively affects the current level of market capitalization at 1% 
significance level in both system GMM and orthogonal GMM. For both system GMM and 
orthogonal GMM, there is a positive and statistically significant impact of the growth rate of 
real GDP per capita on stock market capitalization ratio. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis states that as an economy grows, large-scale industries and capital-intensive 
industries gradually replace traditional sectors in an economy. That, in turn, is followed by a 
movement of the private sector towards market-based finance. The ratio of aggregate money 
supply to inflation has a positive and statistically significant impact on stock market 
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capitalization. This is consistent with the view that money promotes growth as assumed by 
the Monetarism and neo-Keynesians. In addition, the later ratio has a negative and 
statistically significant one-year lagged effect on stock market capitalization. 
Table  5-6 Determinants of the Development of the Stock Market 
Dependent Variable 
Stock Market Capitalization 
System GMM Orthogonal GMM 
ln(Stock Market Capitalization)t-1 0.667*** 0.705*** 
 
(0.047) (0.037) 
ln(GDP per capita)t 3.758*** 1.520**  
 
(1.095) (0.731) 
ln(GDP per capita)t-1 -3.739*** -1.492**  
 
(1.039) (0.711) 
ln(M/P)t 0.110** 0.082*  
 
(0.050) (0.045) 
ln(M/P)t-1 -0.074* -0.054*  
 
(0.041) (0.031) 
ln(Domestic Credit)t 0.147 0.118 
 
(0.193) (0.153) 
ln(Domestic Credit)t-1 -0.196 -0.200 
 
(0.195) (0.171) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t 0.048*** 0.054*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t-1 0.009 0.007 
 
(0.012) (0.009) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t  0.505 0.365 
 (0.343) (0.301) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t-1 -0.532* -0.314 
 (0.274) (0.272) 
No.Observations 885 885 
No.Countries 66 66 
No.Instruments 22 22 
Ar1 0.001 0 
AR2 0.485 0.522 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.000 0.000 
Hansen test of overid. Restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.007 0.008 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
Notes: The values reported in Table  5-6 are GMM regression estimates during the period 1988-2009. All 
variables are transformed using natural logarithm. The dependent variable is the values of stock market 
capitalization ratio. The independent variables are one-year lagged values of stock market capitalization ratio 
and current and one-year lagged values of the following variables: ratio of money supply over price level, 
domestic credits by banking sector, annual privatization proceeds ratio, and trade ratio. The standard deviation is 
reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
In addition, as shown in Table  5-6, the level of domestic credit provided by banks has 
no statistically significant contemporaneous or one-year lagged impact on stock market 
capitalization. With respect to privatization, the results show a positive contemporaneous and 
statistically significant impact on stock market capitalization. This is consistent with the 
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hypothesis of the study that privatization induces new activities in stock markets. Trade ratio 
has a positive contemporaneous impact on stock market capitalization; however, it is 
statistically insignificant. Trade ratio has a negative one-year lagged effect on market 
capitalization; however, it is statistically insignificant in orthogonal GMM, but statistically 
significant in system GMM. As reported in Table  5-6, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in 
first differences shows no proof of a second order autocorrelation and there is no indication 
of misspecification bias. 
Table  5-7 reports the results of Specification II, which describes the determinants of 
the development of the banking sector. The study has found that one-year lagged value of 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector is statistically significant and positively 
affects the current level of the domestic credit at 1% significance level in both system GMM 
and orthogonal GMM.  
The GDP growth has a negative and statistically significant contemporaneous impact 
on domestic credit ratio. GDP growth has a negative one-year lagged impact on domestic 
credit ratio; however, it is statistically insignificant. With respect to the ratio of the annual 
privatization proceeds, it has a negative impact on domestic credit ratio. The one-year lagged 
effect of privatization on the domestic credit is positive. However, the latter two effects are 
statistically insignificant. Inflation has a contemporaneous negative and statistically 
significant impact on domestic credit.  
The bank liquid reserves ratio has a contemporaneous negative and statistically 
significant impact on the domestic credit. However, the ratio has a positive and statistically 
significant one-year lagged impact on the domestic credit. The overall impact of bank liquid 
reserves on domestic credit ratio is negative. Market capitalization and real interest rate have 
no statistically significant impact on domestic credit by the banking sector.  
As reported in Table  5-7, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences shows 
no proof of a second order autocorrelation and there is no indication of misspecification bias. 
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Table  5-7 Determinants of the Development of the Banking Sector 
Dependent Variable 
Domestic Credit 
System GMM Orthogonal GMM 
ln(Domestic Credit)t-1 1.048*** 1.042*** 
 
(0.048) (0.027) 
ln(GDP Growth)t -0.060** -0.032*  
 
(0.026) (0.019) 
ln(GDP Growth)t-1 -0.021 -0.002 
 
(0.016) (0.012) 
ln(Real Interest Rate)t 0.001 -0.016 
 
(0.022) (0.019) 
ln(Real Interest Rate)t-1 -0.003 -0.008 
 
(0.027) (0.026) 
ln(Bank Liquid reserves)t -0.083** -0.084*** 
 
(0.035) (0.028) 
ln(Bank Liquid reserves)t-1 0.078** 0.083*** 
 
(0.031) (0.025) 
ln(Stock Market Capitalization)t 0.051 0.035 
 
(0.036) (0.027) 
ln(Stock Market Capitalization)t-1 -0.006 -0.013 
 
(0.025) (0.022) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t -0.004 -0.006 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t-1 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
ln(Inflation)t -0.060** -0.054**  
 
(0.024) (0.022) 
ln(Inflation)t-1 -0.003 0.002 
 
(0.026) (0.024) 
No.Observations 602 602 
No.Countries 59 59 
No.Instruments 26 26 
Ar1 0.023 0.025 
AR2 0.918 0.907 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.015 0.048 
Hansen test of overid. Restrictions (Prob > 
chi2) 
0.047 0.041 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
  
Notes: The values reported in Table  5-7 are GMM regression estimates during the period 1988-2009. The 
dependent variable is the values of total domestic credit ratio. The independent variables are one-year lagged 
values of domestic credit ratio and current and one-year lagged values of the following variables: GDP growth, 
net interest margin, bank liquid reserves, and stock market capitalization ratio, annual privatization proceeds 
ratio, and inflation. The standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table  5-8 reports the results of Specification III, which describes the determinants of 
the development of the financial system structure. The annual GDP per capita has a 
contemporaneous positive and statistically significant impact on structural activity ratio, 
structural size ratio, and structural efficiency ratio. However, GDP per capita has a negative 
and significant one-year lagged effect on the previously mentioned ratio of financial structure. 
111 
 
 
 
 
Inflation has neither contemporaneous nor lagged impact on the structural activity, structural 
size, or structural efficiency ratios. 
Table  5-8 Determinants of the Development of the Structure of the Financial System  
Dependent Variable 
Structural Activity Structural Size Structural Efficiency 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
Structural Activity Ratio t-1 0.691*** 0.777***    
   
 
(0.074) (0.049) 
   
   
Structural Size Ratio t-1   
0.676*** 0.781*** 
 
   
   
(0.062) (0.047) 
 
  
Structural Efficiency Ratio t-1     
0.734*** 0.794*** 
     
(0.084) (0.079) 
ln(GDP per capita)t 5.020** 4.174*** 5.986*** 3.160*** 4.367* 3.389**  
 
(2.085) (1.260) (1.671) (0.752) (2.456) (1.617) 
ln(GDP per capita)t-1 -5.038** -4.298*** -6.195*** -3.183*** -4.401* -3.466**  
 
(2.022) (1.235) (1.648) (0.750) (2.394) (1.605) 
ln(Inflation)t 0.082 0.071 -0.026 0.021 0.035 0.073*  
 
(0.075) (0.049) (0.048) (0.036) (0.076) (0.045) 
ln(Inflation)t-1 -0.035 -0.013 0.065 0.068 -0.029 -0.009 
 
(0.059) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) (0.050) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t 0.090** 0.114*** 0.054*** 0.089*** 0.072** 0.071*** 
 
(0.037) (0.023) (0.019) (0.017) (0.032) (0.025) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t-1 0.021 0.033** 0.002 0.010 0.044* 0.047*** 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.024) (0.018) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t  0.362 0.603 0.599** 0.190 0.932** 0.941**  
 
(0.473) (0.417) (0.297) (0.268) (0.401) (0.358) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t-1  -0.615 -0.611 -0.417 -0.285 -0.789** -0.756**  
 
(0.425) (0.415) (0.296) (0.286) (0.374) (0.378) 
No.Observations 868 868 884 884 724 724 
No.Countries 65 65 66 66 64 64 
No.Instruments 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ar1 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.464 0.438 0.815 0.804 0.027 0.03 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.337 0.374 0.023 0.027 0.008 0.04 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
      
Notes: The values reported in Table  5-8 are GMM regression estimates during the period 1988-2009. The 
dependent variables are structure activity ratio (SAR), structure size ratio (SSR), and structure efficiency ratio 
(SER). The independent variables are one-year lagged values of SAR, SSR, and SER and current and one-year 
lagged values of the following variables: GDP growth, ratio of money supply over the price level, annual 
privatization proceeds ratio, and trade ratio. The standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
As shown in Table  5-8, the current trade ratios positively affect the structural 
efficiency ratio; and it is statistically significantly. However, the latter ratios have negative 
and statistically significant one-year lagged effect on the structural efficiency ratio. The 
annual privatization ratio has a contemporaneous positive and statistically significant impact 
on the structural activity ratio, structural size ratio, and structural efficiency ratio. Moreover, 
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privatization has a positive one-year lagged effect on the three structural ratios, but it is 
statistically significant only for structural efficiency ratio. The latter ratio is statistically 
significant for the structural activity ratio when using orthogonal GMM.  
As reported in Table  5-8, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences shows 
no proof of a second order autocorrelation and there is no indication of misspecification bias 
for structural activity and structural size ratios. However, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 
shows a second order autocorrelation for the structural efficiency ratio. 
Table  5-9 reports the results of Specification IV, which describes the determinants of 
the development of the overall financial sector. The study has found that GDP growth has a 
contemporaneous positive impact on the development of the finance activity, finance size, 
and finance efficiency ratios. The previous impacts are statistically significant for all 
estimators except for system GMM when the dependent variable is the finance activity and 
finance efficiency ratios. The GDP growth has a negative one-year lagged effect on finance 
activity and finance efficiency ratios. However, it is only statistically significant for finance 
efficiency ratio. Nevertheless, GDP growth has a positive one-year lagged effect on the 
financial size ratio; however, it is statistically insignificant. In addition, trade openness and 
financial liberalization have positive contemporaneous impact on the development of the 
three measures of overall financial development. However, the sign is negative for the impact 
of financial liberalization on finance size ratio when using system GMM estimator. Contrary, 
the one-year lagged effect of trade and financial openness negatively affect the overall 
financial development. The latter effect is statistically significant for the impact of trade on 
finance activity ratio. Privatization has a statistically significant contemporaneous positive 
impact on the finance activity, finance size, and finance efficiency ratios. In addition, 
privatization has a positive one-year lagged effect on the three measures of the overall 
financial development; however, it is statistically insignificant.  
As reported in Table  5-9, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences shows 
no proof of a second order autocorrelation and there is no indication of misspecification bias 
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for finance efficiency ratio. However, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) shows a second 
order autocorrelation for the finance size ratio. Hansen and Sargan tests failed to meet the 
identification restrictions. 
Table  5-9 Determinants of the Development of Overall Financial System 
Dependent Variable 
Finance Activity Finance Size Finance Efficiency 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
Finance Activity Ratiot-1 0.799*** 0.799***    
  
 
(0.075) (0.065) 
   
  
Finance Size Ratiot-1   
0.700*** 0.857*** 
 
  
   
(0.070) (0.046) 
 
  
Finance Efficiency Ratiot-1     
0.982*** 0.978*** 
     
(0.083) (0.059) 
ln(GDP growth)t 0.038 0.125* 0.091* 0.143*** 0.100 0.173*** 
 
(0.079) (0.065) (0.049) (0.041) (0.089) (0.056) 
ln(GDP growth)t-1 -0.110 -0.047 0.021 0.014 -0.164* -0.104*  
 
(0.080) (0.057) (0.046) (0.031) (0.096) (0.060) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t  1.902*** 1.727*** 0.729 0.415 0.970 1.129*  
 
(0.624) (0.558) (0.509) (0.406) (0.642) (0.646) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t-1  -1.663*** -1.592*** -0.315 -0.234 -0.940 -1.141*  
 
(0.623) (0.541) (0.543) (0.372) (0.633) (0.638) 
ln(Net Foreign Assets)t 0.078 0.131* 0.052 -0.008 0.196 0.202**  
 
(0.081) (0.070) (0.088) (0.048) (0.159) (0.096) 
ln(Net Foreign Assets)t-1 -0.073 -0.016 -0.024 -0.007 -0.140 -0.171*  
 
(0.085) (0.072) (0.067) (0.057) (0.095) (0.090) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t 0.077** 0.058** 0.041* 0.046*** 0.103** 0.073*** 
 
(0.034) (0.024) (0.020) (0.016) (0.042) (0.026) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t-1 0.050 0.030 0.023 0.014 0.046 0.016 
 
(0.036) (0.027) (0.019) (0.015) (0.043) (0.029) 
No.Observations 668 668 675 675 576 576 
No.Countries 65 65 65 65 62 62 
No.Instruments 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ar1 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
AR2 0.64 0.628 0.005 0.009 0.421 0.393 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.237 0.362 0.005 0.003 0.081 0.012 
Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.853 0.514 0.133 0.063 0.152 0.028 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
      
Notes: the values reported in Table  5-9 are GMM regression estimates during the period 1988-2009. The 
dependent variables are finance activity ratio (FAR), finance size ratio (FSR), and finance efficiency ratio 
(FER). The independent variables are one-year lagged values of FAR, FSR, and SER and current and one-year 
lagged values of the following variables: GDP growth, trade ratio, net foreign assets, and annual privatization 
proceeds ratio. The standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
5.5. Implication of the Study 
The study has a number of theoretical and empirical implications. The theoretical 
implication of this study is represented in the following two points. First, the importance of 
not treating the financial development in a country as an aggregate phenomenon; instead, it 
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should be disaggregated into sub-dimensions. This is because different factors have a 
relatively different impact on the various dimensions of the financial sector, mainly: size, 
activities, and efficiency. Second, researchers should consider the impact of the growth on the 
financial sector development. Although this result might not be new as shown in Calderon 
and Liu (2003), the findings in this study provide more evidence on the long debate regarding 
the potential growth impact on the financial sector.  
On the practical side, the study has showed a number of interesting results that are 
useful for policy makers. First, privatization positively affects the development of the 
financial sector, in particular local stock markets. Second, trade openness is an essential 
factor that increases volume of transactions within the financial sector, measured by total 
value traded and domestic credit. Third, income level is an important factor in evolving 
market-based financial structures.  
The previous three main results have major implications for policy makers. First, by 
empowering the private sector in an economy and increasing its participation in economic 
activities, activities of the financial sector can be developed. This has an implication for 
developing countries that aim at improving activities, size, and efficiency within the financial 
sector. That is, government should support policies that encourage the participation of the 
private sector to engage more in economic activities, which, in turn, stimulates financial 
sector development. For countries that aim at reviving its local stock markets, e.g. Egypt, it 
should consider privatizing its remaining SOEs, which could help in encouraging capital 
accumulation and investments and, in turn, accelerating the developmental pace of the 
financial sector. However, when setting up a privatization plan, government should consider 
a potential loss in activities of the banking sector. Second, income level of a country is an 
important factor for financial sector development. Governments aiming at deepening their 
financial sector should consider policies that support improving income level within a 
country. That is, a more prosperous economy is, a more deepening its financial sector is. 
Finally, government in developing countries should set up a strategy for more liberalization 
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of its economy. That is because encouraging trade liberalization enables countries to attract 
foreign investment, which, in turn, stimulates activities within the financial sector. 
5.6. Conclusion  
The study has shown that privatization has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the development of market-based financial structure and the overall financial 
sector development. This was shown in the statistically significant impact of the annual 
privatization ratio on ratios of stock market capitalization, structural activity, structural size, 
structural efficiency, finance activity, finance size, and finance efficiency. This is due to the 
significant impact of privatization on stock markets, when governments divest their SOEs 
through share issue privatization. The previous results support the hypothesis that there is a 
tendency for developing countries toward favoring share issue privatization to develop their 
financial markets. Share issue privatization plays a major role in increasing the number of 
publicly listed firms, which, in turn, leads to higher activity, size, and efficiency of stock 
markets. Another way through which privatization can positively affect the development of 
the financial market is the growth channel. That is, as an economy grows, it depends more on 
industrialization and the financial structure tends to be more market-based finance. 
Privatization supports the growth channel by developing and enhancing activities of 
manufacturing sectors. One further link between privatization and stock market development 
is the nature of the ownership. Private investors are more engaged in riskier activities and 
could raise funds easier from stock markets than the banking sector. This is because financial 
markets provide various financial instruments with various degrees of riskiness. Contrary, 
privatization has no statistically significant impact on the banking sector. 
This study has shown that banks and financial markets neither compete nor cooperate. 
This was shown by the statistically insignificance of the association between market 
capitalization and the domestic credit provided by the banking sector. This partially supports 
other empirical evidences that showed that banks evolve independently of stock markets.  
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This study is consistent with other findings with respect to the importance of openness 
and financial liberalization for the overall financial sector development. However, the study 
has distinguished between the financial development in terms of activities, size, and 
efficiency. In this context, the study has found that although trade openness measured by the 
trade ratio affects the structural efficiency and finance activities ratios, it does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the finance size or finance efficiency ratios. This is mainly 
due to the impact of liberalization on increasing the number of market participants; however, 
it may not have such impact on the volatility of stock prices or the costs of financial services. 
On the other hand, the study has found that financial liberalization does not have such impact 
on the overall financial development ratios when compared to the trade ratio. 
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5.7. Appendix: Examining the Impact of Privatization on the Development of the 
Financial Sector after Excluding Former Communist and Socialist Countries  
This section reports results of the previously mentioned specification of the study 
regarding the impacts of privatization on the financial after excluding former communist and 
socialist countries from the sample. Table  5-10 reports the results of Specification I, which 
describes the determinants of the development of the stock market.  
Table  5-10 Determinants of the Development of the Stock Market after Excluding 
Former Communist and Socialist Countries 
Dependent Variable 
Stock Market Capitalization 
System GMM Orthogonal GMM 
ln(Stock Market Capitalization)t-1 0.643*** 0.734*** 
 
(0.062) (0.049) 
ln(GDP per capita)t 1.144 0.817 
 
(0.801) (0.513) 
ln(GDP per capita)t-1 -1.321* -0.839* 
 
(0.767) (0.491) 
ln(M/P)t 0.099** 0.049 
 
(0.039) (0.029) 
ln(M/P)t-1 -0.05 -0.029 
 
(0.031) (0.020) 
ln(Domestic Credit)t 0.329* 0.309** 
 
(0.193) (0.147) 
ln(Domestic Credit)t-1 -0.271* -0.397** 
 
(0.156) (0.157) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t 0.048 0.073*** 
 
(0.031) (0.019) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t-1 0.018 0.02 
 
(0.026) (0.019) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t  0.407 0.373 
 
(0.392) (0.335) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t-1  -0.154 -0.17 
 
(0.360) (0.344) 
No.Observations 627 627 
No.Countries 43 43 
No.Instruments 22 22 
Ar1 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.885 0.978 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.000 0.003 
Hansen test of overid. Restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.049 0.074 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Notes: The values reported in Table  5-10 are GMM regression estimates during the period 1988-2009 after 
excluding former communist and socialist countries. All variables are transformed using natural logarithm. The 
dependent variable is the values of stock market capitalization ratio. The independent variables are one-year 
lagged values of stock market capitalization ratio and current and one-year lagged values of the following 
variables: ratio of money supply over price level, domestic credits by banking sector, annual privatization 
proceeds ratio, and trade ratio. The standard deviation is reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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As shown in Table  5-10, the one-year lagged value of market capitalization is 
statistically significant and positively affects the current level of market capitalization at 1% 
significance level in both system GMM and orthogonal GMM. For both system GMM and 
orthogonal GMM, there is a negative and statistically significant impact of the one-year 
lagged values of growth rate of real GDP per capita on stock market capitalization ratio. The 
ratio of aggregate money supply to inflation has a positive impact on stock market 
capitalization; however, it is statistically significant only for system GMM. In addition, the 
later ratio has a negative one-year lagged effect on stock market capitalization; however, it is 
statistically insignificant. The level of domestic credit provided by banks has a positive and 
statistically significant contemporaneous impact on stock market capitalization. Moreover, 
the previous ratio has a negative and statistically significant one-year lagged impact on stock 
market capitalization. Trade ratio has no statistically significant impact on stock market 
capitalization. With respect to the privatization ratio, the results show a positive 
contemporaneous and one-year lagged impact on stock market capitalization; however, it is 
significant only for orthogonal GMM.  
As reported in the table, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences shows 
no proof of a second order autocorrelation and there is no indication of misspecification bias. 
Table  5-11 reports the results of Specification II, which describes the determinants of 
the development of the banking sector. The one-year lagged value of domestic credit is 
statistically significant and positively affects the current level of domestic credit at 1% 
significance level in both system GMM and orthogonal GMM. The GDP growth has a 
negative and statistically significant contemporaneous impact on the domestic credit ratio. 
GDP growth has a negative one-year lagged impact on domestic credit ratio; however, it is 
statistically significant only for system GMM. Annual privatization proceeds ratio has a 
negative contemporaneous impact on domestic credit ratio; however, it is statistically 
insignificant. The one-year lagged effect of privatization on the domestic credit is positive; 
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but it is statistically insignificant. Inflation has a contemporaneous negative and statistically 
significant impact on the domestic credit.  
Table  5-11 Determinants of the Development of the Banking Sector after Excluding 
Former Communist and Socialist Countries 
Dependent Variable 
Domestic Credit 
System GMM Orthogonal GMM 
ln(Domestic Credit)t-1 0.978*** 0.994*** 
 
(0.043) (0.023) 
ln(GDP Growth)t -0.074** -0.039*   
 
(0.027) (0.023) 
ln(GDP Growth)t-1 -0.030* -0.002 
 
(0.016) (0.013) 
ln(Real Interest Rate)t -0.009 -0.015 
 
(0.025) (0.020) 
ln(Real Interest Rate)t-1 0.006 0.008 
 
(0.025) (0.027) 
ln(Bank Liquid reserves)t -0.055* -0.072**  
 
(0.032) (0.029) 
ln(Bank Liquid reserves)t-1 0.089*** 0.098*** 
 
(0.031) (0.025) 
ln(Stock Market Capitalization)t 0.083** 0.057 
 
(0.037) (0.036) 
ln(Stock Market Capitalization)t-1 -0.014 -0.024 
 
(0.037) (0.036) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t -0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t-1 0.002 0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
ln(Inflation)t -0.037* -0.043*   
 
(0.021) (0.023) 
ln(Inflation)t-1 0.019 0.017 
 
(0.024) (0.026) 
No.Observations 412 412 
No.Countries 37 37 
No.Instruments 26 26 
Ar1 0.047 0.049 
AR2 0.926 0.409 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.087 0.409 
Hansen test of overid. Restrictions (Prob > chi2) 0.386 0.430 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Notes: The values reported in Table  5-11are GMM regression estimates during the period 1988-2009 after 
excluding former communist and socialist countries. The dependent variable is the values of total domestic 
credit ratio. The independent variables are one-year lagged values of domestic credit ratio and current and one-
year lagged values of the following variables: GDP growth, net interest margin, bank liquid reserves, and stock 
market capitalization ratio, annual privatization proceeds ratio, and inflation. The standard deviation is reported 
in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
In addition, as shown in Table  5-11, bank liquid reserves ratio has a contemporaneous 
negative and statistically significant impact on the domestic credit. However, the ratio has a 
positive and statistically significant one-year lagged impact on the domestic credit. The 
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overall impact of bank liquid reserves on domestic credit ratio is positive. Real interest rate 
has no statistically significant impact on domestic credit provided by the banking sector. 
Market capitalization has a positive and statistically significant impact on the domestic credit; 
however, it is statistically significant only for system GMM.  
As reported in Table  5-11, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences 
shows no proof of a second order autocorrelation and there is indication of misspecification 
bias for orthogonal deviation GMM. 
Table  5-12 reports the results of Specification III, which describes the determinants of 
the development of the financial system structure. The one-year lagged values of structural 
activity, structural size, and structural efficiency ratios have positive and statistically 
significant impact on the current values of financial structural ratios. The annual GDP per 
capita has a contemporaneous positive and statistically significant impact on structural 
activity, structural size, and structural efficiency ratios. However, GDP per capita has a 
negative and statistically significant one-year lagged effect on the previously mentioned 
ratios of the financial structure. Inflation has neither contemporaneous nor lagged statistically 
significant impact on the structural activity and structural size ratios. With respect to the 
impact of inflation on the structural efficiency ratio, inflation has a positive contemporaneous 
and statistically significant effect only when considering orthogonal deviation GMM. Current 
trade ratios positively affect the structural efficiency ratio; and it is statistically significantly. 
However, the latter ratios have negative and statistically significant one-year lagged effect on 
the structural efficiency ratio. The overall impact of the trade ratio is positive. The annual 
privatization ratio has a contemporaneous positive and statistically significant impact on the 
structural activity ratio, structural size ratio, and structural efficiency ratio. Its impact is 
statistically significant on all measures of the financial structural ratios with the exception of 
its impact on structural size ratio when considering system GMM. Moreover, privatization 
has a positive one-year lagged effect on the three structural ratios, but it is statistically 
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significant only for structural efficiency ratio and the structural activity ratio when 
considering system GMM.  
Table  5-12 Determinants of the Development of the Structure of the Financial System 
after Excluding Former Communist and Socialist Countries 
Dependent Variable 
Structural Activity Structural Size Structural Efficiency 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
Structural Activity Ratio t-1 0.689*** 0.755***    
                
 
(0.087) (0.070) 
   
                
Structural Size Ratio t-1   
0.663*** 0.784*** 
 
                
   
(0.055) (0.047) 
 
                
Structural Efficiency Ratio t-1     
0.785*** 0.763*** 
     
(0.110) (0.116) 
ln(GDP per capita)t 3.238* 3.839*** 2.350** 1.787*** 4.929** 3.725*** 
 
(1.866) (1.127) (0.884) (0.477) (2.144) (1.212) 
ln(GDP per capita)t-1 -3.334* -4.005*** -2.600*** -1.842*** -5.015** -3.753*** 
 
(1.908) (1.109) (0.866) (0.471) (2.183) (1.159) 
ln(Inflation)t 0.068 0.068 -0.031 0.014 0.007 0.077*   
 
(0.078) (0.050) (0.037) (0.023) (0.067) (0.045) 
ln(Inflation)t-1 -0.058 -0.033 0.035 0.03 -0.069 -0.029 
 
(0.064) (0.057) (0.029) (0.023) (0.071) (0.057) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t 0.144*** 0.117*** 0.05 0.087*** 0.130*** 0.076**  
 
(0.039) (0.032) (0.031) (0.021) (0.035) (0.036) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t-1 0.052** 0.023 0.006 0.012 0.074** 0.039*** 
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.028) (0.014) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t  0.578 0.738 0.435 0.227 1.502*** 1.278**  
 
(0.631) (0.536) (0.418) (0.333) (0.550) (0.509) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t-1  -0.633 -0.635 -0.069 -0.206 -1.248** -1.128**  
 
(0.612) (0.521) (0.388) (0.315) (0.502) (0.450) 
No.Observations 613 613 627 627 498 498 
No.Countries 42 42 43 43 40 40 
No.Instruments 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ar1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
AR2 0.917 0.928 0.650 0.681 0.175 0.189 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.024 0.179 0.000 0.006 0.068 0.151 
Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.412 0.254 0.102 0.04 0.424 0.290 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Notes: The values reported in Table  5-12 are GMM regression estimates during the period 1988-2009 after 
excluding former communist and socialist countries. The dependent variables are structure activity ratio (SAR), 
structure size ratio (SSR), and structure efficiency ratio (SER). The independent variables are one-year lagged 
values of SAR, SSR, and SER and current and one-year lagged values of the following variables: GDP growth, 
ratio of money supply over the price level, annual privatization proceeds ratio, and trade ratio. The standard 
deviation is reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
As reported in Table  5-12, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences 
shows no proof of a second order autocorrelation and there is no indication of 
misspecification bias for structural activity, structural size, and structural efficiency when 
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considering system GMM. In addition, there is no indication of misspecification bas for 
structural size ratio when considering orthogonal deviation GMM However, there is a 
misspecification bias for structural activity and structural efficiency when considering the 
orthogonal deviation GMM. 
Table  5-13 reports the results of Specification IV, which describes the determinants of 
the development of the overall financial sector. The one-year lagged values of finance 
activity, finance size, and finance efficiency ratios have positive and statistically significant 
impact on the current values of the ratios of the development of the overall financial sector. 
The GDP growth has a contemporaneous positive impact on the development of the finance 
activity, finance size, and finance efficiency ratios. The previous impacts are statistically 
significant for all estimators except for system GMM when the dependent variable is the 
finance activity and finance efficiency ratios. The GDP growth has a negative one-year 
lagged effect on finance activity and finance efficiency ratios. However, it is only statistically 
significant for finance efficiency ratio when considering orthogonal deviation GMM. 
Nevertheless, GDP growth has a positive one-year lagged effect on the finance size ratio; 
however, it is statistically insignificant. The trade openness and financial liberalization have 
positive contemporaneous impact on the development of the three measures of overall 
financial sector development. However, they are statistically significant only for the impact 
of trade on the finance activity ratio and the impact of the financial liberalization on the 
finance efficiency ratio. Contrary, the one-year lagged effect of trade and financial openness 
negatively affect the overall financial sector development with the exception of the impact of 
trade on the finance size ratio. The latter effects are statistically significant for the impact of 
trade on finance activity ratio and the impact of financial liberalization on finance efficiency 
ratio in both system and orthogonal deviation GMM and finance size ratio when considering 
orthogonal deviation GMM. Privatization ratio has positive and statistically significant 
contemporaneous impact on the finance activity, finance size, and finance efficiency ratios. 
However, it is only statistically insignificant for its impact on the finance efficiency ratio 
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when considering orthogonal deviation GMM. In addition, privatization ratio has a positive 
one-year lagged effect on the three measures of the overall financial sector development; 
however, it is statistically significant only for structural activity ratio and structural efficiency 
ratio when considering system GMM. 
Table  5-13 Determinants of the Development of Overall Financial System after 
Excluding Former Communist and Socialist Countries 
Dependent Variable 
Finance Activity Finance Size Finance Efficiency 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Orthogonal 
GMM 
Finance Activity Ratiot-1 0.841*** 0.809***    
                
 
(0.098) (0.089) 
   
                
Finance Size Ratiot-1   
0.647*** 0.858*** 
 
                
   
(0.087) (0.079) 
 
                
Finance Efficiency Ratiot-1     
1.080*** 1.094*** 
     
(0.068) (0.075) 
ln(GDP growth)t 0.047 0.156** 0.102* 0.147*** 0.119 0.187*** 
 
(0.090) (0.059) (0.059) (0.042) (0.106) (0.061) 
ln(GDP growth)t-1 -0.128 -0.035 0.02 0.008 -0.181 -0.132*   
 
(0.090) (0.059) (0.054) (0.039) (0.114) (0.073) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t  1.709** 1.645** 0.274 0.111 0.991 1.117 
 
(0.795) (0.751) (0.747) (0.525) (0.952) (1.008) 
ln(Trade Ratio)t-1  -1.485* -1.488** 0.271 0.106 -0.943 -1.096 
 
(0.808) (0.729) (0.689) (0.442) (0.932) (0.992) 
ln(Net Foreign Assets)t 0.054 0.096 0.066 0.049 0.248* 0.279*** 
 
(0.088) (0.078) (0.086) (0.048) (0.139) (0.093) 
ln(Net Foreign Assets)t-1 -0.102 -0.077 -0.039 -0.111** -0.289** -0.342*** 
 
(0.121) (0.072) (0.061) (0.048) (0.133) (0.110) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t 0.088** 0.056* 0.055* 0.053*** 0.117** 0.054 
 
(0.040) (0.029) (0.028) (0.019) (0.053) (0.036) 
ln(Annual Privatization)t-1 0.075* 0.052 0.041 0.025 0.094* 0.03 
 
(0.042) (0.034) (0.026) (0.019) (0.050) (0.034) 
No.Observations 481 481 492 492 409 409 
No.Countries 42 42 42 42 40 40 
No.Instruments 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ar1 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.010 
AR2 0.407 0.415 0.044 0.062 0.268 0.254 
Sargan test of overid. 
restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.056 0.212 0.000 0.011 0.510 0.370 
Hansen test of overid. 
Restrictions (Prob > chi2) 
0.414 0.499 0.042 0.314 0.098 0.127 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
Notes: the values reported in Table  5-13 are GMM regression estimates during the period 1988-2009 after 
excluding former communist and socialist countries. The dependent variables are finance activity ratio (FAR), 
finance size ratio (FSR), and finance efficiency ratio (FER). The independent variables are one-year lagged 
values of FAR, FSR, and SER and current and one-year lagged values of the following variables: GDP growth, 
trade ratio, net foreign assets, and annual privatization proceeds ratio. The standard deviation is reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
As reported in Table  5-13, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences 
shows no proof of a second order autocorrelation and there is no indication of 
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misspecification bias for finance efficiency ratio. However, the Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 
shows a second order autocorrelation for the finance size ratio. Sargan test failed to meet the 
identification restrictions for the specification when finance efficiency ratio is considered. In 
addition, Sargan test failed to meet the identification restrictions for the specification when 
finance activity ratio, in case of the orthogonal deviation GMM, is considered. 
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Chapter 6. Privatization and the Choice of Financing: Evidence from 
Egypt 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter empirically examines the impact of privatization on choices of financing 
of Egyptian firms. Although it is widely accepted that privatization improves the performance 
of firms, its impact on the choices of finance is generally ignored. The empirical study in this 
chapter examines the determinants of choices of financing based on a sample of operating 
firms in Egypt during the period 2004-2009. In addition, this study scrutinizes differences in 
choices of financing of three types of firms: privatized firms, state-owned firms, and well-
established publicly listed firms. In the relevant literature, empirical analyses, e.g. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Cantillo and Wright (2000), and Jong et al. (2008), provided evidences on 
determinants of financial constraints of operating firms based on cross-country analysis. 
Those analyses ignored such issue at a country-level basis, in particular among developing 
countries.  
In the Egyptian context, studies of the privatization (Heller and Schiller, 1989; Aly 
and Shields, 1999; Awadalla, 2003; Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007; Kenawy, 2009) examined its 
impact on macroeconomic variables such as employment, budget deficit, and investment. 
Those studies ignored largely the effects of privatization at firm level, with few exceptions35. 
However, a number of questions are still needed to be answered. Specifically, what are main 
determinants of choices of financing of privatized firms? Do privatized firms in the context of 
choices of financing behave differently when compared to other operating firms? 
                                                
35 The existing related firm-level studies in Egypt examined the impact of privatization on the operating 
performance of privatized firms, mainly El-Mahdy et al. (2007), Omran (2007), and Omran (2009). El-Mahdy et 
al. (2007) and Omran (2007) examined the operating performance of non-financial privatized firms and 
privatized banks, respectively. Omran (2009) examined the impact of privatization on the concentration of 
ownership structure in post privatization period. Refer to  Chapter 2 for more details. 
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Privatization could influence the choices of finance of firms through its impact on the 
performance of financial sector and performance of firms. By promoting competition within 
the financial sector and widening share ownership through privatization, e.g., Farinós et al. 
(2007), spillover effects on the capital structure of firms are expected. These effects facilitate 
access to external finance by alleviating the financial constraints, particularly for small and 
young firms and those with concentrated ownership structures (Bena and Ondko, 2012). 
Furthermore, the expected gains from privatization, which are represented in wider 
ownership structure 36  and improved information disclosure standards, mitigate the 
information asymmetry across firms. This, in turn, facilitates access to external finance. As 
discussed in Myers and Majluf (1984), Jensen (1986), and Fama and French (2005), the 
differences among firms in their choices of financing are triggered by the information 
asymmetry in an environment where imperfect capital market exists.  
The information asymmetry among firms has the following two aspects. The first is 
ascending from the different incentives between lenders, i.e. banks and stock markets, and 
borrowers, i.e. firms, and second is ascending from the different incentives between insiders, 
i.e. managers, and outsiders, i.e. shareholders. The first aspect of the information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders, as discussed in Leland and Pyle (1977), arises because of the 
moral hazard problem that hinders the transfer of information between lenders and borrowers. 
That is because firms know better about their collateral, profitability, and other fundamentals 
than lenders. In that context, the differences in the degree of information disclosure across 
firms amplify the information asymmetry in the credit market. That, in turn, affects choices 
of financing among firms through affecting their ability to access alternative financial 
instruments, i.e. bank-based and market-based financial instruments. Thus, poor quality firms, 
                                                
36 In the context of Egypt, although privatization widened the ownership structure after divestiture, 
Omran (2009) showed that the state still partially controls over privatized firms. In addition, those firms are 
characterized by a relatively partial concentration in their ownership structure. 
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in terms of information disclosure and operating performance, opt for bank-based finance, 
while high quality firms opt for market-based finance. In that context, firms with abundant 
cash and collateral and high profitability depend more on market-based finance, while firms 
with less internal cash and collateral and low profitability depend more on bank-based 
finance (Cantillo and Wright, 2000). In the privatization context, Knyazeva et al. (2009) 
showed that the transfer of ownership from the state to the private sector increases the 
reliance of privatized firms on external finance. This is because of the higher information 
asymmetry that faced by privatized firms after divestiture compare to firms with an 
established reputation in the financial market. Thus, those firms are expected to rely more on 
bank-based finance. The second aspect of information asymmetry results from the different 
incentives between managers and shareholders. As discussed in Jensen (1986), the payout to 
shareholders ascends the conflict between managers and shareholders. This conflict mainly 
arises because the cash payout to shareholders reduces available resources under control of 
managers. As a result, a cost of monitoring by the capital market rises when managers require 
new capital. Accordingly, this conflict affects the choices of financing by firms, when they 
choose to finance their activities through internal finance in order to avoid such monitoring 
costs. In addition, according to Harvey et al. (2004), the latter conflict affects the choice of 
financing by recruiting to debt when high agency cost is realized. This is because financing 
through debt, i.e. bank-based finance, provides signals that those firms do not overinvest. 
Thus, bank-based finance mitigates overinvestment problem resulted from adopting wasteful 
investment projects by obliging managers to pay out abundant cash to service the debt 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1995). 
Given the rational mentioned above, this empirical study attempts to overcome 
weaknesses in earlier studies by examining the impact of privatization on choices of 
financing among privatized firms. By utilizing qualitative and quantitative analyses, the 
primary objective of this study is to scrutinize determinants of choices of financing in Egypt 
during the period of 2004-2009 for three groups of firms: privatized firms, well-established 
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publicly listed firms, and state-owned firms. In addition, the study attempts to identify 
differences in choices of finance among the three groups of firms. This study is based on an 
assumption that privatized firms face the same challenges, which are faced by new firms once 
enter a market. Thus, they face costly external finance compared to internal finance and a 
costly market-based finance compared to bank-based finance.  
The study contributes to the relevant literature in four ways. First, the study extends 
the existing privatization research in Egypt by scrutinizing the determinants of choices of 
financing of privatized firms. Second, the study employs a larger number of firms from 
different industries compared to the previous studies in the Egyptian context. Third, by 
making a distinction between privatized firms, well-established publicly listed firms, and 
state-owned firms, the study provides a comprehensive and deep analysis of the impact of 
privatization on the Egyptian economy. Fourth, the study contributes to the literature related 
to financial sector development by examining the impact of privatization on the access of the 
external finance. That is, the study considers the demand side of the evolution of the financial 
services. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After introduction, Section  6.2 
explains the methodology of the study. Section  6.3 describes the data and used variables. 
Section  6.4 reports the results of the study. Section  6.5 analyzes the implications of the study. 
Finally, section  6.6 presents the conclusion of the study. 
6.2. Methodology 
As mentioned in  Chapter 4, two main approaches demonstrate the interaction between 
financing decisions and real decisions of firms. The first approach based on the Modigliani 
and Miller theorem (1958) shows that financing decisions are independent of real decisions 
of firms. The second approach based on neo-Keynesian theories, i.e. the tradeoff theory 
(Jensen, 1986) and the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) emphasizes the 
associations between financing decisions and real decisions of firms. Based on those two 
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approaches, various empirical studies, e.g. Fama and French (2005), and Cantillo and Wright 
(2000), scrutinized the determinants of choices of financing of firms.  
This empirical study is based on number of assumptions of the neo-Keynesian 
approach. Three main assumptions are assumed: 1) the financial structure is driven by 
choices of financing of firms; 2) choices of financing depend on the desire of firms to involve 
in riskier activities; 3) a prevailing of symmetric information, agency problem, and imperfect 
capital markets. In the Egyptian context, those assumptions are good for representing the 
nature of the Egyptian financial market, where stock prices are not good indicator for firms to 
consider their investment plans. In addition, by considering asymmetric information and 
agency problem, this represents the nature of poor auditing standards and corporate 
governance that characterize Egyptian operating firms. By considering those assumptions, the 
study is able to examine the development of the demand for the financial activities. 
This study is motivated by the recent contribution of Brav (2009), which examined 
determinants of access to external finance by combining the ideas of the pecking order theory 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the tradeoff theory (Jensen, 1986). Based on assumption of the 
information asymmetry and agency conflict, two main effects on choices of financing are 
identified: a level effect and a sensitivity effect. The framework of the author has two 
predictions. First, firms with less informational transparency and limited ownership structures 
depend more on bank-based finance and avoid market-based finance, namely the level effect. 
This is because equity issue is very sensitive to informational asymmetry, which occurs either 
between lenders and firms or between shareholders and managers, compared to debt issue. 
Second, the operating performance of firms affects their bank-based finance, namely the 
sensitivity effect. That is due to the increased costs of raising funds from market-based 
finance. In addition, firms with more asymmetric information depends less on information-
sensitive instruments such as market-based finance. The existing information asymmetry and 
agency cost depend on main firm level characteristics such as sizes and ownership structure 
(Holod and Peek, 2007). 
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This empirical study attempts to answer the following questions. (1) Do privatized 
firms in the context of choices of financing behave differently compared to other operating 
firms? (2) What are main determinants of choices of financing across privatized firms? The 
distinction is made for three types of firms: privatized firms, well-established publicly listed 
firms, and state-owned firms. The distinction among the three groups of firms stems from the 
differences in the informational asymmetry and ownership structure. Information asymmetry 
is a binding constraint of firms, especially among firms with limited ownership structure. 
Although privatized firms have operated under a state ownership, privatization widens their 
ownership structure (Omran, 2009). Thus, in post privatization period, the financial 
institutions willing to provide funds evaluate their creditworthiness differently compared to 
pre divestiture period (Knyazeva et al., 2009).  
The study adopts three strategies to examine the differences in financing decisions 
across firms. First, the study adopts a qualitative analysis to identify differences in choices of 
financing between the different types of firms. In the latter analysis, the study classifies firms 
according to their sizes. Second, the study employs a nonparametric test in order to test for 
the statistical significance of the change in central values of main financial variables. In 
particular, the study uses the Wilcoxon rank sum and Jonckheere-Terpstra tests to test the 
following. (1) Is there a statistically significant difference of the mean short-term debt, long-
term debt, and total liabilities across firms? (2) Is there a statistically significant difference of 
the mean measure of a financial constraint across firms? Third, the study uses fixed effect 
(within) regression to identify main determinants of choices of finance across firms. The 
study used the Hausman-test to test the null hypothesis of no systematic difference between 
the estimates obtained from random effect regression and fixed effect (within) regression. It 
rejected the null hypothesis. That is, using the random effect regression will generate an 
inconsistent estimator. Therefore, results obtained from fixed effects models will be reported. 
Based on Brav (2009), six main control variables are used, which will be explained in 
section  6.3.: size, growth, profitability, capital expenditure, age, and asset tangibility. In 
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addition, the study uses cash holding as a commonly used variable (Gaud et al., 2007; Lin et 
al. 2011). Specifically, the study estimates two main regression models: a base model, which 
incorporate the previously mentioned sets of variables, regardless of the ownership type; and 
an extended model, which considers the impact of ownership type. On the basis of the 
previous studies (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Gaud et al., 2007; Brav, 2009; Lin 
et al. 2011), the empirical equation (1) is used as the base model, i.e. Specification I, in order 
to examine the relationship between the choices of financing and firm specific characteristics, 
which is described as follows:  
R^_ = B + B`abA8 + B5CPA8 + B:	c(A8 + BE@[d	A8 + BHUQbA8 + BIUef4A8 + BK@gA8 +
BLOA8,        (1) 
where R^_ is choices of financing, `ab is the firm’s size, CP  is sale growth ratio, 
	c( is the profitability measured by return on assets, @[d	 is the capital expenditure, UQb is 
the number of operating years, Uef4 is tangible assets, and @g is cash holdings.  
In the extended model, i.e. Specification II, the study considers the interaction term 
between ownership type and three main variables: size, sales, and profitability, which will be 
explained in section  6.3, while controlling for four main variables capital expenditure, age, 
asset tangibility, and cash holding. The latter variables are potential factors relevant to 
variations in ownership type (Bougheas et al., 2006; Holod and Peek, 2007; Brav, 2009; 
Knyazeva et al., 2009; Omran, 2009). Those variables reflect the degree of asymmetric 
information and agency conflict of firms, which, in turn, affects their choices of financing. 
This is because equity issue is very sensitive to informational asymmetry and agency problem 
compared to debt issue. Size is considered as a proxy for the degree of information 
asymmetry and access to capital market, while the operating performance measured by sales 
and profitability is considered a proxy for the degree of agency conflict within a firm. On the 
basis of the previous studies (Bougheas et al., 2006; Holod and Peek, 2007; Brav, 2009; 
Knyazeva et al., 2009; Omran, 2009), the empirical equation (2) is used as the extended 
132 
 
 
 
 
model, i.e. Specification II, in order to examine the relationship between the choices of 
financing and ownership type, which is described as follows: 
R^_ = B + B@[d	A8 + B5UQbA8 + B:Uef4A8 + BE@gA8+BH`abA8 ∗ .A + BICPA8 ∗ .A +
BK	c(A8 ∗ .A + BLOA8.       (2) 
where R^_  is choices of financing, @[d	  is the capital expenditure, UQb  is the 
number of operating years, Uef4 is tangible assets, @g is cash holdings, `ab is the firm’s 
size, CP is sale growth ratio, 	c( is the profitability measured by return on assets, and .A is 
a dummy variable to describe the type of firms.  
With respect to the choices of financing in both base and extended models, three 
indicators are used: debt ratio I, debt ratio II, and debt ratio III, as defined in the following 
section. 
6.3. Data and Variables 
Data 
The study collects detailed information from annual financial statements of Egyptian 
firms to examine the choices of financing during the period 2004-2009. The sampled firms 
belong to the following sectors: construction (SIC codes 1521-1799), manufacturing (SIC 
codes 2011-3999), real estate (SIC codes 6512-6553), touristic services (SIC codes 7011-
7041), transport (SIC codes 4011-4971), and trade (SIC codes 5012-5199). The data consists 
of 285 firms. Types of firms include 87 privatized firms, 73 other publicly listed firms, and 
125 state-owned firms. The annual financial statements are collected from the following 
sources: Emerging Markets Information Services (EMIS), Arab Capital Market Resource 
Center, and Egyptian for Information Dissemination Center. Data about state-owned firms 
are collected from Egyptian Business Sector Information Center.  
Variables  
In order to examine the impact of privatization on the choices of financing, the study 
uses various commonly used variables based on (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 
2001; Brav, 2009). For the purpose of describing and defining used variable in this empirical 
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study, variables are classified into two main categories: variables describing financial choices 
and variables describing firm-specific characteristics. All these variables are used throughout 
the empirical analysis. With respect to the choices of financing, the study adopts five 
commonly used measures of leverage37: short-term debt ratios, total liabilities to total assets, 
the total debt ratio (debt ratio I), the short-term debt to total debt ratio (debt ratio II), and the 
total net debt ratio (debt ratio III). Regarding firm-specific characteristics, the study uses size, 
growth, profitability, capital expenditure, age, tangibility, and cash ratio. In addition, the 
study uses two other measures: ownership and financial constraint. The definitions of these 
variables are demonstrated as follows.  
Variables of the Financial Choice  
The study uses two variables to proxy for access to market-based finance: the total 
debt ratio (debt ratio I) and the total net debt ratio (debt ratio II). According to Bougheas et al. 
(2006) and Brav (2009), those measures are considered good proxies for market-based 
finance since they include other forms of long-term liabilities such as bonds and other long-
term financial instruments obtained from the financial market. The total debt ratio (debt ratio 
I) is calculated as the summation of short-term debt and long-term debt scaled by total assets 
(Brav, 2009). Although this measure does not include accounts payable and other liabilities 
such as notes payable, it is considered an appropriate measure of leverage as discussed in 
Rajan and Zingales (1995). Total net debt-asset ratio (debt ratio II) is calculated as the 
summation of short-term debt and long-term debt minus total cash scaled by total assets 
(Brav, 2009). The two previously mentioned measures are used as proxy for market based-
finance as suggested by Bougheas et al. (2006).The study uses short-term debt to total debt 
ratio (debt ratio III) as a proxy for the bank-based finance (Brav, 2009), since majority of 
                                                
37 The study uses a variety of financial indicators in order to avoid some weakness in each measure of 
financial leverage as discussed in Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
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short-term debt consists of loans provided by banks. It is calculated as short-term debt 
divided by the summation of short-term debt and long-term debt.  
The study adopts other three variables of leverage: short-term debt, long-term debt, 
and total liabilities ratios as discussed in Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Jong et al. (2008). 
Short-term debt ratio is calculated as the short-term loans scaled by total assets. It shows the 
volume of assets financed by debt. This ratio is considered a good indicator of leverage, 
which reflects a financial risk of a firm in the short-term (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), and a 
proxy for bank based-finance. Long-term debt ratio is calculated as total long-term debt 
scaled by total asset. This measure is a proxy for market-based finance. According to Jong et 
al. (2008), this measure is a good proxy for financial stability of a firm compared to short-
term debt because it does not include tradable credits. Thus, it gives a more precise measure 
of leverage. Total liability scaled by total assets is used to proxy for cash left for shareholder 
in case of liquidation. That is, it is considered a measure of stock leverage (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). In all the previously mentioned three variables, the study considers scaling 
them by total liability, in addition to total assets, since dividing only by total assets does not 
account for the relative importance of debt to the value of a firm. In that case, the adjusted 
three measures of leverage by total equity shows the portion of debt that firms can use to 
finance changes in the net worth of the firm as discussed in Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
Variables of Firm-Specific Characteristics 
The study uses six main measures for firm-specific characteristics (Brav, 2009): 
profitability, growth, size, age, asset tangibility, and capital expenditure. In addition, the 
study uses cash ratio as a commonly used variable. Return on assets (ROA), as a commonly 
used measure, is used to proxy for profitability. In addition, it is considered as a good proxy 
for the financial insolvency and the true productivity of assets (Altman ,1968; Gaud et al., 
2007; Jong et al., 2008). It is calculated as net income divided by total assets. The study uses 
turnover ratio to proxy for sales growth (Brav, 2009; Lin, et al., 2011). This ratio is calculated 
as current turnover divided by one-year lagged turnover. As suggested by Bougheas et al. 
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(2006) and Holod and Peek (2007), two variables are used to accounts for the existing of 
information asymmetry and agency cost: size and age. In finance literature, the log of total 
assets is a common used proxy for the size of a firm38 (Brav, 2009; Lin et al., 2011). In 
addition, it is considered a good proxy for controlling for the degree of information 
asymmetry and access to capital market (Bougheas et al., 2006). Age is calculated as the 
logarithm of the number of operating years (Brav, 2009; Bougheas et al., 2006). In order to 
control for the financial collateral, the study uses the tangible assets (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Bougheas et al., 2006; Jong et al., 2008); Brav, 2009). It is calculated as the volume of 
fixed assets scaled by total assets. The study uses cash and cash equivalent as a proxy for the 
available liquidity (Gaud et al., 2007; Brav, 2009; Lin et al. 2011). The capital expenditure 
ratio is used to control for the incremental increase in physical assets of firms such as net 
property, plant, and equipment (Brav, 2009; Lin et al., 2011).  
In addition to the previously mentioned variables, the study adopts two other variables 
of firms-specific characteristics: ownership and financial constraints. The study uses a 
dummy variable to identify the ownership of the three sampled groups of firms, i.e. privatized, 
well-established publicly listed, and state-owned firms. The study uses three measures of 
financial constraints: KZ index, as constructed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), WW index, as 
constructed by Whited and Wu (2006), and IG index as constructed by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002). KZ index sorts firms according to the degree of financial constraints. It 
is based on the idea that financially constrained firms have less collateral to meet their 
financial obligations. Thus, they face a difficulty in accessing the external finance. The 
original formulation for this index is represented by a linear combination of cash flow to 
book asset ratio, total long-term debt to book asset ratio, total dividends to book asset ratio, 
                                                
38 In the Egyptian context, according to the Law No. 141 in 2004, firms are classified into small, 
medium, and large firms based on the volume of labor and/or total assets (The Economic Research Forum 
(ERF), 2004; Ministry of Foreign Trade, Egypt, 2004). 
136 
 
 
 
 
stock of cash to book asset ratio, and Tobin’s-Q. A firm is considered financially constrained, 
if it requires an external fund but faces different cost burdens due to asymmetric information 
in the capital market. Given the differences across firms with various ownership structures, 
the differences of financial constraints are expected. The study constructs KZ index with 
exclusion of Q-term as suggested by Baker et al. (2003) and Hennessy et al. (2007). Then, the 
study calculates the average of KZ index grouped by quantiles of the size of firms. KZ index 
is calculated as following:  
hi = −1.001909	@R + 3.139193	N)N. − 39.36780	N.^Z − 1.314759	@USg,	 
where @R is cash flow to book asset ratio, N)N. is total long-term debt to book asset 
ratio, N.^Z is total dividend to book asset ratio, and @USg is the stock of cash to book asset 
ratio. Associated numbers in the equation are commonly used scales (Hennessy et al., 2007).  
Another alternative to KZ index in measuring the degree of financial constraints is 
WW index. The WW index is calculated as follows. 
qq = −0.091	@R − 0.062	.^Z	\S + 0.021	N)N. − 0.044	)_NU + 0.102	^SC − 0.035	SC, 
where @R is cash flow to book asset ratio, .^Z	\S is a dummy variable equals one if a 
firm pays dividend and equals zero otherwise, N)N. is total long-term debt to book asset ratio, 
)_NU is the natural logarithm of total assets, ^SC is the industry sale growth, and SC is a sales 
growth of a firm. Associated numbers in the equation are commonly used scales (Hennessy et 
al., 2007).  
In addition, the study uses the internally financed growth index as suggested by 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2002). This index measures the portion of growth internally financed, 
which is calculated as follows: 
^Cs = t]uv9t]uv
. 
where ^C is the internally financed growth index, and P\U is the return on assets.  
Table  6-1, Table  6-2, Table  6-3, and Table  6-4 report definitions of main variable 
used in the analysis and their summary statistics, respectively.  
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Table  6-1 Definition of Main Variables Used in Examining the Choices of Financing  
Variable Definition 
Age Logarithm of Operating Years 
Capital Expenditure Changes in the Physical Assets /Total Assets 
Cash ratio (Cash and Cash Equivalents)/Total Assets 
Debt Ratio I (Short-Term Debt + Long-Term Debt)/Total Assets 
Debt Ratio II 
(Short-Term Debt+ Long-Term Debt-Cash and Cash 
Equivalents)/Assets 
Debt Ratio III Short-Term Debt/(Short-Term Debt + Long-Term Debt) 
Growth Turnovert/Turnovert-1 
IG Index ROA/(1-ROA) 
KZ Index 
A Linear Combination of the following Ratios: Cash Flow, 
Total Long-Term Debt, Total Dividends, and Stock of Cash  
Long-Term Debt To Total Assets Long-Term Debt/Total Assets 
Long-Term Debt To Total Equity Long-Term Debt/ Shareholders’ Equity 
Return on Assets Net income/ Total Assets 
Short-Term Debt to Total Assets Short-Term Debt/Total Assets 
Short-Term Debt To Total Equity Short-Term Debt/ Shareholders’ Equity 
Size The Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
Tangible Assets Fixed Asset/Total Assets 
Total Liabilities to Total Assets Total Liabilities/ Total Assets 
Total Liabilities to Total Equity Total Liabilities/ Shareholders’ Equity 
Table  6-2 Summary Statistics of Main Variables Used in Examining the Determinants 
of the Choices of Financing: the Base Model 
The Dependent Variable is the Debt Ratio I 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Debt Ratio I 0.14 0.29 0.00 2.55 760 
Size 13.16 2.25 8.83 23.03 760 
Growth 0.93 1.43 -8.90 15.54 760 
Return on Assets 0.03 0.23 -2.01 0.73 760 
Capital Expenditure 0.02 0.27 -1.95 1.04 760 
Age 3.65 0.68 0.69 5.02 760 
Tangible Assets 0.41 0.26 0.00 1.79 760 
Cash Ratio 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.69 760 
The Dependent Variable is the Debt Ratio II 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Debt Ratio II 0.02 0.34 -0.68 2.52 760 
Size 13.16 2.25 8.83 23.03 760 
Growth 0.93 1.43 -8.90 15.54 760 
Return on Assets 0.03 0.23 -2.01 0.73 760 
Capital Expenditure 0.02 0.27 -1.95 1.04 760 
Age 3.65 0.68 0.69 5.02 760 
Tangible Assets 0.41 0.26 0.00 1.79 760 
Cash Ratio 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.69 760 
The Dependent Variable is the Debt Ratio III 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Debt Ratio III 0.81 0.33 0.00 1.00 516 
Size 13.38 2.60 8.83 23.03 516 
Growth 0.97 2.62 -18.75 39.34 516 
Return on Assets 0.02 0.23 -1.95 0.73 516 
Capital Expenditure 0.02 0.27 -1.95 1.00 516 
Age 3.57 0.70 0.69 5.02 516 
Tangible Assets 0.41 0.28 0.00 1.79 516 
Cash Ratio 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.69 516 
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Table  6-3 Summary Statistics of Main Variables Used in Examining the Determinants 
of the Choices of Financing: the Extended Model 
The Dependent Variable is the Debt Ratio I 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Debt Ratio I 0.15 0.32 0.00 3.81 768 
Capital Expenditure 0.01 0.32 -3.72 1.04 768 
Age 3.65 0.68 0.69 5.02 768 
Tangible Assets 0.41 0.26 0.00 1.79 768 
Cash Ratio 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.69 768 
Size*PF 3.85 6.33 10.44 23.03 768 
Size*WEPL 2.40 5.45 8.83 22.68 768 
Growth*PF 0.40 3.28 -18.75 74.31 768 
Growth*WEPL 0.15 0.47 0.00 8.65 768 
Profitability *PF 0.02 0.11 -1.95 0.53 768 
Profitability*WEPL 0.02 0.07 -0.47 0.73 768 
The Dependent Variable is the Debt Ratio II 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Debt Ratio II 0.02 0.36 -0.68 3.73 768 
Capital Expenditure 0.01 0.32 -3.72 1.04 768 
Age 3.65 0.68 0.69 5.02 768 
Tangible Assets 0.41 0.26 0.00 1.79 768 
Cash Ratio 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.69 768 
Size*PF 3.85 6.33 10.44 23.03 768 
Size*WEPL 2.40 5.45 0.00 22.68 768 
Growth*PF 0.40 3.28 -18.75 74.31 768 
Growth*WEPL 0.15 0.47 0.00 8.65 768 
Profitability *PF 0.02 0.11 -1.95 0.53 768 
Profitability*WEPL 0.02 0.07 -0.47 0.73 768 
The Dependent Variable is the Debt Ratio III 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Debt Ratio III 0.81 0.33 0.00 1.00 517 
Capital Expenditure 0.02 0.31 -3.08 1.00 517 
Age 3.57 0.70 0.69 5.02 517 
Tangible Assets 0.41 0.28 0.00 1.79 517 
Cash Ratio 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.69 517 
Size*PF 4.94 6.89 10.44 23.03 517 
Size*WEPL 3.57 6.32 0.00 22.68 517 
Growth*PF 0.35 2.11 -18.75 39.34 517 
Growth*WEPL 0.22 0.55 0.00 8.65 517 
Profitability *PF 0.02 0.12 -1.95 0.40 517 
Profitability*WEPL 0.03 0.08 -0.47 0.73 517 
Table  6-4 Summary Statistics of Main Variables Used in Examining the Comparison 
between Privatized, Publicly Listed, and State-owned Firms 
Variable Average S.D Min. Max. Obs. 
Short-Term Debt to Total Assets 0.12 0.29 0.00 2.55 789 
Debt Ratio III 0.15 0.30 0.00 2.55 789 
Debt Ratio II 0.03 0.35 -0.68 2.52 789 
WW Index -0.63 0.20 -2.40 1.26 789 
KZ Index 0.06 0.61 -4.36 5.47 789 
IG Index 0.06 0.19 -0.67 1.54 789 
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6.4. Results 
As outlined in section  6.2, the empirical analysis of this chapter consists of three 
analyses: an exploratory analysis, non-parametric tests, and regression analysis. The study 
starts reporting results obtained from the exploratory analysis, and then results of non-
parametric tests and regression analysis are reported.  
Figure  6-1until Figure  6-4 explore the choices of finance of privatized firms compared 
to well-established publicly listed firms (WEPLs) and state-owned firms (SOEs). The figures 
show the average source of finance categorized by firm sizes. Q1 until Q4 in each figure 
indicates first to fourth quantiles of size based on the total assets.  
Figure  6-1 and Figure  6-2 describe the average short-term debt ratio and total debt 
ratio scaled by total assets, respectively. The former figure shows that small size privatized 
firms depend less on short-term debt ratio, which implies lower dependence on bank loans. 
With the exception of the fourth quantile, the larger the size of privatized firms is, the higher 
the degree of dependence on short-term debt is, since the large portion of short-term debt 
takes the form of bank’s loans. However, in the largest size group, indicated by the fourth 
quantile, the short-term debt ratio declines.  
Figure 6-1 Average Short Term Debt to 
Asset Ratio by Ownership Type, 2004-2009 
Figure 6-2 Average Debt Ratio I by 
Ownership Type, 2004-2009 
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As noted in Figure  6-2, compared to WEPLs, the short-term debt to asset ratio is 
higher in the second and third quantiles, while the ratio is lower in the first and fourth 
quantiles. Compared to SOEs, small and medium size firms, indicated by Q1 until Q3, depend 
more on short-term debt, while the fourth quantile groups depend less on short-term debt. 
Debt ratio I, which measures the total debt scaled by total assets, is higher among 
privatized firms in Q1 until Q3 compared to SOEs. Contrary, the fourth quantile group has 
lower debt ratio I. Compared to WEPLs, debt ratio I of privatized firms is almost similar in 
lower quantiles, indicated by Q1 until Q3, while it is lower in the fourth quantile.  
Debt ratio II, in Figure  6-3, which measures the total debt minus cash scaled by total 
assets, is almost similar to SOEs for first quantiles. In the third quantile, the ratio is higher for 
privatized firms, while it is lower in the second and fourth quantile.  
Compared to WEPLs, the ratio among privatized firms is higher in the first and third 
quantiles. However, it is notable that the ratio among WEPLs substantially exceeds the 
privatized firms in fourth and second quantiles. 
Debt ratio III, in Figure  6-4, measures the short-term debt divided by the total debt. It 
implies utilization of bank-based finance of a firm. For small size firm groups, indicated by 
Figure 6-3 Average Debt Ratio II by 
Ownership Type, 2004-2009 
Figure 6-4 Average Debt Ratio III by 
Ownership Type, 2004-2009 
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Q1 until Q3, the ratio is higher among privatized firms compared to WEPLs. Across all 
quantiles, the ratio is lower among privatized firms compared to SOEs.  
Table  6-5 until Table  6-7 show results of nonparametric tests. Table  6-5 reports the 
results obtained from the comparison between privatized firm and well-established publicly 
listed firms (WEPLs). As shown in Table  6-5, privatized firms have lower short-term debt to 
asset ratio compared to WEPLs. The ratio among privatized firms is lower by 1.68 percentage 
point compared to WEPLs and it is statistically significant at 5%.  
Table  6-5 Mean and Mean-Difference of Selected Variables: A Comparison between 
Privatized Firms and Well-Established Publicly Listed Firms 
Variable Privatized Firms 
Well-Established 
Publicly Listed Firms 
Difference 
Short-Term Debt to Total Assets 0.0655 0.0823 -0.0168** 
Debt Ratio I 0.1597 0.1871 -0.0274** 
Debt Ratio II 0.0384 0.1014 -0.0630*** 
Debt Ratio III 0.9210 0.8791 0.0418*** 
WW Index -0.6572 -0.6424 -0.0147 
KZ Index -0.0143 0.1325 -0.1467*** 
IG Index 0.0873 0.1020 -0.0147** 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
With respect to debt ratio I and debt ratio II, they are indicators of market-based 
finance. The lower ratios among privatized firms compared to WEPLs indicates lower 
dependence of privatized firms on market-based finance. Privatized firms have lower ratios 
compared to WEPLs. The average debt ratio I if a firm was a privatized is 15.97%; and if a 
firm was SOEs is 18.7%. Debt ratio I among privatized firms is less by 2.7 percentage points 
compared to WEPLs. It is statistically significant at 5%. Debt ratio II of privatized firms is 
less by 6.3 percentage points compared to WEPLs and statistically significant at 1%.  
This is consistent with the presumption that privatized firms are still lack of reputation 
in the equity market and the market-finance is still costly for them. Another explanation for 
lower ratios among privatized firms is that firms with more tangible assets are less likely to 
raise funds from equity market and opt for bank-based finance. The study estimated the 
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average asset tangibility, which equals fixed assets scaled by total assets, for privatized firms, 
WEPLs, and SOEs at 45%, 43%, and 39%, respectively. 
With respect to debt ratio III as an indicator of bank-based finance, it is higher among 
privatized firms by 4.2 percentage points compared to WEPLs and it is statistically 
significant at 1%. There are two explanations why the ratio is higher among privatized firms 
compared to WEPLs. One is because of the relatively high asset tangibility among privatized 
firms makes access to bank’ loan easier than equity markets. Second, privatized firms are 
relatively credit constrained making it difficult to access market-based finance.  
Regarding to the financial constraints indicators, privatized firms have higher KZ and 
IG indices compared to WEPLs, which implies higher financial constraints and higher 
reliance on internal funds among privatized firms compared to WEPLs. WW index is lower 
among privatized firms; however, it is statistically insignificant.  
Table  6-6 reports the results obtained from the comparison between privatized firm 
and SOEs. As shown in the table, privatized firms have higher short-term debt to asset ratio 
compared to state-owned firms. Short-term debt to asset ratio of privatized firms is higher by 
3.1 percentage point compared to SOEs and it is statistically significant at 1%.  
Table  6-6 Mean and Mean-Difference of Selected Variables: A Comparison between 
Privatized Firms and State-Owned Firms 
Variable Privatized Firms State-owned Firms Difference 
Short-Term Debt to Total Assets 0.0655 0.0346 0.0309*** 
Debt Ratio I 0.1597 0.1537 0.0060 
Debt Ratio II 0.0384 -0.0741 0.1125*** 
Debt Ratio III 0.9210 1.0000 -0.0790*** 
WW Index -0.6572 -0.6395 -0.0177 
KZ Index -0.0143 -0.1237 0.1094*** 
IG Index 0.0873 0.0301 0.0572*** 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
With respect to debt ratio I and debt ratio II, privatized firms have higher ratios 
Compared to SOEs. Debt ratio I among privatized firms is higher by 0.6 percentage point 
compared to SOEs. However, it is statistically insignificant. Debt ratio II of privatized firms 
is higher by 11.2 percentage points compared to SOEs and is statistically significant at 1%.  
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With respect to debt ratio III, it is lower among privatized firms compared to SOEs. 
The ratio is lower among privatized firms by 7.9 percentage points compared to SOEs and it 
is statistically significant at 1%. The latter result can be explained by the measures of 
financial constraints.  
As shown in the table, privatized firms have higher KZ and IG indices compared to 
SOEs, which implies higher financial constraints and higher reliance on internal funds among 
privatized firms compared to SOEs. Although WW index is lower among privatized firms, it 
is statistically insignificant.  
Table  6-7 reports the results obtained from comparison between private ownership 
and state ownership. As shown in the table, firms with private ownership have higher ratios 
of short-term debt to asset ratio by 3.8% compared to state ownership. Debt ratio I and debt 
ratio II are higher among private firms by 1.7% and 13.9% respectively. The difference is 
statistically significant for debt ratio I, but statistically insignificant for debt ratio II. Private 
firms have lower debt ratio III by -9.6% compared to firms with state ownership.  
Table  6-7 Mean and Mean-Difference of Selected Variables: A Comparison between 
Private Ownership and State Ownership 
Variable Private Ownership  State Ownership Difference 
Short-Term Debt to Total Assets 0.0728 0.0346 0.0382*** 
Debt Ratio I 0.1711 0.1537 0.0174 
Debt Ratio II 0.0650 -0.0741 0.1391*** 
Debt Ratio III 0.9038 1.0000 -0.0962*** 
WW Index -0.6514 -0.6395 -0.0119 
KZ Index 0.0447 -0.1237 0.1684*** 
IG Index 0.0933 0.0301 0.0632*** 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
With respect to financial constraints indices, as indicated by KZ index, IG index, and 
WW index, private firms have higher KZ and IG indices compared to firms with state 
ownership. KZ index is higher by 16.4% and is statistically significant. This implies higher 
financial constraints that private firms face compared to firms with state ownership. In 
addition, private firms have higher IG index by 6.3% and is statistically significant. This 
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implies that private firms rely more on internal funds compared to state ownership firms. 
Although private firms have lower WW index, it is statistically insignificant. 
Table  6-8 and Table  6-9 report results of the regression analysis, which describes 
factors that influence choices of finance by firms. In particular, results obtained from 
Table  6-8 give predictions of the baseline regression, i.e. Specification I, regarding the 
overall determinants of choices of financing of operating firms, regardless of the ownership 
type, as measured by the three debt ratios: debt ratio I, debt ratio II, and debt ratio III. On the 
other hand, results obtained from Table  6-9 give predictions of the extended model, i.e. 
Specification II, regarding the determinants of choices of financing by considering ownership 
type. In the latter table, the study considers the interaction term between ownership type and 
three main variables: size, sales, and return on assets (ROA).  
As shown in Table  6-8, the log of total assets used as a proxy for size has statistically 
significant impact on debt ratio I, debt ratio II. This suggested the important role of size in 
mitigating the asymmetric information between the firm and the market, which facilitates 
market-based finance. The latter result is consistent with other earlier studies (Bougheas et al., 
2006; Holod and Peek, 2007). Although the size positively affects debt ratio III, it is 
statistically insignificant. The positive relationship between size and debt ratio III emphasizes 
that bank-based finance and market-based finance are not perfect substitutes. This result is 
consistent with the finding of Bernanke and Blinder (1988). In general, larger firms have 
easier access to external finance. The larger a size is, the more transparent a firm is, which, in 
turn, facilitates the access to external finance. This is consistent with the finding of Holod and 
Peek (2007).  
Furthermore, sales growth positively affects debt ratio I, debt ratio II, and debt ratio 
III. However, it is statistically insignificant. Profitability and capital expenditure are 
negatively associated with debt ratios. This is consistent with the predictions of the tradeoff 
theory (Brav, 2009). 
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Table  6-8 Base Model of Factors that Influence Debt Ratios 
Dependent Variables 
Fixed Effects (Within) Regression 
Debt ratio I Debt ratio II Debt ratio III(a) 
Size 0.032** 0.101*** 0.019 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) 
Sales Growth 0.009 0.009 0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) 
ROA -0.664*** -0.661*** 0.097 
 
(0.095) (0.097) (0.081) 
Capital Expenditure -0.130*** -0.123**  -0.109** 
 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.046) 
Age -0.208 -0.139 0.225* 
 
(0.147) (0.150) (0.136) 
Tangible Assets 0.136 0.234**  -0.489*** 
 
(0.097) (0.099) (0.084) 
Cash and Cash Equivalent -0.033*** -0.095*** -0.006 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
Constant 0.782 0.100 0.017 
 
(0.546) (0.556) (0.492) 
Number of Observations 760 760 516 
Number of Firms 233 233 190 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01  
Notes: The values reported in Table  6-8 are fixed effect (within) regression estimates during the period 2004-
2009. The dependent variables are debt ratio I, debt ratio II, and debt ratio III. The independent variables are 
size, sales growth, ROA, capital expenditure, age, tangible asset, and cash ratio. The standard deviation is 
reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(a) Debt ratio III is a proxy for debt obtained from banks, which is different from Debt ratio I and Debt ratio II, 
which are proxies for market-based finance because of their inclusion of other long-term financial instruments 
such as bonds. 
In addition, as shown in Table  6-8, return on assets, as a measure of profitability has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the choice of market-based finance measured 
by debt ratio I and debt ratio II. However, this is positive and statistically insignificant for 
debt ratio III. With respect to capital expenditure, the study found that it has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on debt ratios I, II, and III. Age has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on debt ratio III. The positive sign is expected since mature firms are 
expected to be less financially constrained compared to younger firms that, in turn, facilitates 
access to debt finance. The latter result is consistent with the finding of Bougheas et al. 
(2006). 
Tangible assets, as a measure of collateral, have a negative and statistically significant 
impact on debt ratio III but a positive and statistically significant impact on debt ratio II. The 
latter result is consistent with predictions of Bougheas et al. (2006), who showed that lower 
collateral is associated with investment financed by bank-based finance. Contrary, large 
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collateral is associated with market-based finance. Finally, cash and cash equivalent has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on debt ratio I and II. In general, large available 
cash holdings reduce the required amount of external finance. 
Table  6-9 reports the results from regression analysis after taking into consideration 
the type of the firm. With respect to the control variables, capital expenditure has a negative 
and statistically significant impact on all debt ratios. Age has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on debt ratio III, but negative and statistically significant impact on debt 
ratio I. Tangible assets have a negative and statistically significant impact on debt ratio III, 
but a positive and statistically insignificant impact on debt ratio I and III. Cash and cash 
equivalent negatively affects all debt ratios and it is statistically significant.  
Considering the ownership type, size has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on debt ratio I, and debt ratio II, across privatized firms. This suggested large size firms have 
easier access to bank-based finance and market-based finance. Contrary to other empirical 
evidences, e.g. Bougheas et al. (2006) and Brav (2009), the large size facilitates access to 
both bank-based finance and market-based finance. This is because large size ascends the 
agency cost within a firm. As a result, a number of firms opt for bank-based finance to 
alleviate the agency cost problem, particularly in emerging market, as discussed in the recent 
investigation of Harvey et al. (2004). The latter result may indicate a possible high agency 
problem that a number of Egyptian privatized firms face. In turn, those firms choses debt 
finance as a way to mitigate the agency problem. In addition, this implies a potential of 
overinvestment problem that firms face, as stated in McConnell and Servaes (1995). In 
addition, this highlights the possible differences in bank-lending channel and financing 
decision between developing countries, where the agency cost is higher, and developed 
countries, where the agency cost is lower. The impact of size among WEPLs on the debt 
ratios is positive and statistically significant.  
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Table  6-9 Extended Model of Factors that Influence Debt Ratios 
Dependent Variables 
Fixed Effects (Within) Regression 
 
Debt ratio I Debt ratio II Debt ratio III(a) 
Capital Expenditure -0.234*** -0.221*** -0.086* 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045) 
Age -0.321* -0.256 0.252* 
 
(0.166) (0.168) (0.143) 
Tangible Assets 0.121 0.157 -0.462*** 
 
(0.101) (0.103) (0.078) 
Cash and Cash Equivalent -0.037*** -0.100*** -0.021* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) 
Priv*Size 0.045** 0.113*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) 
WEF*Size 0.033* 0.098*** 0.030** 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) 
Priv*Sales -0.001 -0.001 0.008* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
WEF*Sales -0.106*** -0.110*** -0.062** 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.028) 
Priv*ROA -0.025 -0.007 0.017 
 
(0.151) (0.154) (0.113) 
WEF*ROA 0.134 0.189 0.033 
 
(0.322) (0.327) (0.222) 
constant 1.419** 1.273**  0.017 
 
(0.609) (0.620) (0.509) 
Number of Observations 768 768 517 
Number of Firms 233 233 190 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
   
 
Notes: The values reported in Table  6-9 are fixed effect (within) regression estimates during the period 2004-
2009. The dependent variables are debt ratio I, debt ratio II, and debt ratio III. The independent variables include 
four control variables: capital expenditure, age, tangible asset, cash ratio, and variables of interest: interaction 
term between type of the firm and three measures: size, sales, and ROA. The standard deviation is reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(a) Debt ratio III is a proxy for debt obtained from banks, which is different from Debt ratio I and Debt ratio II, 
which are proxies for market-based finance because of their inclusion of other long-term financial instruments 
such as bonds. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table  6-9, growth of sales has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on debt ratio III among privatized firms. Contrary, among WEPLs, the 
growth of sales has a negative and statistically significant impact on debt ratio III. This is 
consistent with the presumption of the study that privatized firms are treated as new entity in 
the credit market. Thus, they face costly market-based finance and, in turn, they rely more on 
bank-based finance. Although the growth of sales is positively associated with easier access 
to financial markets (Jong et al., 2011), the negative sign is an implication of the relatively 
higher financial constrained of privatized firms. In addition, this could be an implication of 
the preposition of tradeoff theory that states that a firm increases leverage until it reaches a 
target debt level, but once a firm passes its target level, the relation should be negative. That 
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is, regardless of their growth, privatized firms opt for bank-based finance as a cheaper way of 
raising external finance until they could reach their target debt level. Contrary, sales are 
negatively associated with debt ratio I and debt ratio II among privatized and WEPLs. 
However, such impact is statistically significant only among WEPLs.  
Return on assets among privatized firms has a negative impact on debt ratio I, and 
debt ratio II, but a positive impact on debt ratio III. The latter impacts on the three debt ratios 
are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, return on assets among WEPLs has a 
positive impact on the three debt ratios, but it is statistically insignificant. 
6.5. Implication of the Study 
The study has a number of theoretical and empirical implications. The theoretical 
implication of this study is represented in the emphasis on the applicability of the tradeoff 
theory in the Egyptian context. In this context, the study has highlighted the long debate 
regarding the nature of the relationship between market-based finance and bank-based 
finance. The study has shown that both sources of financing are not perfect substitutes. Firms 
could choose the two sources depending on their costs. This provides more evidence on 
supporting the tradeoff theory against the pecking order theory. Three main channels support 
the previously mentioned argument: the growth channel, the profitability channel, and size 
effect channel. The growth of a firm stimulates an easy access to both sources of financing. 
Moreover, profits are negatively associated with both market-based and bank-based finance, 
which is consistent with the predictions of the tradeoff theory. Regarding the size effect 
channel, the prevailing of positive association between size and leverage ratio shows that 
privatized firms did not yet reach their targeted debt level. That is, regardless of the growing 
privatized firms, they opt for bank-based finance as a cheaper way of raising external funds. 
This is an implication of the preposition of tradeoff theory that states that a firm increases 
leverage until it reaches the targeted debt level, but once a firm passes its target level, the 
association between size and leverage should be negative in favor of market-based finance. 
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On the practical side, the study has highlighted the potential of the following three 
environments in the Egyptian market. First, privatized firms face a high agency cost. Second, 
privatized firms encounter an overinvestment problem. Third, the possible differences in 
bank-lending channel exist between firms operating in the Egyptian market compared to 
firms operating in other emerging economies in terms of the degree of agency cost. That is, 
Egyptian privatized firms face high agency cost that, in turn, enforces them to rely more on 
debt finance, even if their size grows. 
The previously mentioned environments have various implications for the Egyptian 
economy. This can be represented in the following four issues. First, priorities should be 
given to privatize larger firms, which are able to face the challenges in the Egyptian market 
represented in high burdens of accessing the external finance. Second, it should be considered 
improving the auditing standards within operating firms in order to alleviate the asymmetric 
information problem. Third, it should be considered sectoral diversification in the 
privatization process instead of divesting firms belong to specific sector. This can help in 
reducing the overinvestment problem resulted from low investment opportunities. Fourth and 
finally, before further privatization, it should be considered the capacity of the financial 
sector in providing sufficient financial services to new divested firms.  
6.6. Conclusion 
The study has emphasized on the differences in financial decisions of firms based on 
differences in the ownership structure. Overall, privatized firms rely more on bank-based 
finance in funding their investments. Moreover, the size is an important factor that influences 
the access to external finance among privatized firms. The study has shown that the smaller 
the size of privatized firms, the lower reliance on bank-based finance. This is because of the 
higher cost that small firms face in accessing the market-based finance. Contrary, the larger 
the size of privatized firms is, the higher access to external finance is, particularly the bank-
based finance.  
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In addition, the study has emphasized on the different influence of the size based on 
the differences on the ownership structure. Although larger privatized firms depend more on 
bank-based finance, large size well-established publicly listed firms depend more on market-
based finance. By comparing between privatized firms and state-owned firms, the study has 
found that privatized firms rely relatively more on internal finance rather than debt-finance, 
particularly among small size ones, while state-owned firms rely more on debt in financing 
their investments.  
Overall, privatized firms relatively rely more on debt-finance when compared to well-
established publicly listed firms, which depends mainly on market-based finance in funding 
their investments. In addition, privatized firms relatively rely more on internal finance when 
compared to SOEs. This implies the difficulty of privatized firms in accessing external 
finance due to a number of factors. One, privatized firms are still lack of reputation in the 
equity market and the market-based finance is still costly for them. Two, privatized firms 
have more tangible assets and are less likely to raise funds from equity market. Three, 
privatized firms are relatively credit constrained. That represents a difficult condition for 
privatized firms to access the equity market. Four, privatized firms find internal finance 
cheaper when compared to external finance. That is internal finance has a relatively cost 
advantage over external finance for privatized firms. Five, the high reliance of state-owned 
firms on debt-finance emerges from their tendency to finance their losses by obtaining loans 
from state-owned banks.  
With respect to the determinants of choices of financing, the study has shown that, 
irrespective of the ownership structure, size is an important factor. It plays a main role in 
mitigating the asymmetric information between lenders, i.e. financial institutions and 
borrowers, i.e. firms. Thus, the larger size a firm is, the easier access to external finance is. 
This is because size has a positive impact on the auditing transparency of large firms.  
Although the age of a firm has a positive and statistically significant impact on bank-
based finance, it has no statistically significant impact on the market-based finance. On the 
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other hand, other factors such as size, profitability, and capital expenditure have more 
influence on market-based finance.  
By taking into consideration the ownership structure, the study has found that size of 
privatized firms is an important factor in determining their access to external finance. This is 
mainly because large size ascends the agency cost within a firm. As a result, a number of 
privatized firms opt for bank-based finance to alleviate their agency cost problem. The latter 
result might indicate a possible high agency problem that a number of Egyptian privatized 
firms face. In turn, those firms choose debt-finance as a way to mitigate such problem. In 
addition, the study has found an important role of sales growth in facilitating access to bank-
based finance among privatized firms.   
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Chapter 7. Privatization and the Development of the Financial Sector: 
Evidence from Egypt 
7.1. Introduction 
In Egypt, the financial sector plays a central role in the economy thorough funding 
large industries and big business. One of the characteristics of that sector is the dominance of 
the state intervention over its financial activities, particularly before 1990s. However, state 
control over the financial sector has diminished gradually since 1990s. This was mainly 
because of the privatization plans, which targeted liberalizing the sector.  
The government committed to implement a reform in the financial sector through 
privatizing a number of banks and non-bank financial institutions, as discussed in  Chapter 3. 
Since 1990s, the government aimed at selling shares of joint ventures and commercial state-
owned banks. This resulted in a significant evolution of the financial sector in terms of 
stability, size, lending, and risk-taking behavior, which led to increase competition within the 
financial sector. Until 2010, Egypt sold shares of 14 joint venture banks out of 17, and 
divested one of its largest state-owned banks, namely Bank of Alexandria. In addition, a 
number of non-bank financial institutions were privatized.  
 A number of empirical evidences, (e.g., Bonin et al., 2005; Boubakri et al., 2005; 
Clarke et al., 2005b; Otchere, 2005; Berger et al., 2009), found that private ownership 
outperformed the state ownership in the banking sector. However, the expected improvement 
in performance of privatized banks may differ from non-financial firms. Megginson (2005) 
showed that the expected improvement in the performance of privatized financial institutions 
was far less than the expected improvement in performance of privatized non-financial 
institutions.  
However, those studies ignored another important aspect with respect to the 
relationship between privatization and behavior of banks. In particular, they ignored the 
impact of privatization on lending and risk-taking behavior of privatized banks. Privatization 
encourages foreign entry of banks, which, in turn, has a potential crowding out effect on 
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lending behavior and risk-taking of operating financial institutions (Clarke et al., 2005b). In 
addition, privatization has a potential impact on the usage of financial instruments. Beck et al. 
(2005) found that privatized banks that invest more in government bonds and other non-
lending activities outperformed banks that depend mainly on lending activities. In addition, 
privatized banks may relatively favor non-lending activities compared to state-owned banks. 
This is because of the ability of the latter banks to charge lower lending interest rates 
(Sapienza, 2004).  
In the Egyptian context, empirical evidence, e.g. Omran (2007), ignored the impact of 
privatization on the lending and risk-taking behavior of privatized firms. Omran (2007) 
analyzed the changes in operating performance of 12 privatized banks during the period of 
1996-1999. His study mainly focused on the analysis of the change in the performance of 
privatized banks rather than examining the sources of improvement. In addition, the existing 
literature does not compare the performance between privatized financial institutions and 
privatized non-financial institutions, given the potential improvement differences between 
financial and non-financial institutions as discussed in Megginson (2005).  
This empirical study extends the existing relevant literature in the Egyptian context by 
focusing on the sources of improvement in performance rather than identifying the trends of 
the improvement. This empirical study mainly raises questions that were not considered in 
the previous empirical research. In particular, the study raises the following questions. (1) Do 
privatized financial institutions differ in their lending behavior compared to other private 
counterparts? (2) Do privatized financial institutions differ in their performance compared to 
other non-financial institutions? (3) Do privatized financial institutions differ in their risk-
taking behavior compared to other non-financial institutions?  
Based on a sample of privatized financial institutions and other private financial 
institutions during the period of 2000-2009, the study attempts to answer the forgoing 
questions. The study is based on an idea that improved performance of banks and non-bank 
financial institutions could affect their lending and risk-taking behavior. For this purpose, the 
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study adopts a qualitative analysis to scrutinize differences among banks and non-bank 
financial institutions in the aspects of improved performance. In addition, the study analyzes 
how these aspects affect their lending and risk-taking behavior. 
After introduction, this chapter is organized as follows. Section  7.2 demonstrates the 
methodology of the study. Section  7.3 describes the data and used variables. Section  7.4 
reports the results of the empirical analysis. Section  7.5 analyzes the implication of the study. 
Finally, section  7.6 shows the conclusion of the study. 
7.2. Methodology 
As mentioned in  Chapter 4, theories of financial intermediaries, as demonstrated by 
Diamond (1984) and Cerasi and Daltung (2000), provided the essential tools to analyze the 
lending behavior of banks. According to those theories, bank diversification is essential for 
reducing the exhibited economic risks and increasing profitability. Thus, bank diversification 
positively affects performance of banks and reduces the chances of costly financial 
bankruptcy (Winton, 1999).  
The positive effects of bank diversification emerge from its impact on resolving the 
incentives problem (Diamond, 1984) and mitigating informational asymmetries (Boyd and 
Prescott, 1986). However, diversification can generate losses that are represented in higher 
expected operating cost compared to focusing in the same line of businesses. Two aspects of 
bank diversifications can be identified: sectoral diversification and financial instrument 
diversification.  
Based on the previous theoretical background, this empirical study analyzes the 
different factors that contribute to improve performance of privatized financial institutions in 
Egypt, mainly credit efficiency, asset utilization, cost efficiency, and income composition. In 
addition, the study analyzes the differences across banks in terms of their lending behavior. 
Then, the study examines the differences in risk-taking and other performance measures 
between financial institutions vs. non-financial institutions. In all the above-mentioned 
analyses, the study covers the period of 2000-2009. 
155 
 
 
 
 
This study is based on the assumption that diversification of loans among banks 
affects their lending and risk-taking behavior by mitigating asymmetry of information and 
cost of monitoring. This is assumed because of the potential high asymmetric information and 
cost of monitoring that characterizes developing countries, in general, and the Egyptian 
economy, in particular. By considering that assumption, the study is able to examine the 
development of the supply of the financial activities provided by the financial institutions. 
For this purpose of examining the previously mentioned issues, the study adopts a 
qualitative analysis and non-parametric tests. There are three reasons why such analysis 
might be meaningful. One, it helps elaborating results obtained from financial statements of 
financial institutions. Two, given that accounting standards may vary across financial 
institutions and non-financial institutions in Egypt, performance indicators based on annual 
changes may be more reliable. Three, it helps in following the differences among different 
categories of institutions that belong to different sectors.  
The methodology of the study is divided into three parts. First, the study analyzes the 
aspects of improved performance of privatized banks. Second, the study scrutinizes the 
lending behavior of banks. Finally, the study measures the performance indicators of 
privatized financial institutions and compares them with other non-financial institutions. The 
demonstration of these parts is described as follows.  
In the first part, the study calculates commonly used financial indicators that measure 
the evolution of credit, capital sufficiency, cost efficiency, and income structure. The study 
calculates these indicators for two categories of banks: privatized banks (PBs) and other 
operating private banks (OPBs). For all the previous variables, the distribution among 
different bank sizes is analyzed. For the latter point, individual banks are classified based on 
their size measured by total assets into four size groups denoted by Q1 until Q4. Q1 denotes 
the first quantile of the sample, which represent the smallest bank size group, while Q4 
denotes the fourth quantile, which represent the largest bank size group.  
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In the second part, the study analyzes the lending behavior of banks. Two aspects of 
diversification are concerned: sectoral loan diversification and financial instrument 
diversification. Regarding the sectoral loan diversification, the study measures the allocation 
of loans directed for the following sectors: agriculture, banks, households, manufacturing, 
services, and trade. Regarding the financial instrument diversification, the study scrutinizes 
the segments of financial instruments in terms of lending activities such as loans and non-
lending activities such as treasury bills, securities, and bonds.  
In order to measure the degree of diversification of sectoral lending and financial 
instruments, the study uses Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (Rossi et al., 2009). Two 
versions of HHI are measured: gg w^, which measures the degree of loan diversification, and 
gg x^, which measures the degree of concentration across financial instruments. gg w^ index 
equals unity when all loans provided by a bank are granted for a single sector. It is calculated 
as follows: 
gg^w = ∑ ;z{|>
5}
A~ ,  
 = ∑ dA}A~  , 0 < gg^w < 1 
where gg w^ is the degree of loan diversification, dA is the portion of lending that are 
devoted to sector ,  is the total volume of lending, and 4 is the number of sectors.  
On the other hand, gg x^ index equals unity when a bank grants credits in a form of a 
single financial instrument, i.e. treasury bills, securities, or bonds. It is calculated as follows: 
gg x^ = ∑ ;z
 ̀
| >
5}̀
~̀ ,  
 = ∑ dA}́~̀  , 0 < gg x^ < 1 
where gg x^ is the degree of financial instrument diversification, d A is the portion of 
credit in a form of a financial instrument ,̀   is the total volume of the financial portfolio, 
and 4̀ is the number of financial instruments. 
In the third part of the empirical analysis, the study measures the performance 
indicators and risk-taking behavior of privatized financial institutions classified by size 
groups, i.e. Q1 until Q4. With respect to the performance indicators, the study uses commonly 
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used measures of operating and financial performance, which give conclusion regarding the 
financial soundness and solvency of financial institutions. In particular, the study uses ratios 
of return on assets, return on equity, debt-asset, debt-equity, and revenues-asset.  
With respect to the risk-taking behavior, the study uses Z-scores to evaluate banks 
based on scores of their riskiness, which is described as follows:  
i = t]u Yutt]u
 , 
where	i is Z-scores, P\U is return on assets, and @UP is the capital-asset ratio. 
In a further step, the study compares the performance and risk-taking measures of 
privatized financial institutions vs. other private financial institutions and privatized non-
financial institutions. In this step, the study uses a non-parametric test, i.e., Kruskal-Wallis 
test, to test for the significance of the difference in central values of the operating and 
financial performance and risk-taking behavior.  
7.3. Data and Variables 
Data 
In order to accomplish the research objectives, this study collects a unique database 
on Egyptian banks (SIC codes 6011-6099), non-bank financial institutions (SIC codes 6211-
6411), and non-financial privatized firms during the period of 2000-2009. The non-financial 
privatized firms belong to the following sectors: construction (SIC codes 1521-1799), 
manufacturing (SIC codes 2011-3999), telecommunication (SIC codes 4812-4899), regulated 
utilities (SIC 4900–4999), and trade (SIC codes 5012-5199).  
The data are collected from three main sources: Arab Capital Market Resource Center, 
Thomson Reuters, official financial statements. The details of the sampled financial and non-
financial institutions are described as follows.  
The study utilizes a sample of 109 financial and non-financial institutions, which is 
described as the following: 16 privatized banks (PBs), 6 privatized non-bank financial 
institutions (PFIs), 14 other private banks (OPBs), 29 other non-bank financial institutions 
(OFIs), and 44 privatized non-financial firms (PNFIs).  
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To date, there are 25 privatized banks and non-bank financial institutions since the 
start of the privatization in 1991. The study does not include Bank of Cairo, Misr Exterior 
Bank, and Development and Popular Houses due to lack of data39. 
Variables 
This section shows, first, the main variables that are used for scrutinizing the effects 
of privatization on banks activities and lending behavior as measured by financial indicators. 
Then, the section briefly describes a number of additional variables that are used on the 
analysis of the performance and risk-taking of financial institutions and non-financial 
institutions. 
Various commonly used indicators are used to gauge activities of banks. In particular, 
the study uses the total credit ratio to proxy for credit efficiency (Diamond, 1984). The study 
scales the total credit by total deposits to indicate the efficiency of banks in utilizing their 
deposits. The total credit includes credits to private sector, household, and the governments. 
The total deposits include term and demand deposits. The credit to deposit ratio is calculated 
as follows: 
@P =	 VYVX ∗ 100, 
where @P is the credit ratio, N@ is the total credits, and N. is the total deposits.  
Capital to asset ratio (CAR) is used to proxy for asset utilization. This ratio shows the 
sufficiency of capital in financing assets. That is, it reflects the degree of solvency of a bank. 
The capital includes funds contributed by owners, reserves, and retained earnings. Following 
Kishan and Opiela (2000); Mohieldin and Nasr (2007), the study controls for the potential 
size-effect by dividing by total assets. Thus, the ratio is calculated as follows:  
@UP = Y YtVu ∗ 100, 
                                                
39 Bank Misr acquired Misr Exterior Bank in 2004. Separate financial statements of Misr Exterior bank 
could not be found. 
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where CAR is the capital-asset ratio, CS is capital shares, CR is capital reserves, and 
TA is the total assets.  
Cost efficiency (CE) shows the portion of costs that generates income. This ratio 
reflects the bank ability to utilize its resources efficiently (Lin and Zhang, 2009). Lower 
ratios indicate better situation of a bank. It is calculated as follows: 
@[ = VYVx ∗ 100, 
where @[ is the cost efficiency ratio, N@ is the total cost, and N_^ is the total net 
income.  
The income structure of banks shows the distribution of net interest income and net 
non-interest income as a percentage of total net income. Net interest income equals the 
interest received from assets minus the interest paid on liabilities. Non-interest income 
includes deposits and transaction fees (Lepetit et al., 2008; Rossi et al., 2009). 
In order to scrutinizing the bank lending behavior, the following two measures are 
used: the sectoral loan diversification (gg w^ ) and the financial instrument diversification 
(gg x^). According to Rossi et al. (2009), Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a statistical 
measure that shows the degree of concentration of bank lending directed for specific sectors 
or the degree of concentration of a financial instrument within the credit portfolio.  
In addition to the previous variables, the study uses a number of additional variables 
to explore the operating and financial performance of financial institutions and compare them 
with non-financial institutions. In particular, the study uses five standard financial ratios that 
are used to measure performance: return on assets, return on equity, debt-equity, debt-assets, 
and revenues to total assets. Return on assets and return on equity are important measures of 
profitability of an institution (Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009). Debt-asset 
and debt-equity ratios are measures of leverage of an institution (Adrian and Shin, 2010). The 
latter ratios show volumes of assets or equity that are financed by debt. They are considered 
good indicators for reflecting the financial risk of an institution in the short term. Revenues to 
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total assets ratio is a measure of growth of financial institutions (Holod and Peek, 2007). In 
addition, it measures the efficiency of an institution in utilizing its assets (Stiroh, 2004).  
Finally, the study uses Z-scores in order to analyze the risk-taking behavior of 
financial institutions and compare them with non-financial institutions. This index is a good 
measure for analyzing the potential of bankruptcy. It ranks institutions based on their 
riskiness by measuring the statistical distance from insolvency. That is, the higher the score is, 
the lower the potential of bankruptcy is (Laeven and Levine, 2009). The following table 
summarizes the used variables and their definition.  
Table  7-1 Definition of Main Variables Used in Examining the Impact of 
Privatization on Banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
Variable Definition 
Capital-Asset Ratio  The Sufficiency of Banks Capital in Financing its Asset 
Cost-Income Ratio  The Portion of Income that Covers Costs  
Credit-Deposit Ratio The Extent of Utilized Credit per Unit of Raised Deposits 
Instrument Concentration 
The Degree of Concentration of Financial Instruments within the Credit 
Portfolio of Banks  
Growth Ratio The Ratio of Total Revenues Divided by Total Assets 
Income Structure  
The Percentages of Net Interest Income and Non-Interest Income as 
Percentage of Total Net Income 
Lending Concentration  The Degree of Concentration of Bank Loans Directed for Specific Sectors 
Leverage 
The Portion of Debt that is Used in Financing Assets Measured by Debt-
Asset or Debt-Equity Ratios 
Profitability The Portion of Generated Earnings per Unit of Assets 
Riskiness 
The Degree of Riskiness of a Firm in Operating its Assets Measured by 
Z-Scores 
7.4. Results 
As outlined in section  7.2, the empirical study of this chapter consists of three 
analyses: (1) analysis of aspects of improved performance among privatized banks against 
other private banks, (2) analysis of the lending behavior among privatized banks against other 
private banks, (3) analysis of the operating performance and risk-taking of privatized 
financial institutions against privatized non-financial institutions.  
Main Findings of the Aspects of Improved Performance among Privatized Banks 
This section reports main results of annual activities of privatized banks (PBs) and 
other private banks (OPBs) during the period of 2000-2009. In particular, the study analyzes 
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the following main ratios: credit to deposit, capital to asset, cost-income, and income 
structure, which are reported in Table II-3 until Table II-7 in appendix II. In addition, the 
median values and growth rates of these ratios are reported.  
Egypt over the period under scrutiny witnessed a modest improvement in activities of 
private banks compared to privatized banks. We refer to two tables to make the point clear. 
The first is Table II-3, which reports the credit to deposit ratio. The second is Table II-4, 
which reports the capital to asset ratio. Credit to deposit ratio shows the efficiency of banks in 
utilizing credits per unit of raised deposits. In general, OPBs outperformed PBs with 
estimated median at 57% compared to 51.9% among PBs. Among PBs group, Delta 
International, Egyptian Commercial Bank, and National Development were the most active 
banks in terms of credit to deposit ratio in their annual performance. The data reveals that the 
average credit-deposit ratio of privatized banks declined from 74.1% in 2000 to less than 
46% since 2006. Five OPBs outperformed PBs, namely Islamic International Bank, Nile 
Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank, United Bank, and Egyptian Workers Bank, which had credit to 
deposit ratio above 80%. On the other hand, six PBs, namely Egyptian Saudi finance Bank, 
Arab African International Bank, Egyptian American Bank, Credit Agricole Egypt, Bank of 
Alexandria, and Alexandria Commercial and Maritime tailed the sampled banks with ratio 
less than 50%. Nine OPBs had credit to deposit ratio higher than the sample median, which is 
estimated at 53.5%, while five of them had lower ratio than the sample median. On the other 
hand, seven PBs had higher ratio than the median, while nine PBs had lower ratio than the 
median.  
The capital to asset ratio is a measure of solvency of banks and is considered a 
measure of efficiency in credit allocation by banks. The median value is estimated at 7% for 
the whole sample. PBs had a lower capital to asset ratio estimated at 7% compared to 7.4% 
for OPBs and 7% for the whole sample during the period under consideration. Eight PBs out 
of 30 in the whole sample had a ratio less than 8%. Among PBs, nine out of 16 PBs had a 
ratio less than the median. Among OPBs, seven out of 14 banks had a ratio less than the 
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median. The data shows that the credit-deposit ratio of privatized banks during 2003-2007, 
except for 2005, was below the median of the entire period. On the other hand, average of the 
ratio for OPBs during the period 2000-2004 was below the entire period median, before it 
rose again since 2005.  
Figure  7-1 and Figure  7-2 attempts a comparison of credit-deposit ratio and capital-
asset ratio, respectively, for individual banks that belong to OPBs and PBs. Compared to 
OPBs, PBs were less efficient in utilizing credits per unit of deposit, as shown in Figure  7-1. 
Among PBs group, Delta Bank had the highest ratio, estimated at 73.4%. The latter ratio was 
far beyond Islamic International bank (118.5%), Nile bank (107.9%), Faisal Islamic Bank 
(105%), United Bank (85%), and Egyptian Workers (84%), which belong to OPBs. 
 
 
As shown in Figure  7-2, capital-asset ratio for Cairo Far East bank, among the PBs 
group, had the highest ratio (19.8%) compared to other counterparts. Followed by Cairo Far 
East Bank, three other banks had high ratios among PBs group, namely Delta Bank, Misr 
Romania, and Alexandria Commercial and Maritime, with ratios estimated at 14%, 11.3%, 
and 9.5%, respectively.  
Figure 7-1 Average Credit -Deposit Ratios by 
Privatized and Private Egyptian Banks, 2000-
2009 
Figure 7-2 Average Capital -Asset Ratios by 
Privatized and Private Egyptian Banks, 
2000-2009 
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Cost-income ratio shows the changes in cost per unit of net income, which is used to 
assess the financial burden on a bank. Table II-5 shows the ratio for the sampled banks. In 
general, the cost-income ratio for PBs was higher when compared to OPBs, which is 
estimated at 35.9% and 30.9%, respectively. The annual change of scheduled privatized 
banks reveals that the ratio increased above the sample median in 2003, 2004, and 2007. This 
position slightly improved in 2008. The majority of banks had positive cost-income ratio with 
the exception of two banks, namely Islamic International Bank (-6.2%), which belongs to 
OPBs and Cairo Far East Bank (0%), which belongs to PBs. 
 Figure  7-3 presents the cost-income ratio for the two bank groups. Among the OPBs 
group, it is notable that Egyptian worker Bank had the highest cost-income ratio estimated at 
100%. On the other hand, Islamic International Bank had the lowest ratio, estimated at -6%. 
Followed by Islamic International Bank, Al Baraka and Nile Bank had competitive cost-
income ratio. Among privatized banks group, Egyptian Commercial and Cairo Far East Bank 
had the lowest ratio, which approached to zero, while Suez Canal had the highest ratio 
estimate at 87.8%. Followed the Cairo Far East Bank, two other banks had competitive ratios, 
namely Egyptian Commercial and Egyptian Saudi Finance. 
Figure  7-3 Average Cost-Income Ratios by Privatized and Private Egyptian Banks, 2000-
2009 
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Net interest income shows the portion of earning that banks obtain from lending 
activities, while non-interest income shows the portion of earnings that banks obtain from 
non-lending activities such as fees and commissions, and returns on tradable instruments, e.g., 
shares and bonds.  
Table II-6 and Table II-7 show the portions of net interest income and non-interest 
income for each bank group. The data shows that the net interest income for the PBs 
exceeded the OPBs, which is estimated at 70% and 61%, respectively. Three PBs had 
relatively high portions of net interest income compared to OPBs. In particular, Misr 
Romania, which belongs to PBs, led the sample with a ratio of 98%. Al Barka Bank, which 
belongs to OPBs, tailed the sample with estimated ratio at 0%. Among PBs group, Egyptian 
Saudi Finance Bank and National Development Bank tailed the sample with estimated ratios 
at 0% and 27.4%, respectively. On the other hand, Islamic International Bank, Arab Banking, 
Nile Bank, Misr Iran, and United Bank had the highest net interest income among OPBs 
group, which are estimated at 93%, 88%, 87%, 86%, and 82%, respectively.  
Regarding the non-interest income, in general, the ratio among PBs fell beyond OPBs, 
which is estimated at 29.7% and 39%, respectively. Among privatized banks, Egyptian Saudi 
Finance, National Development Bank, and Suez Canal Bank had the highest non-interest 
income ratios, which are estimated at 100%, 72.6%, and 63.5%, respectively. On the other 
hand, among OPBs group, Al Barka Bank, Egyptian Workers Bank, and Faisal Islamic Bank 
had the highest non-interest income ratios, which are estimated at 100%, 68%, and 66%, 
respectively. The non-interest income of all scheduled privatized banks decreased drastically 
in 2008 after a significant improvement during 2003-2007.  
Figure  7-4 and Figure  7-5 show the percentages of net interest income and non-
interest income for the two groups of bank. It is clear that net interest income exceeded non-
interest income for majority of privatized banks. On the other hand, OPBs generated more 
income from non-interest income, namely Al Baraka Bank, Faisal Bank, Egyptian Workers 
Bank, Union National Bank, and Egyptian Gulf Bank. 
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Table  7-2 demonstrates the differences in the previous measures of bank activities 
classified by different size groups. It is clear that privatized banks had lower credit-deposit 
ratio compared to OPBs. As shown, the median ratio among privatized banks is estimated at 
51.8%, while it is estimate at 57% among OPBs. The small size banks indicated by first and 
second quantiles within PBs had a relatively lower ratio when compared to OPBs, while the 
larger size ones indicated by third and fourth quantiles had higher ratios.  
The data reveals that the median of capital-asset ratio among privatized banks, i.e. 
7.04%, was lower when compared to other private banks with ratios estimated at 7.41%. 
However, the median difference between the two groups was statistically insignificant. The 
first quantile of PBs had a ratio higher than the sample median, while all other quantiles had 
ratios lower than the sample median. 
 
Figure 7-4 Average Ratios of Net Interest 
Income by Privatized and Private Egyptian 
Banks, 2000-2009 
Figure 7-5 Average Ratios of Net Non-
Interest Income by Privatized and Private 
Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
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Table  7-2 Quantiles of Average Percentages of Performance Indicators by Privatized 
and Private Egyptian Banks and Total Sample, 2000-2009 
Variable Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Median SD. Obs. 
Credit-Deposit Ratio 
PBs 53.88** 44.65*** 52.86 52.95 51.86** 20.81 125 
OPBs 64.40** 57.61*** 50.97 49.00 57.04** 28.00 107 
TS 58.56 50.44 51.96 51.98 53.46 25.72 232 
Capital-Asset Ratio 
PBs 8.51 8.32 6.99 6.72 7.04 4.46 117 
OPBs 8.56 7.54 5.75 5.22 7.41 5.12 83 
TS 8.56 7.87 6.40 6.46 7.15 4.74 200 
Cost-Income Ratio 
PBs 6.42*** 50.36 42.16 42.16*** 35.85 54.36 116 
OPBs 45.83*** 28.04 36.74 14.28*** 30.88 35.08 82 
TS 13.49 37.21 37.75 34.51 34.86 47.24 198 
Net Interest Income 
PBs 78.18*** 78.28 62.90 74.81 70.31*** 48.17 120 
OPBs 57.67*** 81.33 44.19 40.98 61.00*** 75.52 90 
TS 70.00 78.54 61.00 72.55 67.95 61.92 210 
Non-Interest Income 
PBs 21.82*** 21.72 37.10 25.19 29.69** 48.17 120 
OPBs 42.33*** 18.67 55.81 59.02 39.00** 75.52 90 
TS 30.00 21.46 39.00 27.45 32.05 61.92 210 
Notes: PBs indicates privatized banks, OPBs indicates other private banks, and TS indicates the total 
sample. Q1 until Q4 indicates first until fourth quantile of the size meas3ured by total assets. The study has 
applied two-sample equality of median test to test for the significance of the difference in central values between 
PBs and OPBs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
With respect to cost-income ratio, its median value was higher with magnitude of 5% 
among PBs compared to OPBs. For the PBs, the first quantile had a lower ratio compared to 
the sample median, while all other quantiles ha ratios higher than the sample median. 
Compared to OPBs, with the exception of the first quantile, all privatized banks had higher 
ratios. The privatized banks group recorded high net interest income among all size groups 
with median estimated at 70.3% compared to 61% among OPBs. With the exception of the 
second quantile, all other quantiles within PBs had higher ratios than the sample median. On 
the other hand, except for the second quantile, the non-interest income was higher across all 
size groups of OPBs with ratio estimated at 39% compared to 30% among PBs. This is a 
positive outcome for OPBs, since higher non-lending activities could reduce the risks of the 
dependence on interest income. 
Main Findings of Bank Lending Behavior  
This section shows the results of the distribution of sectoral lending for the two 
groups of banks. In particular, it shows the share of lending for the manufacturing, trade, 
services, agriculture, banking, and household sectors. In addition, this section shows results 
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of the distribution of lending instruments across banks. Finally, this section presents results of 
the concentration of lending activities across banks.  
The Distribution of the Sectoral Lending 
Table II-8 until Table II-13 report, for each bank groups, the annual sectoral lending 
for each bank, their respective medians, and growth rates during the period 2000-2009. In the 
whole sample, the median values of total lending for the manufacturing, trade, services, 
agriculture, banks, and households are estimated at 27.7%, 31.3%, 18.6%, 0.6%, 0.7%, and 
8%, respectively. However, these ratios vary among each bank groups. The ratios of lending 
for the manufacturing, services, and banking sector were relatively higher among privatized 
banks, which are estimated at 30%, 23%, and 4.6%, respectively, compared to 25.7%, 11%, 
and 0% among OPBs group. On the other hand, lending for the trade, agriculture, and 
household were relatively lower among privatized banks, which are estimated at 23.5%, 0.6%, 
7.2%, respectively, compared to 45.9%, 0.7%, and 11.6%, respectively, among OPBs. As 
shown in the tables, the annual lending activities among PBs for the manufacturing sector 
outperformed their counterparts in OPBs in all years, with the exception of year 2007. In the 
latter year, the ratio dropped down to 26%. With respect to the trade sector, after 2002, the 
lending of PBs for the sector was reduced significantly in favor of more lending for services 
and the banking sector. Lending for agriculture drastically dropped during 2007-2008 in 
favor of more lending for the banking sector. In the case of OPBs, the lending for the services 
sector was reduced in favor of more lending for the trade sector, especially during the period 
of 2003-2006. Lending for agriculture sector significantly increased since 2008. With respect 
to lending for household, OPBs granted the sector relatively higher annual loans when 
compared to PBs. Figure  7-6 summarizes the averages of lending for the previously 
mentioned sectors by each bank group. 
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Figure  7-6 Average Percentages of Lending for other Sectors by Private and 
Privatized Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
Figure  7-7 until Figure  7-12 describe the sectoral lending behavior for individual 
banks in each bank group. Figure  7-7 indicates that privatized banks, namely Egyptian 
American Bank, commercial international bank, National Societe General Egypt, had highest 
ratios of lending for the manufacturing sector with ratios estimated at 51%, 45%, and 42%, 
respectively.  
Figure 7-7 Average Percentages of Lending 
for Manufacturing Sector by Private and 
Privatized Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
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On the other hand, banks of Societe Arab International and Egyptian workers Bank, 
which belong to OPBs, had high ratios of lending for the sector with estimated ratios at 39% 
and 35%, respectively. Among privatized banks, Suez Canal Bank and Alexandria 
Commercial Bank had the highest ratios of lending for the trade sector with ratios estimated 
at 55% and 40%, respectively. Islamic International Bank and Egypt Worker Bank were 
among OPBs that competed PBs in their lending for the trade sector with estimated ratios at 
57% and 50%, respectively. 
According to Figure  7-9, privatized banks led the sampled banks in lending for the 
services sector. In particular, Commercial International Bank, Misr International Bank, and 
Delta International Bank led the sampled banks with ratios exceeded 30% of their total loans. 
 In the case of OPBs, United Bank was ranked first with ratio estimated at 35.4%. 
Regarding the lending pattern for the agriculture sector, majority of the sampled banks had a 
lower lending ratio when compared to the other sectors.  
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Figure 7-9 Average Percentages of Lending 
for Services Sector by Private and Privatized 
Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
Figure 7-10 Average Percentages of Lending 
for Agriculture Sector by Private and 
Privatized Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
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Figure  7-10 shows that majority of the sampled banks had ratios less than 7%. Among 
privatized banks, Cairo Far East Bank and Egyptian American Bank led the other 
counterparts in their lending for the agriculture sector. On the other hand, Islamic 
International Bank, El Watany Bank, and BNP Bank led the OPBs in their lending for the 
sector with ratios exceeded 4% of their lending portfolio. With the exception of the latter 
banks, the ratio was below 2.5% among other operating Banks.  
As shown in Figure  7-11 and Figure  7-12, PBs had relatively high volumes of lending 
for banks when compared to OPBs. In particular, Misr Romania, Alexandria Commercial, 
and Egyptian Saudi had highest ratios estimated at 28%, 22%, and 17%, respectively. With 
the exception of Arab Banking (5.5%), OPBs had a very small lending ratio for banks. With 
respect to lending for households, OPBs exceeded PBs in their lending for the sector. In 
particular, El Watany Bank and BNP Bank outperformed their competitors that belong to PBs 
with ratios exceeded 16%. Egyptian Commercial, Egyptian American Bank, and National 
Societe were among the top PBs in their lending for the sector with ratios estimated at 14.5%, 
14%, and 13.7%, respectively.  
Figure 7-11 Average Percentages of 
Lending for Banking Sector by Private and 
Privatized Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
Figure 7-12 Average Percentages of Lending 
for Household Sector by Private and 
Privatized Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
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The Distribution of Lending Instruments 
For each bank groups, Table II-14 until Table II-17 show results of the lending 
instruments during the period of 2000-2009. In addition, medians values and growth rates are 
reported. In the whole sample, the median values of total loans, treasury bills, bonds, and 
securities are estimated at 78%, 15.8%, 0.4%, and 0.2%, respectively. As shown in 
Figure  7-13, ratios of loans, treasury bills, bonds, and securities among PBs are estimated at 
74.5%, 18.8%, 1.4%, and 0.3%, respectively, compared to 83%, 10%, 0%, and 0.002% 
among OPBs group. 
Figure  7-13 Average Percentages of Lending Instruments by Private and Privatized 
Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
In general, privatized banks were relatively higher in utilizing treasury bills, bonds, 
and securities compared to OPBs. On the other hand, OPBs exceeded PBs in their usage of 
loans. 
As shown in Figure  7-14, among privatized banks, Suez Canal, Delta Bank, 
Commercial International, Egyptian Commercial, and Misr International had highest ratios of 
loans in their portfolio, which exceeded 80%. On the other hand, Egyptian Saudi Finance and 
Arab African International were among lowest banks in using loans as financial instruments. 
Among OPBs, seven banks had ratio exceeded 80%, namely Egyptian Workers, Islamic 
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International, Societe Arab International, El Watany Bank, Arab Bank, Egyptian Gulf Bank, 
and Nile Bank.  
Privatized banks used relatively higher ratios of treasury bills compared to OPBs. As 
shown in Figure  7-15, the top five banks that utilized treasury bills belong to the privatized 
bank group. In particular, Egyptian Saudi Finance, Cairo Barclays bank, Egyptian American, 
Arab African International, and bank of Alexandria had highest ratios of using treasury bills 
exceeded 25%. HSCB and BNP were on the top among OPBs that utilized treasury bills in 
their financial portfolio with ratio exceeded 20%.  
With respect to bonds and securities, as shown in Figure  7-16 and Figure  7-17, 
National Development and Alexandria Commercial Bank were among privatized banks that 
utilized relatively high volumes of bonds and securities. In particular, 16.6% and 12% of their 
portfolio were devoted to bonds and securities, respectively. On the other hand, United Bank 
and Misr Iran were among OPBs group that used relatively high volumes of bonds and 
securities in the sample. In particular, United Bank devoted 15% and 1.3% of its portfolio to 
Figure 7-14 Average Percentages of Loans 
by Private and Privatized Egyptian Banks, 
2000-2009 
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bonds and securities, respectively, while Misr Iran devotes 4.3% and 1.4% of its portfolio to 
bonds and securities, respectively. 
The Concentration of Lending Activities 
Table  7-3 reports the results of HHI and HHI indices. These indices show the degree 
of concentration of lending. HHI shows the degree of concentration of sectoral lending by 
individual banks. Overall, privatized banks had relatively lower median values of the 
concentration index compared to other private banks, which are estimated at 0.29 and 0.33, 
respectively. Suez Canal, Egyptian American, Misr Romania and Commercial International 
Bank were on top of privatized banks in their sectoral lending concentration with scores 
estimated at 0.4, 0.39, 0.38, and 0.35, respectively. As shown before, Suez Canal Bank 
mainly lent for the services (20.6%) and trade sectors (55%). Egyptian American Bank 
mainly lent for the manufacturing (51%) the services (17%) sectors. Misr Romania Bank 
mainly lent for the trade (37%) and Banks (29%) sectors. Commercial International Bank 
mainly lent for the manufacturing (45%) and services (36%) sectors. On the other hand, 
Egyptian Workers, Islamic International, and Societe Arab International were on the top of 
Figure 7-16 Average Percentages of Bonds 
by Private and Privatized Egyptian Banks, 
2000-2009 
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OPBs in their lending concentration with scores estimated at 0.39, 0.38, and 0.35, 
respectively. Egyptian Workers mainly lent for the manufacturing (35%) and trade (50%) 
sectors. Islamic International Bank mainly lent for the manufacturing (15%) and trade (57%) 
sectors. Societe Arab International Bank mainly lent for the manufacturing (39%) and trade 
(42%) sectors.  
Table  7-3 Average HHI Indices by Private and Privatized Egyptian Banks, 2000-2009 
 HHI Index HHI Index 
Banks Median Growth Rate Median Growth Rate 
Privatized Banks 0.309** -0.008 0.647*** -0.003 
Alex. Commercial 0.290 -0.065 0.634 0.072 
Arab African Int. - - 0.508 0.027 
Bank of Alex. - - 0.610 0.168 
Cairo Barclays - - 0.557 -0.005 
Misr Romania 0.380 -0.073 0.566 -0.026 
Cairo Far East 0.075 0.000 0.532 0.041 
Commercial International 0.350 -0.063 0.733 -0.021 
Delta International 0.280 0.000 0.743 0.022 
Egyptian American 0.390 0.054 0.565 -0.057 
Egyptian Commercial 0.290 -0.065 0.728 0.031 
Egyptian Saudi Finance 0.250 -0.043 0.998 0.001 
Misr International 0.300 0.033 0.685 -0.054 
National Development - - 0.624 -0.023 
National Soc. Gen. 0.280 0.000 0.639 -0.025 
Suez Canal 0.400 0.000 0.785 0.002 
Other Private Banks 0.331** -0.016 0.715*** -0.007 
Arab Banking Co. 0.320 -0.028 0.709 0.019 
Bnp Paribas 0.330 -0.088 0.670 -0.017 
Egyptian Gulf - - 0.695 0.148 
Egyptian Workers 0.390 0.013 0.912 0.013 
El Watany B. 0.235 0.230 0.755 -0.003 
Hsbc B. - - 0.621 -0.030 
Islamic International 0.380 0.000 0.906 -0.002 
Misr Iran - - 0.499 -0.069 
Nile B. - - 0.688 -0.095 
Societe Arabe Int. 0.350 -0.092 0.843 0.020 
United Bank 0.285 0.036 0.611 -0.007 
Notes: gg^w measures the degree of loan diversification, and gg x^ measures the degree of concentration 
across financial instruments. The study has applied two-sample equality of median test to test for the 
significance of the difference in central values between PBs and OPBs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
With respect to the concentration of the financial instruments, as measured by gg x^ 
index, the results show that privatized banks had lower median values of the concentration 
index compared to other private banks, which are estimated at 0.6, and 0.7, respectively.  
Among privatized banks, Egyptian Saudi Finance, Suez Canal, Delta International, 
and Commercial International Bank were on the highest rank of the concentration of financial 
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instruments with scores estimated at 0.99, 0.78, 0.74, and 0.73, respectively. With the 
exception of Egyptian Saudi Finance, the latter banks depended mainly on loans. As shown 
previously, Suez Canal, Delta International, and Commercial International Bank mainly 
granted loans with ratios estimated at 88%, 85%, and 85%, respectively. Saudi Finance Bank 
mainly provided credits in a form of treasury bills with ratio estimated at 99%. On the other 
hand, Egyptian Workers Bank, Islamic International Bank, and Societe Arab International 
had highest concentration ratio among OPBs with scores estimated at 0.91, 0.90, and 0.84, 
respectively. This is because Egyptian Workers Bank and Islamic International bank utilized 
95% of their financial portfolio in a form of loans, while Societe Arab International utilized 
91% of its financial portfolio in a form of loans.  
Main Findings of the Performance Measures by Privatized Financial Institutions and 
Privatized Non-Financial Institutions 
In this section, the study reports the results of the operating performance and risk-
taking behavior across the various types of institutions, i.e. privatized financial institutions 
(PFIs), other private financial institutions (OPFI), and privatized non-financial institutions 
(PNFI). The following ratios of operating performance are reported: return on assets, return 
on equity, debt-asset, and debt-equity. Furthermore, Z-scores as a measure of risk-taking are 
reported. In a further stage, the study reports the results of the non-parametric test regarding 
the comparison of the median values of the previously mentioned measures across the 
different institution types.  
Table II-18 until Table II-22 reports the results of the performance indicators of 
privatized financial institutions (PFIs) and other private financial institutions (OFIs), while 
Table II-23 until Table II-27 reports the results of these indicators among privatized non-
financial institutions. As shown in the tables, privatized financial institutions had the lowest 
values of return on assets among the sampled institutions. The tables show that the annual 
performance of PNFIs outperformed PFIs and OFIs in terms of profitability as measured by 
ROA and ROE. However, the financial efficacy measured by the two leverage ratios of NPFI 
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was lower compared to PFIs and OFIs. By comparing profitability between PFIs and OFIs, it 
is clear that OFIs outperformed PFIs. This is indicated by the higher values of ROA and ROE 
of OFIs. The debt-asset ratio among PFIs was higher when compared to OFIs, while the debt-
equity ratio was lower among PFIs compared to OFIs. 
As shown in Table  7-4, the median values of ROA among PFIs were estimated at 
1.6% compared to 2.1%, and 7.5% for OFIs and PNFIs, respectively. By comparing ROA for 
different size groups indicated by the four quantiles, the results show that ROA in the second, 
third, and fourth quantiles of PFIs were lower than the median sample. However, small size 
group of PFIs indicated by the first quantile had ROA that is above the median sample, which 
is estimated at 13.4%. Compared to OFIs, PFIs had higher ROA in first, third, and fourth 
quantiles. Compared to PNFIs, PFIs had a lower ROA in the second, third, and fourth 
quantile. Return on equity of PFIs is estimated at 12.8% compared to 14%, and 17.7% for 
OFIs and PNFIs, respectively.  
Table  7-4 Quantiles of Average Percentages of Operating Performance by Privatized 
and Private Financial Institutions, Privatized non-Financial Institutions, and Total Sample 
Variables Firm Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Median SD. Obs. 
Return on Assets 
PFIs 13.4 1.1**** 2.4*** 1.2*** 1.6*** 4.0 171 
OFIs 5.8 2.3*** 1.3*** 1.1*** 2.1*** 7.0 306 
PNFIs 6.2 7.5*** 9.0*** 10.6*** 7.5*** 9.3 395 
TS 6.3 4.7 3.8 1.5 3.2 8.1 872 
Return on Equity 
PFIs 33.3 3.9 19.7 12.4 12.8 29.3 171 
OFIs 78.1 12.4 9.0 12.4 14.0 72.0 295 
PNFIs 13.0 17.1 22.5 16.9 17.7 26.1 395 
TS 21.4 15.7 15.6 12.8 16.0 48.7 861 
Debt-Asset  
PFIs 0.0 10.0 2.2*** 2.0*** 2.0*** 13.6 171 
OFIs 11.8 6.3 8.4*** 1.1*** 8.6*** 21.9 305 
PNFIs 10.0 13.0 12.5*** 9.0*** 11.0*** 17.9 395 
TS 10.0 10.4 8.0 2.3 7.3 19.1 871 
Debt-Equity 
PFIs 1.0*** 23.0** 17.0** 22.2 19.0*** 115.8 171 
OFIs 3.1*** 6.2** 5.8** 9.8 6.1*** 127.2 300 
PNFIs 21.0*** 29.0** 22.5** 16.0 22.0*** 127.3 394 
TS 6.2 19.9 18.0 17.0 15.0 125.0 865 
Notes: PFIs indicates privatized banks and non-bank financial institutions, OFIs indicates other private 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, PNFIs indicates privatized non-financial institutions, and TS indicates 
the total sample. Q1 until Q4 indicates first until fourth quantile of the size measured by total assets. The study 
has applied K-sample equality of median test to test for the significance of the difference in central values
between PBs and OPBs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
In the first and second quantiles, OFIs outperformed PFIs in the values of ROE. In the 
third quantile, PFIs outperformed OFIs, while the values were similar among OFIs and PFIs 
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in the fourth quantile. With the exception of the first quantile, PNFIs outperformed PFIs in 
terms of ROE ratio. With respects to the leverage ratios, the table shows that debt-asset ratio 
was the lowest among PFIs when compared to the other counterparts. The ratio was lower 
across all quantiles when compared to PNFIs. Compared to OFIs, the ratio was higher in the 
second and fourth quantiles. Regarding the debt-equity ratio, it was higher among PFIs when 
compared to PNFIs and lower when compared to OFIs. With the exception of the first 
quantile, the debt-equity ratio among PFIs was lower in all other quantiles compared to OFIs. 
The ratio was lower among PFIs in all size groups compared to PNFIs.  
Table  7-5 shows the results of the risk-taking behavior indicated by Z-scores among 
various firm groups.  
Table  7-5 Quantiles of Average Z-Scores of by Privatized and Private Financial 
Institutions, Privatized non-Financial Institutions, and Total Sample 
Quantiles PFIs OFIs PNFIs TS 
Q1 0.351***
(a) 0.015*** 0.058*** 0.042 
Q2 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.082*** 0.066 
Q3 0.039 0.049 0.070 0.068 
Q4 0.027** 0.043** 0.078** 0.040 
Median 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.070*** 0.052 
SD. 0.124 0.097 0.062 0.090 
Obs.  170 299 395 864 
Notes: PFIs indicates privatized banks and non-bank financial institutions, OFIs indicates other private 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, PNFIs indicates privatized non-financial institutions, and TS indicates 
the total sample. Q1 until Q4 indicates first until fourth quantile of the size measured by total assets. The study 
has applied K-sample equality of median test to test for the significance of the difference in central values 
between PBs and OPBs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(a) The reported large value of the average Z-score in the first quantile among PFIs is due to the high Z-
scores achieved by PFIs. This is because of large values of the capital to asset ratio among that group, which are 
considered indicators of less efficiency in utilizing the acquired financial resources. The 50th percentile of the 
Z-scores among the sample of PFIs in the first quantile is related to the institution of United Housing & 
Development, for which its Z-score is estimated at 0.35.  
In the small size group indicated by the first quantile, privatized financial institutions 
had higher Z-scores compared to the sample median. This indicates a lower risk exhibited. 
However, in all other size groups, the scores were below the sample median, which implies a 
higher riskiness. The value of Z-scores in the first quantile is estimated at 0.35, while it is 
lower in all other size groups, which is estimated at 0.027. By comparing the risk-taking 
behavior of privatized financial institutions with other financial institutions and privatized 
178 
 
 
 
 
non-financial institutions, the scores achieved across all size groups of PFIs were lower, with 
the exception of the first quantile. 
By looking at the annual Z-scores, as shown in Table  7-6, the study found that there is 
a tendency of Z-scores of privatized financial institutions to increase slightly over time. There 
is a major improvement in the Z-scores after 2005. However, by comparing the scores of 
PFIs with the other counterparts, they had lower growth rates. That is, the growth rate of Z-
scores was negative among PFIs, while it was positive among OFIs and PNFIs.  
Table  7-6 Annual Z-Scores by Privatized and Private Financial Institutions, Privatized 
non-Financial Institutions, and Total Sample 
Year PFIs OFIs PNFIs TS 
2000 0.026** 0.023** 0.064** 0.042 
2001 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.065*** 0.037 
2002 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.066*** 0.032 
2003 0.034*** 0.021*** 0.069*** 0.044 
2004 0.029** 0.025** 0.070** 0.046 
2005 0.043** 0.027** 0.064** 0.048 
2006 0.033 0.034 0.068 0.053 
2007 0.074 0.042 0.076 0.064 
2008 0.070 0.051 0.082 0.079 
2009 0.069 0.053 0.081 0.079 
Median 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.070*** 0.052 
SD. 0.124 0.097 0.062 0.090 
Obs.  170 299 395 864 
Notes: PFIs indicates privatized banks and non-bank financial institutions, OFIs indicates other private 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, PNFIs indicates privatized non-financial institutions, and TS indicates 
the total sample. The study has applied K-sample equality of median test to test for the significance of the 
difference in central values between PBs and OPBs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Table  7-7 and Table  7-8 report the results of the non-parametric test, which tests the 
differences of the median levels of the previous performance indicators across the different 
institution types. As shown in Table  7-7, measures of profitability, i.e. ROA and ROE were 
lower among PFIs when compared to OFIs. The median difference is estimated at -0.005%, 
and -0.013%, respectively, and it is statistically significant at 1%. On the other hand, there 
exist a negative median difference with respect to debt-asset ratio, which is estimate at -
0.064% and it is statistically significant. Although the median difference of debt-equity ratio 
is positive, it is statistically insignificant. Regarding the Z-scores between the two groups, 
there is a positive median difference, but it is statistically insignificant. 
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Table  7-7 Median and Median-Difference of Performance Indicators by Privatized 
and Private Financial Institutions 
Variable PFIs OFIs Difference 
Return on Assets 0.016 0.021 -0.005*** 
Return on Equity 0.128 0.140 -0.013*** 
Debt-Asset  0.020 0.084 -0.064*** 
Debt-Equity 0.185 0.060 0.125*** 
Z-Scores 0.032 0.028 0.003 
Notes: PFIs indicates privatized banks and non-bank financial institutions, OFIs indicates other private 
banks and non-bank financial institutions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
By comparing profitability between privatized financial institutions and privatized 
non-financial institutions, the study found a negative difference. As shown in Table  7-8, 
privatized financial institutions had lower ROA and ROE. This indicates a lower profitability 
among privatized financial institutions. The median difference is estimated at -0.06%, and -
0.05% and it is statistically significant at 1% and 10%, respectively. On the other hand, the 
leverage ratios indicated by debt-asset and debt-equity ratios show a positive outcome. As, 
the privatized financial institutions less leveraged compared to privatized non-financial 
institutions. The estimated median differences are -0.09% and -0.035% for debt-asset and 
debt-equity ratio, respectively. However, it is only statistically significant for debt-asset ratio. 
Regarding the Z-scores, the scores are lower among PFIs compared to PNFIs. The difference 
is estimated at -0.035 and it is statistically significant. 
Table  7-8 Median and Median-Difference of Performance Indicators by Privatized 
Financial Institutions and Privatized non-Financial Institutions 
Variable PFIs PNFIs Difference 
Return on Assets 0.016 0.075 -0.060*** 
Return on Equity 0.128 0.177 -0.049* 
Debt-Asset  0.020 0.110 -0.090*** 
Debt-Equity 0.185 0.220 -0.035 
Z-Scores 0.032 0.070 -0.039*** 
Notes: PFIs indicates privatized banks and non-bank financial institutions, PNFIs indicates privatized non-
financial institutions. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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7.5. Implication of the Study 
The study has found a number of interesting empirical results in the Egyptian context. 
In the Egyptian context, those results should be taken into consideration before moving on 
the privatization within the financial sector, particularly the banking sector. All these results 
cast serious doubts on the expected gains from the privatization of the banking sector. The 
findings contradict with other existent evidences that privatization can enhance efficiency and 
financial efficacy in the financial sector. In particular, the study has emphasized the following 
five main results. First, privatized banks lagged behind other private banks in terms of credit 
utilization, insolvency, asset utilization, and cost efficiency. Second, larger privatized banks 
utilized their resources efficiently when compared to smaller ones. Third, privatized banks 
were less diversified compared to other private banks. Fourth, privatized financial institutions 
lagged behind their counterparts in terms of profitability. Fifth, privatized financial 
institutions exhibited a relatively high risk when compared to other private banks.  
Based on the analysis of the study, three main issues should be considered in order to 
remedy the previously mentioned distortions. First, it should be considered further financial 
reforms that aim at minimizing the control of the state over the banking sector in Egypt, 
which might be one of the major obstacles that are faced by privatized financial institutions. 
By considering the latter reforms, the potential gains from privatization, in terms of 
improving competition of the market, could be increased. That is because the improvement of 
the competition is one of major prerequisites that can partially guarantee better performance 
of privatized firms. Second, it should be considered giving priority to privatize larger banks 
and postpone privatizing smaller one until a certain degree of competition in the financial 
sector is realized. Finally, it should be considered implementing further institutional reforms 
before moving on the privatization in the banking sector; for instance, through adopting new 
financial innovations by attracting foreign financial institutions to operate in the sector. The 
latter point will help enhancing the competition within the financial sector and could increase 
the expected gains from divesting banks and other non-bank financial institutions.  
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7.6. Conclusion 
Egypt over the period under scrutiny witnessed a modest improvement in activities of 
private banks compared to privatized banks. The study has shown that privatized banks 
lagged behind other private banks in terms of credit-deposit ratio, capital-asset ratio, and 
cost-income ratio. The study has found that privatized banks were relatively less efficient in 
utilizing their deposits. Privatized banks suffered relatively from insolvency when compared 
to other private banks. Moreover, they exhibited higher costs in operating their activities.  
The study has emphasized on the relative importance of interest income in the income 
structure of privatized banks. The study has shown that privatized banks were relatively less 
engaging in non-lending activities. Compared to other private banks, the non-lending 
activities among privatized banks fell beyond. This indicator is important in understanding 
their vulnerability to the market conditions in terms of fluctuations of interest rates.  
When taking the size of banks into consideration, the study has shown that small size 
privatized banks had a relatively lower credit-deposit ratio when compared to OPBs, while 
the larger size ones had higher ratios. This implies that larger privatized banks utilized their 
resources more efficient than small one. In addition, different size group among privatized 
banks suffered from less capitalization and higher cost burdens. Overall, in all size groups, 
privatized banks depended more on net-interest income compared to other private banks. This 
is a negative outcome for privatized banks, since higher non-lending activities could reduce 
the risks of the reliance on interest income. 
Regarding the lending behavior of banks, the study has shown that privatized banks 
lent mainly for the manufacturing, services, and banking sector, while other private banks 
focused in lending for the trade, agriculture, and household. Moreover, privatized banks were 
relatively higher in utilizing treasury bills, bonds, and securities compared to OPBs, while 
OPBs exceeded PBs in their usage of loans.  
Overall, privatized banks focused in specific lines of businesses compared to other 
private banks. The study has shown that other private banks were better diversified in their 
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lending and financial portfolio compared to privatized firms. This is a positive outcome for 
other private banks, since diversification positively affects performance of banks in terms of 
reducing risk and increases profit efficiency.  
In general, privatized financial institutions lagged behind their counterparts in terms 
of profitability. In addition, the annual performance of privatized non-financial institutions 
outperformed privatized financial institutions and other private financial institutions in their 
profitability. However, the financial efficacy of privatized financial institutions and other 
private financial institutions outperformed privatized non-financial institutions. By 
comparing between privatized financial institutions and other private financial institutions, 
the study has found that the latter institutions outperformed the former in terms of 
profitability. However, privatized financial institutions performed better in terms of financial 
stability.  
By scrutinizing the risk-taking of privatized financial institutions, the study has shown 
that privatized financial institution exhibited higher risk compared to the other counterparts. 
The study has found that there was a tendency of Z-scores within privatized financial 
institutions to improve slightly over time; however, they achieved negative growth rates in 
number of years. Contrary, other private financial institutions and privatized non-financial 
institutions achieved positive growth rates of the Z-scores.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
The thesis has highlighted the debatable issue in Egypt concerning the impact of 
privatization on development of the financial sector. Previous researches on privatization, in 
the Egyptian context, concentrated on its impact on macroeconomic phenomena such as 
income distribution, foreign direct investment, and fiscal deficit. In addition, a number of 
researches had been done on the performance of privatized non-financial institutions. 
However, those researches ignored, largely, the impact of privatization on the financial sector, 
in particular the following issues: the financial system structure, choices of financing of firms, 
and lending and risk-taking behavior of financial institutions.  
This thesis has attempted to overcome weaknesses in the previous research about 
privatization. Although the pre-existing findings, in the Egyptian context, showed that 
privatization can stimulate and enhance activities within the financial sector on aggregate 
level, by analyzing the impact of privatization on individual banks, this study has found 
negative influence of privatization on the banking sector. 
In order to get the previous findings, the established methodology of this thesis has 
been based on the neo-Keynesian economics, which are appealing to the empirical studies 
included in the thesis by providing more realistic assumptions compared to other schools of 
economic thought. The neo-Keynesian economics significantly contributed to the 
understanding of finance and the development of financial institutions through introducing 
concepts of asymmetric information, agency problem, and adverse selection. By assuming 
imperfect capital markets, it replaced unrealistic assumptions of neo-classical economics, 
which has enabled the study to scrutinize the financing behavior of firms that are located in 
economies with less sophisticated and inefficient capital markets, such as Egypt. By 
assuming the credit rationing, the study has been able to consider the impact of privatization 
on the banking credit, not money, which is interconnected with the real economic activities. 
Thereby, the study has incorporated the financial sector in the analysis of the variations in the 
economic policies, such as privatization.  In addition, taking into account the agency problem, 
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which results from conflicts between managers and shareholders, has enabled the study to 
examine the impact of privatization on the demand side of the financial sector, which is 
represented in the choice of financing by privatized firms.  
The main objectives of the thesis have been to highlight the different impacts of 
privatization on banks and stock markets. In addition, the study has pointed out the expected 
consequences of privatization on the demand and the supply sides of financial services. In the 
demand side, it has considered the choices of financing among privatized firms. In the supply 
side, it has considered the overall evolution of the financial sector and efficiency of privatized 
financial institutions in providing financial services.  
Based on those objectives, the thesis has questioned the following eight main issues. 
First, does privatization positively affect development of the banking sector and stock 
markets? Second, does privatization have a significant positive impact on the financial 
system structure? Third, does privatization positively affect the development of the overall 
financial sector? Fourth, do privatized firms depend more on internal finance compared to 
external finance? Fifth, do privatized firms depend more on bank-based finance compared to 
market-based finance? Sixth, what are the main determinants of choices of financing of 
privatized firms? Seventh, does privatization affect the performance of privatized banks and 
non-bank financial institutions? Eighth, does privatization affect the lending and risk-taking 
behavior of privatized financial institutions?  
In establishing the methodologies for the empirical studies included in the thesis, a 
variety of empirical quantitative and qualitative techniques have been considered. In 
particular, those studies have utilized dynamic panel data models, fixed effect (within) 
regression, and non-parametric tests, namely the Wilcoxon signed-rank, Jonckheere-Terpstra, 
and Kruskal-Wallis tests. In addition, the studies have utilized exploratory analyses based on 
a number of indicators and indices that measure operating performance, risk-taking, and 
lending behavior among financial institutions and non-financial institutions. 
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It is important to mention that the study has suffered from a number of limitations that 
need to be taken into account, namely the following issues. First, unavailability of a 
comprehensive privatization dataset that includes all privatization transactions has limited the 
study from analyzing small privatization transactions. Second, unavailability of data that 
covers socioeconomic indicators has limited the study from considering the impacts of social 
impacts of privatization. Third, unavailability of a comprehensive measure of the 
development of financial sector has limited the study from considering the obstacles that are 
faced by firms in accessing external finance. Fourth, lack of data about privatized small size 
firms in Egypt has limited the study from considering the overall impact of privatization. 
However, some of those limitations could be considered as important elements for future 
research in the relevant literature. The limitations have brought forth various possible issues 
for future research. Taking into consideration socioeconomic factors, in addition to 
privatization, in examining the development of financial sector would enhance the scope of 
the research in the relevant literature. By considering a more comprehensive dataset that 
includes detailed information about all privatization transaction would enable better 
elaboration of elements of privatization and its impact on the development of the financial 
sector. By constructing a comprehensive indicator of the financial sector development, which 
takes into consideration the ability of firms to access the financial sector, this would provide a 
better proxy for the overall financial sector development. By taking into consideration small 
size firms, in addition to medium and large size firms, this would provide precise evidence 
regarding the impact of privatization on the financial sector development. 
The study has found various new findings that are crucial from the developmental 
perspectives. The study has shown that privatization has had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the development of market-based financial structure and the overall 
financial sector development. This has been shown in the statistically significant impact of 
the annual privatization ratio on ratios of stock market capitalization, structural activity, 
structural size, structural efficiency, finance activity, finance size, and finance efficiency. 
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This could be justified by the significant impact of privatization on stock markets when 
governments divest their state-owned firms through share issue privatization. The previous 
result has supported the hypothesis that there is a tendency for developing countries toward 
favoring share issue privatization to develop their financial markets. The study has found that 
although trade openness measured by the trade ratio affects the structural efficiency and 
finance activities ratios, it does not have a statistically significant impact on the finance size 
or finance efficiency ratios. This could be mainly due to the impact of liberalization on 
increasing the number of market participants; however, it might not have such impact on the 
volatility of stock prices or the costs of financial services. On the other hand, the study has 
found that financial liberalization does not have a strong impact on the financial structural or 
overall financial development ratios when compared to the trade ratio. The study has found 
that there is a positive and statistically significant impact of the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita on stock market capitalization ratio. This is consistent with the hypothesis states that as 
an economy grows, large-scale industries and capital-intensive industries gradually replace 
traditional sectors in an economy. That, in turn, is followed by a movement of the private 
sector towards market-based finance. 
Furthermore, the study has found that privatized firms have had a statistically 
significant lower short-term debt to asset ratio compared to well-established publicly listed 
firms. Privatized firms have statistically significant lower ratios of indicators of market-based 
finance compared to well-established publicly listed firms. Contrary, privatized firms have a 
statistically significant higher ratio of the indictor of bank-based finance compared to well-
established publicly listed firms. Regarding to the financial constraints indicators, privatized 
firms have statistically significant higher ratios of credit constraint and reliance on internal 
finance compared to well-established publicly listed firms. Compared to state-owned firms, 
privatized firms have statistically significant higher ratio of the indicator of the market-based 
finance. Contrary, privatized firms have a statistically significant lower ratio of the indicator 
of the bank-based finance compared to state-owned firm. Privatized firms have statistically 
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significant higher ratios of indicators financial constraints and reliance on internal finance 
compared to state-owned firms. 
Though the financial sector in Egypt received a large share in the total privatization 
proceeds since its announcement in 1991, this study has found that privatization negatively 
influenced the sector. Four aspects of distortions characterized the negative impact of 
privatization on the financial sector in Egypt. First, privatized banks have lower ratios of 
credit to deposit, capital to asset, and cost to income. Second, privatized banks depend on 
income structure that are more towards interest bearing income. Third privatized banks have 
higher concentration ratio of their lending activities compared to other private banks, which 
have been better diversified. Fourth, privatized financial institutions have lower profitability 
and higher risk scores when compared to other private financial institutions and privatized 
non-financial institutions. 
The study has provided various theoretical and empirical implications that are crucial 
for the development of the financial sector. With respect to the theoretical implication, the 
study has emphasized the following three issues. First, instead of treating the financial 
development in a country as an aggregate phenomenon, it should be disaggregated into sub-
dimensions, namely activities, size, and efficiency. Second, it should be considered the 
impact of the growth in an economy on activities of the financial sector. Third, the choices of 
financing among Egyptian privatized firms are more compatible with the presumptions of the 
tradeoff theory through three main channels: the growth, the profitability, and size effect 
channels.  
In addition to the theoretical implications, in the Egyptian context, the study has 
found number of new applicable results that are crucial from the developmental perspectives. 
Those results are considered important for both policy makers and scholars because of their 
various implications concerning macroeconomic policies, choices of financing among 
privatized firms, activities of financial institutions, and the lending and risk-taking behavior 
of financial institutions.  
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With respect to the implications regarding macroeconomic policies, the study has 
shown the following issues. First, privatization is an important factor in the development of 
the financial sector, particularly stock markets. The previous result suggests a tendency of 
developing countries to favor share issue privatization in order to develop their financial 
markets. Share issue privatization plays a major role in increasing the number of listed firms 
in the market. The relative positive impact of privatization on financial markets compared to 
banks is due to the preferences of new private firms, which engage in more risker activities, 
in choosing the market-based finance after privatization, compared to the pre-privatization 
period. This is because financial markets provide different financial instruments with 
different degrees of riskiness. In addition, the high usage of share issue privatization, which 
was adopted in Egypt, helped in enriching activities in its financial market. Furthermore, the 
study has emphasized the importance of industrialization that can be enhanced through 
privatization, which encourages private participation in the sector. Thus, as an economy 
becomes more industrialized, the financial system structure becomes more market-based 
system. Second, privatization encourages competition, by allowing the operation of new 
private banks, within the financial sector, which, in turn, improves the financial and operating 
efficiency of the sector. Third, the study has emphasized possible negative outcomes from 
privatization on the financial sector. In particular, privatization could harm activities and 
efficiency of the banking sector. One explanation of the previous result has been the impact 
of privatization in reducing concentration and, in turn, losing the benefits from economies of 
scale within the banking sector. Fourth, the study has emphasized the crucial role of 
macroeconomic policies that work together with privatization. Those policies are important 
for realizing the potential gains from privatization, namely the trade openness and financial 
liberalization. Trade openness and financial liberalization increase the number of listed firms 
in the financial market. However, the study has shown that trade openness matters more than 
financial liberalization. The study has underlined the nature of the relationship between banks 
and stock markets. The study has found that there is no statistically significant impact of the 
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market capitalization on domestic credit. Moreover, there is no statistically significant impact 
of the domestic credit on market capitalization.  
With respect to the implications regarding the choices of financing among privatized 
firms, the study has highlighted the importance of the ownership structure on the choices of 
financing of privatized firms. This is because of the deregulation of divested firms during 
post privatization period in terms of the appointment of the new management, the new 
auditing standards, and widening the ownership structure. Ownership is an important factor 
that causes variations in the financing decisions across firms. In particular, the study has 
emphasized the following seven issues. 
First, privatized firms relied more on bank-based finance in funding their investments 
compared to other well-established publicly listed firms, which relied more on market-based 
finance. The latter result has suggested that privatized firms faced difficulty in accessing the 
market-based finance. The difficulty in accessing the market-based finance resulted from 
number of characteristics that were specific for privatized firms. Those characteristics have 
been represented in the following issues. The lack of reputation of privatized firms in the 
equity market hindered their access to the market-based finance, which was a costly source of 
finance. Privatized firms possessed more tangible assets. That is, they were less likely to raise 
funds from the equity market. Privatized firms were relatively credit constrained that enforce 
them to opt for internal funds rather than a relatively expensive external finance. This is 
because the impact of the size of privatized firms on their access to external finance, which 
were represented in their lower dependence on market-based finance and the higher 
dependence of bank-based finance. This is because of the high costs of the stock market. The 
limited ownership structure of privatized firms, compared to other publicly listed firms, was 
an obstacle for accessing the equity market. The poor auditing standards within privatized 
firms reduced the quality of the information disclosure, which is important for gaining credit 
from the financial institutions. The cost disadvantage that was faced by privatized firms 
hindered their access the market-based finance. 
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Second, privatized firms relied more on internal finance rather than debt-finance 
compared to state-owned firms. This was because of the reliance of the state-owned firms on 
state-owned banks in financing their activities, even if they were financially fragile. This was 
due to the guarantee by the central government in repaying backs the loans of state-owned 
firms. In addition, the large value of tangible assets of privatized firms negatively affected 
their access to the external finance.  
Third, the study has highlighted a possibility of a high agency cost problem within 
privatized firms. As a result, number of privatized firms opted for bank-based finance to 
alleviate their agency cost problem.  
Fourth, Regardless of the ownership structure, other firm-specific characteristics 
influenced the financing decision by firms. The study has highlighted the influence of four 
main firm-specific characteristics on choices of financing by operating firms: size, age, 
profitability, and capital expenditure. Size was an important factor because of its role in 
mitigating the asymmetric information problem between firms and financial institutions and 
improving the informational disclosure within a firm. With respect to the age, although the 
age of a firm positively influenced the access to the bank-based finance, it had no statistically 
significant impact on the market-based finance. On the other hand, other factors such as 
profitability and capital expenditure had more influence on market-based finance. 
Fifth, the study has shown that size represented a key factor for the distinction 
between privatized and other operating firms. Size of privatized firms was an important factor 
that affects their choices of finance. The smaller the size of privatized firms was, the lower 
the dependence on bank-based finance and the higher the dependence on internal finance. On 
the other hand, the larger the size of privatized firms was, the higher the dependence on bank-
based finance. Contrary, the smaller the size of well-established publicly listed firms was, the 
higher the dependence on bank-based finance, while the larger the size of well-established 
publicly listed firms was, the higher the dependence on market-based finance.  
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Sixth, sales growth of privatized firms was an important factor in facilitating access to 
bank-based finance. This is because sales growth is considered an indicator of the good 
performance of firms. For privatized firms, which had limited ownership structure, the good 
performance of sales growth facilitated their access to credit from banks. 
With respect to the implications regarding activities of the financial institutions, the 
study has found number of results that have various implications from the developmental 
perspectives of the financial sector. In particular, the study has highlighted the possible 
negative impact of privatization on the banking sector. The possible negative impact of 
privatization on banks has been represented in the following issues. First, privatized banks 
lagged behind other operating private banks in terms of the credit utilization and asset 
sufficiency. Second, privatized banks exhibited higher costs in operating their activities. 
Third, privatized banks suffered from higher degree of insolvency when compared to their 
rivals. That is because they were less efficient in attracting new deposits due to less 
innovative financial products that were introduced. In addition, they exhibited higher 
administrative costs, less loan diversification, less capitalization, and lower profitability. 
Fourth, privatized banks relied more on interest income rather than non-interest income, such 
as fees, commissions, and returns on tradable instruments, such as shares and bonds. This 
contributed to instability in the operation of privatized banks. The higher dependence of 
privatized banks on interest income has been justified by the following reasons. They were 
considered risk averse, so engaging in lending activities was less risky for them to get income. 
They were characterized by the lack of credit worthiness, which was resulted from the lack of 
reputation of those banks compared to other private banks. Different size groups among 
privatized banks suffered from less capitalization. In general, the possible negative impact of 
privatization on the banking sector could stem from the following reasons. First, the 
regulations associated with the adoption of privatization allowed the free entry and exist of 
operating banks. This, in turn, affected the activities of those banks. Second, allowing foreign 
banks, which had higher credit worthiness compared to domestic banks, to operate could 
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crowd out the activities of the latter banks. Third, the bad reputation of the state-owned banks 
during the pre-privatization periods, in terms of high bad loans, bad credit rating by 
international financial organizations, and high dependence of privatized banks in its income 
structure on interest bearing income, negatively affected their activities.  
With respect to the implications regarding the lending and risk-taking behavior of 
financial institutions, the study has shown number of applicable findings. First, privatized 
banks lent mainly for the manufacturing, services, and banking sectors. This indicated that 
those banks were risk averse, and lending to those sectors, which are less vulnerable to 
shocks compared to the agriculture, trade and household sectors was safer for them. In 
addition, lending to the former sectors required more capital for big volumes of loans. Second, 
privatized banks mainly constructed their financial portfolio in forms of treasury bills, bonds, 
and securities, especially from the government. Those sources of financial portfolio were 
considered as safe sources of raising income compared to the lending activities. Third, 
privatized banks were less diversified in their lending activities and financial portfolio 
compared to the other rivals. This was because different size groups among privatized banks 
suffered from less capitalization. The latter finding badly affected the performance of those 
banks by exhibiting higher risk and lower operating efficiency compared to other operating 
banks. Fourth, size of financial institutions was an important factor in influencing their 
performance and lending activities. That is, large privatized banks utilized resources 
efficiently compared to the small ones. Fifth, privatized financial institutions lagged behind 
their counterparts in terms of profitability and risk-taking. However, the financial efficacy of 
privatized financial institutions outperformed other private financial institutions and 
privatized non-financial institutions. 
This study has contributed to the relevant literature in five ways. First, the study has 
provided more evidences on how real activities, such as privatization, affect the development 
of financial sector. Second, by examining the impact of privatization on financial structure, 
the study has provided more evidence on how privatization has a relative different impact on 
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the development of the banking sector compared to the financial market. Third, by applying 
new theoretical approaches, the study has provided a new analysis on the choices of financing 
of privatized firms. In the Egyptian context, this could enrich the relevant literature by 
providing new evidence on how privatization affects the financing decisions of privatized 
firms. Fourth, the study has contributed to the finance literature by examining the lending and 
risk-taking behavior of privatized banks. Fifth, a uniqueness of the study has been the 
identification of main differences among privatized firms, other publicly listed firms, and 
state-owned firms. In addition, the study has identified the main differences among privatized 
financial institutions and privatized non-financial institutions. In addition, the study has 
constructed a new dataset that includes data about privatized firms and institutions.  
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Appendix I 
Table I-1 the Sampled Countries and their Respective Income Group 
Country Income Group Country Income Group Country Income Group 
Albania LMI Georgia LMI Pakistan LI 
Algeria LMI Ghana LI Panama UMI 
Argentina UMI Grenada UMI Peru LMI 
Armenia LMI Guatemala LMI Philippines LMI 
Azerbaijan LMI Honduras LMI Poland UMI 
Bahrain HI Hungary HI Romania UMI 
Belarus UMI India LMI Russian Federation UMI 
Bolivia LMI Indonesia LMI Serbia UMI 
Bosnia  LMI Jamaica UMI Slovak Republic HI 
Brazil UMI Jordan LMI Slovenia HI 
Bulgaria UMI Kazakhstan UMI South Africa UMI 
Chile UMI Kenya LI Sri Lanka LMI 
China LMI Kyrgyz Republic LI Thailand LMI 
Colombia LMI Latvia UMI Trinidad and Tobago HI 
Costa Rica UMI Lithuania UMI Tunisia LMI 
Cote d'Ivoire LI Macedonia LMI Turkey UMI 
Croatia UMI Malaysia UMI Ukraine LMI 
Czech Republic HI Mexico UMI United Arab Emirates HI 
Ecuador LMI Moldova LMI Uruguay UMI 
Egypt, Arab Rep. LMI Morocco LMI Uzbekistan LI 
El Salvador LMI Nigeria LI Venezuela, RB UMI 
Estonia HI Oman HI Vietnam LI 
Notes: HI is high-income group, UMI is upper middle-income group, LMI is low middle-income group, 
and LI is low-income group.  
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Appendix II 
Table II-1 Basic Indicators of the Sampled Egyptian Financial Institutions 
Institutions -(Values in LE Millions) Sector Total Assets Total Equity Net Income 
Privatized Financial Institutions 
    Alexandria Commercial And Maritime Bank Ba. 2475.00 269.80 12.94 
Arab African International Bank Ba. 18100.00 1270.46 299.00 
Bank of Alexandria Ba. 33000.00 2325.00 429.97 
Barclays Egypt Bank Ba. 10700.00 801.48 208.17 
Blom Bank Egypt Ba. 4690.25 421.81 8.41 
Cairo Far East Bank Ba. 439.52 76.58 0.87 
Commercial International Bank Ba. 41300.00 3985.71 796.44 
Credit Agricole Egypt Ba. 13000.00 1218.22 220.56 
Delta International Bank Ba. 471000.00 97600.00 22100.00 
Egyptian American Bank Ba. 9064.18 640.86 137.51 
Egyptian Commercial Bank Ba. 5164.72 418.90 -33.61 
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank Ba. 6013.07 339.26 9.71 
Misr International Bank Ba. 15300.00 1111.07 128.80 
National Development Bank Ba. 8928.57 489.72 -239.71 
National Societe Generale Bank (Nsgb) Ba. 29100.00 2548.07 449.67 
Suez Canal Bank Ba. 13300.00 997.44 -10.26 
El Kahera Housing Fi. 310.25 175.74 8.77 
Export Development Bank of Egypt Fi. 8333.33 832.64 35.76 
Heliopolis Housing Fi. 936.19 209.74 78.61 
Medinet Nasr Housing Fi. 934.53 227.58 67.64 
T M G Holding Fi. 54000.00 22500.00 901.75 
United Housing & Development  Fi. 87.38 34.87 12.06 
Other Private Financial Institutions 
    Al Baraka Bank Egypt Esc Ba. 6862.50 401.89 8.99 
Arab Banking Corporation Egypt Ba. 3385.71 425.75 28.27 
Bnp Paribas Ba. 8378.29 2536.39 54.76 
Egyptian Gulf Bank Ba. 4037.50 555.30 43.07 
Egyptian Workers Bank Ba. 424.11 66.27 1.32 
El Watany Bank of Egypt Ba. 9800.00 927.23 130.88 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt Sae Ba. 18800.00 865.21 87.17 
Hsbc Bank Egypt  Ba. 16000.00 1025.41 385.96 
Islamic International Bank for Investment And Development Ba. 3929.01 36.44 -27.75 
Misr Iran Development Bank Ba. 4673.84 654.39 100.99 
Nile Bank  Ba. 2088.02 123.13 7.39 
Societe Arabe Internationale De Banque Ba. 905.74 137.61 14.63 
Union National Bank Egypt Ba. 2900.00 390.93 29.77 
United Bank of Egypt Ba. 4026.50 243.64 15.58 
ACE CIIC Insurance Co. Fi. 53.57 41.72 1.17 
Al Ahly for Development And Investment Fi. 282.74 168.16 0.33 
Al Ahram Co Stock Exchange & Securities Brokers  Fi. 27.82 2.75 2.31 
Al Arafa Investment And Consulting Fi. 301.45 55.32 22.34 
Arab Gathering Investment Fi. 165.54 20.67 15.96 
Arab Misr Insurance Group Fi. 171.06 54.59 4.24 
Commercial International Investment Company Fi. 1269.75 195.89 84.33 
Delta Insurance Fi. 517.34 125.86 8.09 
Efg Hermes Holding Sae Fi. 5222.98 3686.81 388.09 
Egyptian American Company Securities Brokerage Fi. 111.14 9.14 9.16 
Egyptian Financial & Industrial Fi. 1106.82 586.27 87.11 
Egyptian Financial Group-Hermes Holding Company  Fi. 4581.09 769.37 369.89 
Egyptian Kuwaiti Holding Fi. 536.37 127.72 51.79 
Egyptians Abroad for Investment & Development Fi. 66.34 16.38 5.53 
El Ahli Investment And Development  Fi. 285.60 -8.77 -3.04 
El Kahera El Watania Investment  Fi. 108.41 -16.21 -1.49 
El Watania Investment Sonid Fi. 307.44 13.06 6.02 
Hermes Corporate Finance Fi. 62.44 29.01 15.84 
Housing & Development Bank Fi. 9837.50 673.70 127.48 
Kuwaiti Egyptian Investment Fi. 114.86 5.04 3.70 
Mansour & Maghraby Investment & Development  Fi. 3690.07 923.21 403.45 
Misr Financial Investments Fi. 68.47 8.02 6.41 
Mohandes Insurance Fi. 646.71 126.89 10.67 
Nile City Investment Fi. 943.37 6.95 45.71 
Osool Esb Securities Brokerage Fi. 56.66 3.75 5.90 
Prime Investments Fund Managers Fi. 10.39 3.25 3.15 
Prime Securities Stock Brokers  Fi. 177.37 11.73 14.12 
Saudi Egyptian Investment & Finance Fi. 116.31 14.39 10.86 
Suez Canal Insurance  Fi. 172.92 17.58 14.06 
Notes: Ba. indicates banks and Fi. indicates financial services excluding banks. 
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Table II-2 Basic Indicators of the Sampled Egyptian Non-Financial Institutions 
Institutions -(Values in LE Millions) Sector 
Total 
Assets 
Total 
Equity 
Net 
Income 
Acrow Misr formwork And Scaffolding Co. 84.76 50.21 8.86 
Alexandria Portland Cement Co Sae Co. 1047.50 528.11 109.04 
El Saeed Contracting Co Co. 163.96 83.63 7.59 
El Shams for Housing And Development Co Co. 198.89 76.99 5.94 
Giza General Contracting And Real Estate Investment Co Co. 282.94 23.93 3.05 
Misr Beni Suef Cement Co Sae Co. 1234.75 596.36 131.29 
Nasr Co for Civil Works Co. 166.86 51.39 12.16 
Paints And Chemical Industries Co Sae Co. 611.56 450.44 77.71 
Societe Egyptienne D Entreprises Moukhtar Ibrahim Co. 1660.00 218.57 57.04 
Suez Cement Co Sae Co. 6010.00 3400.69 572.75 
Tourah Portland Cement Co Sae Co. 1182.25 794.38 248.16 
Telecom Egypt Co Sae In. 31900.00 23800.00 1849.09 
Vodafone Egypt Telecommunications Co Sae In. 5787.50 2525.00 933.99 
Alexandria Flour Mills And Bakeries Co Ma. 236.12 54.20 6.09 
Cairo for Oil And Soap Co Ma. 113.73 43.83 0.46 
Delta Sugar Co Ma. 977.59 711.96 170.65 
Egyptian Co for Foods Ma. 157.26 117.22 22.94 
Egyptian Starch And Glucose Manufacturing Co Ma. 275.47 170.05 16.24 
El Nasr Transformers And Electrical Products Co Sae Ma. 281.23 128.96 30.46 
Electro Cable Egypt Co Sae Ma. 634.81 344.88 -13.85 
Extracted Oil And Derivatives Co Ma. 242.43 104.80 9.23 
Ismailia Misr Poultry Co Ma. 64.66 27.00 -4.93 
Middle And West Delta Flour Mills Ma. 377.76 134.41 36.40 
Middle Egypt Flour Mills Co Ma. 382.01 146.19 22.69 
Misr Chemical Industries Co Ma. 624.22 163.49 33.69 
Misr Oils And Soap Co Ma. 205.24 69.61 13.68 
Paper Middle East Ma. 59.89 25.51 -2.17 
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals Co Ma. 2985.71 2142.86 825.29 
Upper Egypt Flour Mills Sae Ma. 341.31 156.46 47.24 
Rowad Misr for Tourism Investment Co Os. 316.95 272.74 28.06 
Semiramis Hotels Co Sae Os. 295.60 226.31 81.40 
Alexandria Medical Services Co Sae Re. 41.11 17.80 2.54 
Arab Drug Co for Pharmaceuticals And Chemical Industries Re. 150.57 88.05 16.75 
Arabia Cotton Ginning Co Sae Re. 1032.83 698.67 57.50 
Eastern Company Sae Re. 3690.00 1636.77 467.44 
Egypt Free Shops Co Re. 155.87 106.64 33.87 
El Nasr Clothing And Textiles Co Re. 757.10 380.42 2.97 
General Co for Silos And Storage Re. 524.23 195.12 39.21 
Memphis Pharmaceuticals And Chemical Industries Re. 226.08 108.17 23.15 
Nile Co for Pharmaceuticals And Chemical Industries Re. 318.17 132.62 40.21 
Nile Cotton Ginning Re. 531.51 282.67 13.97 
Unirab Polvara Spinning And Weaving Co Re. 757.06 549.91 1.18 
Alexandria Mineral Oils Co Sae Ut. 2728.57 1664.12 522.93 
Asec Co for Mining Sae Ut. 242.82 141.25 18.35 
Notes: Co. indicates constructions and materials, In. indicates information and technology, Ma. indicates manufacturing, Re. 
indicates retail trade, Ut. indicates utilities, and OS. indicates other services. 
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Table II-3 Credit to Deposit Ratio of Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks           
Alex. Commercial 8.0 70.1 52.1 47.0 49.9 54.0 32.9 31.6 38.7 36.9 42.8 -3.8 
Arab African Int. 74.1 72.1 13.7 44.6 3.3 24.6 16.6 25.1 0.9 1.3 20.6 -2.7 
Bank of Alex. - - - - - - 32.6 32.9 51.9 62.5 42.4 20.5 
Cairo Barclays - - 47.1 39.5 44.7 52.7 57.9 54.4 55.3 45.6 49.9 1.6 
Misr Romania 91.9 91.2 75.0 54.1 53.0 39.9 46.6 37.0 43.8 29.7 49.8 -17.7 
Cairo Far East - 53.7 57.7 48.9 62.2 54.4 - - - - 54.4 -2.6 
Commercial 90.7 79.4 69.0 67.7 56.9 54.6 55.3 51.6 53.8 52.1 56.1 -4.0 
Credit Agricole 64.9 48.1 38.7 31.7 27.3 31.3 27.2 - - - 31.7 -16.0 
Delta International 88.3 84.8 90.0 64.8 73.7 69.6 37.0 64.0 73.6 75.8 73.6 3.1 
Egyptian 64.9 48.1 38.7 31.7 27.3 31.3 27.2 - - - 31.7 -16.0 
Egyptian 73.2 73.1 68.3 62.0 49.5 61.3 70.9 48.6 71.0 59.3 65.2 -6.5 
Egyptian Saudi 46.2 26.2 1.9 14.0 15.1 19.5 4.0 3.2 2.8 2.6 9.0 -12.7 
Misr International 64.6 58.2 49.4 47.9 46.7 54.6 47.4 - - - 49.4 -6.4 
National 76.7 76.3 73.8 68.1 64.4 63.9 59.0 53.6 39.1 23.6 64.1 -7.6 
National Soc. Gen. 74.9 72.2 65.6 56.0 59.1 57.0 46.9 47.6 67.8 59.0 59.0 -3.7 
Suez Canal 78.1 78.7 75.2 70.6 57.3 53.0 57.4 49.4 48.9 49.8 57.3 -4.5 
Other Private Banks 
Al Baraka 66.2 71.4 65.8 57.6 56.5 51.7 51.2 46.7 50.7 50.1 54.1 -1.9 
Arab Banking Co. 62.4 75.2 65.1 57.7 57.0 63.7 59.4 30.4 35.5 39.4 58.5 -1.1 
Bnp Paribas - 65.5 67.9 45.9 38.6 52.2 36.5 28.0 45.6 43.3 45.6 -10.5 
Egyptian Gulf 65.8 58.2 45.4 33.9 36.4 42.8 30.2 40.8 62.7 56.9 44.1 -9.2 
Egyptian Workers - 84.9 83.5 88.3 85.0 - 79.5 69.8 - - 84.2 -2.7 
El Watany B. 80.6 79.4 62.1 57.9 55.9 52.8 61.0 60.4 56.0 51.5 59.2 -5.6 
Faisal B. 102.9 101.6 115.3 110.3 104. 105.7 114.7 115.0 99.7 95.7 105.1 -1.3 
Hsbc B. 51.0 49.9 49.3 38.6 34.4 39.1 34.6 45.6 46.4 42.7 44.2 -2.2 
Islamic 77.9 67.0 162.1 158.5 118. 118.1 - - - - 118.5 -2.3 
Misr Iran 85.8 79.8 98.9 76.1 63.3 42.3 48.8 42.3 45.2 64.4 63.8 -7.0 
Nile B. 77.6 76.8 122.3 111.0 104. 112.3 - - - - 107.9 -1.0 
Societe Arabe Int. 68.1 112.6 57.2 59.4 53.3 37.4 42.8 30.2 40.5 46.7 50.0 3.9 
Union National - - - 47.0 49.9 54.0 50.3 31.6 38.3 38.8 47.0 3.8 
United Bank 78.0 72.2 92.2 94.5 - - - - - - 85.1 2.4 
Table II-4 Capital to Asset Ratio of Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
           Alex. Commercial 9.9 10.6 8.8 7.9 8.4 8.5 9.1 17.9 17.6 14.1 9.5 3.8 
Arab African Int. 12.5 12.3 12.3 10.3 7.0 3.9 2.7 1.8 2.0 - 7.0 -22.9 
Bank of Alex. - - - - - - 5.4 4.4 4.9 - 4.9 -3.8 
Cairo Barclays - - 7.9 6.1 6.6 7.2 3.8 3.0 4.5 6.0 6.0 -6.3 
Misr Romania - - 8.8 6.6 6.1 13.9 11.9 12.3 11.3 
 
11.3 -7.6 
Cairo Far East - 19.9 28.5 12.3 14.0 20.2 - - - - 19.9 28.6 
Commercial International 8.6 8.3 7.9 8.0 6.8 6.7 6.8 6.5 7.5 - 7.5 -3.7 
Credit Agricole 10.7 12.0 9.6 6.7 6.4 3.1 7.7 5.9 5.8 - 6.7 -4.5 
Delta International 21.9 18.7 13.1 16.0 14.8 15.0 1.4 1.2 9.4 9.2 14.0 -11.0 
Egyptian American 8.4 6.1 6.3 5.1 5.2 7.6 6.9 - - - 6.3 -4.3 
Egyptian Commercial 8.5 8.2 7.0 6.4 5.6 4.6 9.4 8.6 8.2 10.4 8.2 -8.7 
Egyptian Saudi Finance 7.0 6.3 3.9 4.1 3.8 8.9 7.1 5.8 5.0 4.5 5.4 -11.4 
Misr International 8.0 8.0 7.7 6.6 6.8 7.4 6.8 - - - 7.4 -1.8 
National Development - - - 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.3 11.2 17.7 - 5.6 -1.0 
National Soc. Gen. - 8.4 7.0 6.1 6.1 4.9 6.1 8.1 10.7 - 6.6 0.3 
Suez Canal - - - 6.4 5.9 4.4 8.8 8.3 7.7 - 7.1 -7.1 
Other Private Banks 
          Al Baraka 7.0 6.3 5.6 5.0 3.8 8.9 7.1 5.8 5.0 4.5 5.7 -12.4 
Arab Banking Co. 9.7 8.5 7.0 7.2 7.4 22.0 22.3 9.3 10.5 13.2 9.5 1.7 
Bnp Paribas - - - 8.4 7.5 9.7 5.5 8.5 11.4 - 8.5 28.0 
Egyptian Gulf - - - 10.1 10.2 13.9 12.3 12.6 12.1 - 12.2 0.7 
Egyptian Workers - - 17.7 15.8 - - - 13.3 - - 15.8 -10.6 
El Watany B. - - - 5.5 6.0 5.7 9.7 8.6 8.0 - 7.0 -5.6 
Faisal B. 3.8 3.5 3.2 2.6 3.0 - 2.8 2.5 5.0 4.3 3.2 -7.7 
Hsbc B. - - - 5.7 5.4 5.0 7.4 5.5 6.1 - 5.6 -5.6 
Islamic International 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.5 - - - - 3.5 -3.6 
Misr Iran - - - 16.6 14.2 11.2 10.4 8.7 12.3 - 11.7 -14.3 
Nile B. 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 - - - - 2.8 -8.8 
Societe Arabe Int. - - - 21.3 19.2 19.2 16.6 9.8 - - 19.2 -11.7 
Union National - - 9.0 7.8 8.6 8.6 7.5 18.4 14.6 14.9 8.8 -6.5 
United Bank 7.1 6.0 5.8 1.6 - - - - - - 5.9 -16.0 
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Table II-5 Cost to Income Ratio of Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
           Alex. Commercial 0.0 13.4 19.8 6.4 0.0 0.0 -71.7 58.5 21.9 33.1 9.9 -67.5 
Arab African Int. 52.9 56.9 60.6 47.8 42.1 38.0 33.6 30.1 30.2 - 42.1 -10.0 
Bank of Alex. - - - - - - 72.3 45.6 69.9 - 69.9 8.2 
Cairo Barclays - - 37.0 72.3 100.4 99.5 79.5 60.7 22.6 39.0 66.5 -10.5 
Misr Romania - - 87.4 88.3 82.4 -39.7 53.4 60.3 45.5 - 60.3 -15.6 
Cairo Far East - 25.8 6.4 0.0 0.0 -3.7 - - - - 0.0 -87.6 
Commercial 30.7 30.9 36.0 41.8 46.8 - 34.5 29.3 36.9 - 35.2 11.9 
Credit Agricole 57.0 58.6 82.8 36.4 56.8 55.8 91.9 42.5 47.5 - 56.8 11.8 
Delta International 101.6 115.1 86.8 95.1 86.2 76.4 0.1 72.3 67.6 69.0 81.3 -8.0 
Egyptian American 26.2 4.1 19.1 44.0 97.5 109.7 66.7 - - - 44.0 66.9 
Egyptian -20.7 35.2 28.0 -0.6 -41.7 -252.8 0.0 0.0 3.9 5.5 0.0 -60.2 
Egyptian Saudi 12.3 9.5 0.2 0.7 0.9 -2.6 0.8 1.0 -2.0 12.2 0.9 -60.2 
Misr International 37.0 35.3 19.6 24.2 25.5 -3.2 2.2 - - - 24.2 -24.4 
National - - - 91.1 89.5 100.0 - -54.1 -56.6 - 17.7 -1.7 
National Soc. Gen. - 31.9 32.2 32.1 42.2 23.2 83.2 58.5 26.8 - 32.2 -0.4 
Suez Canal - - - 78.6 86.7 65.9 99.2 89.0 93.4 - 87.8 4.9 
Other Private Banks 
          Al Baraka 8.0 5.8 - 0.4 0.8 -2.1 0.7 0.8 - 10.2 0.8 -27.0 
Arab Banking Co. 38.0 4.6 2.7 10.0 14.6 28.1 35.9 19.4 21.7 37.9 20.6 19.9 
Bnp Paribas - - - -94.8 89.2 69.6 79.9 67.9 50.7 - 68.7 -22.0 
Egyptian Gulf - - - 76.0 70.3 37.5 37.5 47.0 59.0 - 53.0 -0.2 
Egyptian Workers - - 100.0 92.4 - - - 100.0 - - 100.0 -7.6 
El Watany B. - - - 96.2 90.5 57.0 64.8 41.0 33.7 - 60.9 -17.8 
Faisal B. 8.4 7.5 3.5 23.0 13.1 14.3 13.2 13.2 5.4 8.4 10.7 -9.1 
Hsbc B. - - - 52.8 36.8 36.7 27.4 26.8 25.5 - 32.1 -4.5 
Islamic International -5.9 -5.3 -6.5 0.0 -14.8 -34.2 - - - - -6.2 6.2 
Misr Iran - - - 41.5 39.3 34.4 45.2 23.6 37.5 - 38.4 -5.4 
Nile B. 4.0 5.9 3.7 13.5 2.2 4.7 - - - - 4.3 47.4 
Societe Arabe Int. - - - 45.9 49.5 47.1 45.8 51.5 - - 47.1 2.6 
Union National - - 100.0 100.0 91.4 92.1 93.8 39.0 49.6 40.8 91.7 0.4 
United Bank 11.9 10.2 0.0 1.2 - - - - - - 5.7 -57.2 
Table II-6 Income Structure of Egyptian Banks: Percentage of Net Interest Income 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial 85.6 82.9 82.0 80.8 70.0 62.8 65.7 70.2 90.6 90.9 75.5 -1.2 
Arab African Int. 95.3 168.5 176.4 67.7 69.9 67.7 86.1 74.8 94.1 - 74.8 4.0 
Bank of Alex. - - - 49.2 74.3 82.2 100.0 89.7 277.5 - 85.9 21.6 
Cairo Barclays - - 87.9 78.8 75.1 69.5 67.5 89.3 87.7 89.1 83.3 -3.9 
Misr Romania - - - - - 93.0 103.9 51.5 132.6 - 98.4 11.7 
Cairo Far East - 100.0 100.0 77.1 70.5 78.2 - - - - 77.6 -4.3 
Commercial 53.2 49.0 54.5 57.2 55.7 60.3 51.5 49.6 54.8 60.7 56.4 -2.6 
Credit Agricole - - - 36.1 44.5 56.2 57.4 60.8 67.8 77.8 60.8 11.5 
Delta International 87.9 88.5 90.1 89.4 87.3 74.9 68.7 74.1 87.9 87.7 87.5 0.0 
Egyptian American 90.3 85.6 79.7 78.3 74.7 65.7 64.3 - - - 74.7 -4.9 
Egyptian Commercial 75.3 94.8 87.0 83.6 78.3 64.1 81.1 87.5 85.8 90.5 84.7 -2.9 
Egyptian Saudi Finance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Misr International 90.4 90.0 84.5 82.1 84.4 75.5 69.0 - - - 82.1 -4.5 
National Development - - - 11.8 27.4 31.3 24.7 - -17.5 67.5 27.4 -21.0 
National Soc. Gen. 61.8 62.1 62.9 59.6 62.4 65.1 64.7 68.1 54.5 72.5 64.9 0.5 
Suez Canal - - 45.2 30.0 24.8 15.7 27.3 39.5 33.5 63.5 36.5 -16.2 
Other Private Banks 
Al Baraka 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
El Watany B. - 50.4 32.8 36.4 31.4 44.2 61.4 60.6 65.5 70.4 52.4 8.1 
Arab Banking Co. 87.5 84.4 86.3 88.9 81.0 72.1 75.9 89.4 92.3 91.3 87.6 2.6 
Bnp Paribas 50.4 40.3 59.0 66.7 76.4 100.0 83.5 73.0 100.0 - 76.4 13.1 
Egyptian Gulf 34.5 20.7 24.0 4.5 37.9 53.1 64.1 64.2 58.2 72.0 55.7 0.1 
Egyptian Workers - - - - - 19.2 97.8 44.9 84.1 - 32.0 39.9 
Faisal B. 21.0 15.7 20.8 1.5 12.1 40.3 34.8 40.7 41.3 33.1 34.0 9.1 
Hsbc B. - - - -88.8 69.1 40.3 89.0 33.9 75.0 - 54.7 -41.7 
Islamic International 92.6 91.9 96.8 96.1 90.3 88.1 - - - - 93.2 -0.8 
Misr Iran - - - - - - 86.3 143.4 79.6 - 86.3 10.8 
Nile B. 96.8 94.7 91.9 87.4 86.5 83.9 - - - - 86.9 -3.0 
Societe Arabe Int. - - - 35.3 45.0 43.6 55.5 56.3 60.1 66.5 56.3 6.6 
Union National - - - 25.1 8.6 8.6 37.7 48.8 125.2 64.8 48.8 29.4 
United Bank 95.5 87.9 81.3 82.9 - - - - - - 82.1 -7.5 
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Table II-7 Income Structure of Egyptian Banks: Percentage of Net Non-Interest 
Income 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial 14.4 17.1 18.0 19.2 30.0 37.2 34.3 29.8 9.4 9.1 24.5 5.8 
Arab African Int. 4.7 -68.5 -76.4 32.3 30.1 32.3 13.9 25.2 5.9 - 25.2 -31.9 
Bank of Alex. - - - 50.8 25.7 17.8 0.0 10.3 -177.5 - 14.1 -49.3 
Cairo Barclays - - 12.1 21.2 24.9 30.5 32.5 10.7 12.3 10.9 16.7 16.2 
Misr Romania - - - - - 7.0 -3.9 48.5 -32.6 - 1.6 -167.2 
Cairo Far East - 0.0 0.0 22.9 29.5 21.8 - - - - 22.4 1.4 
Commercial 46.8 51.0 45.5 42.8 44.3 39.7 48.5 50.4 45.2 39.3 43.6 3.5 
Credit Agricole - - - 63.9 55.5 43.8 42.6 39.2 32.2 22.2 39.2 -13.2 
Delta International 12.1 11.5 9.9 10.6 12.7 25.1 31.3 25.9 12.1 12.3 12.5 1.0 
Egyp. American 9.7 14.4 20.3 21.7 25.3 34.3 35.7 - - - 25.3 26.3 
Egyp.Commercial 24.7 5.2 13.0 16.4 21.7 35.9 18.9 12.5 14.2 9.5 15.3 19.7 
Egyptian Saudi 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
Misr International 9.6 10.0 15.5 17.9 15.6 24.5 31.0 - - - 17.9 21.2 
Nati. Development - - - 88.2 72.6 68.7 75.3 365.9 117.5 32.5 72.6 -5.4 
National Soc. Gen. 38.2 37.9 37.1 40.4 37.6 34.9 35.3 31.9 45.5 27.5 35.1 -0.8 
Suez Canal - - 54.7 70.0 75.2 84.3 72.7 60.5 66.5 36.5 63.5 8.7 
Other Private Banks 
           Al Baraka 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 0.0 
El Watany B. - 49.6 67.2 63.6 68.6 55.8 38.6 39.4 34.5 29.6 47.6 -5.5 
Arab Banking Co. 12.5 15.6 13.7 11.1 19.0 27.9 24.1 10.6 7.7 8.7 12.4 -13.0 
Bnp Paribas 49.6 59.7 41.0 33.3 23.6 0.0 16.5 27.0 0.0 - 23.6 -23.9 
Egyptian Gulf 65.5 79.3 76.0 95.5 62.1 46.9 35.9 35.8 41.8 28.0 44.3 -0.2 
Egyptian Workers - - - 421.9 550.5 80.8 2.2 55.1 15.9 - 68.0 -71.1 
Faisal B. 79.0 84.3 79.2 98.5 87.9 59.7 65.2 59.3 58.7 66.9 66.0 -3.5 
Hsbc B. - - - 188.8 30.9 59.7 11.0 66.1 25.0 - 45.3 -62.1 
Islamic 7.4 8.1 3.2 3.9 9.7 11.9 - - - - 6.8 22.4 
Misr Iran - - - - - - 13.7 -43.4 20.4 - 13.7 -282.4 
Nile B. 3.2 5.3 8.1 12.6 13.5 16.1 - - - - 13.1 53.3 
Societe Arabe Int. - - - 64.7 55.0 56.4 44.5 43.7 39.9 33.5 43.7 -8.6 
Union National - - - 74.9 91.5 91.4 62.4 51.2 -25.2 35.2 51.2 -18.0 
United Bank 4.5 12.1 18.7 17.1 - - - - - - 17.9 54.3 
 
Table II-8 Lending for the Manufacturing Sector by Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 13.3 11.4 15.1 13.3 9.4 
Misr Romania - 14.9 14.0 15.7 13.2 15.1 21.9 18.9 32.4 30.6 15.7 3.2 
Cairo Far East - - 26.6 12.5 6.2 9.3 - - - - 10.9 -50.1 
Commercial International - 51.4 49.0 48.4 45.4 51.9 45.3 40.0 37.4 36.6 45.4 -5.5 
Egyptian American - 48.7 51.2 57.9 61.7 35.3 - - - - 51.2 5.8 
Delta International - - 26.7 27.8 26.6 32.8 38.8 40.8 38.3 50.5 35.6 5.1 
Egyptian Commercial 24.3 30.2 36.6 34.4 28.9 23.3 39.1 32.5 27.7 - 30.2 -10.4 
Egyptian Saudi Finance - 10.5 13.3 11.0 9.0 15.5 17.5 15.0 16.2 1.9 13.3 -3.0 
Misr International - 36.9 35.5 36.8 32.3 36.7 40.3 - - - 36.8 3.6 
National Soc. Gen. 49.5 47.8 43.0 41.5 39.0 40.4 39.2 39.3 54.9 56.4 42.3 -3.0 
Suez Canal 19.6 18.2 17.3 14.5 15.0 16.2 18.9 18.5 25.2 23.4 18.3 -2.1 
Other Private Banks 
           Arab Banking Co. - 17.9 17.3 16.4 19.7 17.6 14.4 23.4 25.5 26.9 17.9 1.1 
Bnp Paribas - 35.4 36.8 42.6 45.5 25.7 19.2 16.7 13.0 8.0 25.7 -17.6 
Egyptian Workers - 45.6 35.3 26.3 30.9 28.6 37.5 38.0 - - 35.3 -3.0 
El Watany B. - - - - - - - - 25.7 31.7 28.7 23.6 
Islamic International 14.4 16.1 14.7 13.4 13.5 15.0 - - - - 14.6 0.8 
Societe Arabe Int. - - 38.1 35.9 46.2 39.5 36.8 41.1 38.7 40.6 39.1 -5.6 
United Bank 19.2 26.4 17.9 18.8 - - - - - - 19.0 5.0 
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Table II-9 Lending for the Trade Sector by Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 45.5 40.5 38.8 40.5 -7.6 
Misr Romania - 73.8 72.8 62.3 58.2 26.2 37.0 36.4 16.5 23.1 37.0 -4.1 
Cairo Far East - - 31.2 12.8 14.2 14.3 - - - - 14.2 0.8 
Commercial International - 7.1 7.4 7.6 7.1 6.2 3.7 4.4 9.3 1.8 7.1 -1.6 
Egyptian American - 11.3 9.0 7.2 8.3 3.2 - - - - 8.3 -20.1 
Delta International - - 27.4 25.4 24.1 18.6 16.9 5.0 7.7 5.4 17.7 -9.2 
Egyptian Commercial 50.7 50.2 45.5 28.3 28.5 26.4 28.3 12.5 13.0 - 28.3 -4.3 
Egyptian Saudi Finance - 61.9 51.3 40.3 35.6 31.3 28.4 33.3 40.2 38.0 38.0 -10.5 
Misr International - 23.6 23.3 23.4 21.2 19.1 19.4 - - - 22.3 -1.2 
National Soc. Gen. 21.4 21.3 19.4 15.7 13.9 10.3 14.0 12.9 11.2 9.5 14.0 -11.1 
Suez Canal 52.0 50.2 45.3 58.1 58.7 59.3 58.2 59.2 27.6 39.1 55.1 0.9 
Other Private Banks 
           Arab Banking Co. - 41.0 48.1 51.9 51.9 52.5 53.4 24.8 17.9 11.2 48.1 0.6 
Bnp Paribas - 47.1 41.5 35.7 33.9 45.2 41.8 49.6 45.9 48.9 45.2 -6.3 
Egyptian Workers - 40.0 50.5 53.6 47.0 50.2 50.3 53.8 - - 50.3 6.6 
El Watany B. - - - - - - - - 23.1 22.0 22.6 -4.6 
Islamic International 51.9 59.9 56.5 58.3 58.0 55.1 - - - - 57.3 -0.5 
Societe Arabe Int. - - 51.4 58.7 42.2 45.0 41.2 25.0 28.0 23.6 41.7 -8.4 
United Bank 38.0 31.5 27.2 29.9 - - - - - - 30.7 -13.7 
Table II-10 Lending for the Service Sector by Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 24.6 25.0 22.6 24.6 -3.9 
Misr Romania - 1.5 1.4 1.9 5.8 5.1 12.7 7.0 4.3 5.7 5.1 12.3 
Cairo Far East - - 34.2 13.9 13.7 18.3 - - - - 16.1 -1.4 
Commercial International - 30.5 30.2 30.5 30.8 36.0 37.8 37.3 37.1 44.4 36.0 1.0 
Egyptian American - 25.7 22.1 17.3 12.0 4.1 - - - - 17.3 -26.1 
Delta International - - 31.1 32.2 34.0 28.4 34.3 38.6 39.3 25.0 33.1 3.6 
Egyptian Commercial 1.8 13.6 12.7 28.2 28.0 19.1 44.7 25.3 30.3 - 25.3 9.5 
Egyptian Saudi Finance - 7.1 12.8 24.2 22.9 22.3 19.6 18.3 14.8 15.7 18.3 -4.1 
Misr International - 20.5 33.6 33.7 38.4 35.8 33.8 - - - 33.7 0.3 
National Soc. Gen. 8.0 9.5 17.4 24.1 27.1 24.2 26.9 26.0 17.3 17.6 20.9 10.9 
Suez Canal 26.5 33.0 28.1 18.2 17.5 18.5 17.4 16.3 22.8 28.8 20.6 -4.2 
Other Private Banks 
           Arab Banking Co. - 19.6 21.5 24.1 20.7 13.7 10.3 31.5 37.1 10.8 20.7 -2.2 
Bnp Paribas - 15.7 12.0 6.9 8.5 10.1 13.9 10.7 14.7 13.5 12.0 5.3 
Egyptian Workers - 9.2 2.0 2.7 1.6 2.2 1.8 2.2 - - 2.2 2.1 
El Watany B. - - - - - - - - 21.9 21.5 21.7 -1.6 
Islamic International 22.4 10.8 11.1 9.9 9.7 10.9 - - - - 10.9 -1.6 
Societe Arab Int. - - 5.7 3.0 7.5 9.3 10.4 18.6 16.2 18.9 9.9 17.0 
United Bank 31.8 27.8 39.0 39.6 - - - - - - 35.4 1.6 
Table II-11 Lending for the Agriculture Sector by Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 -13.2 
Misr Romania - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cairo Far East - - 2.1 0.8 10.1 15.6 - - - - 6.1 54.1 
Commercial Int. - 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.6 -9.9 
Egyptian American - 3.2 2.1 2.7 2.2 1.7 - - - - 2.2 -20.7 
Delta International - - 0.1 0.0 0.9 1.2 1.4 0.4 0.6 2.1 0.8 27.9 
Egyptian Commercial 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 11.4 1.2 0.7 0.6 - 0.2 -21.5 
Egyptian Saudi Finance - 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -5.1 
Misr International - 2.6 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.1 - - - 2.2 -5.0 
National Soc. Gen. 1.8 1.8 1.4 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.0 -13.3 
Suez Canal 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 1.8 0.5 -6.5 
Other Private Banks 
          Arab Banking Co. - 0.7 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 
Bnp Paribas - 0.0 6.9 8.3 4.1 2.5 2.9 4.2 5.9 5.4 4.2 15.1 
Egyptian Workers - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 0.0 
El Watany B. - - - - - - - - 5.1 3.9 4.5 -22.9 
Islamic International 3.0 4.5 3.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 - - - - 4.7 2.6 
Societe Arab Int. - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
United Bank 0.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 - - - - - - 0.1 -93.4 
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Table II-12 Lending for the Banking Sector by Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            
Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 15.4 22.1 22.5 22.1 22.7 
Misr Romania - 9.8 11.8 20.1 22.7 53.5 28.5 37.8 46.8 40.6 28.5 22.0 
Cairo Far East - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - 0.0 0.0 
Commercial Int. - 3.8 4.9 5.9 8.3 1.8 5.1 8.5 7.3 8.3 5.9 23.8 
Egyptian American - 0.8 0.8 13.9 1.8 4.6 - - - - 1.8 76.0 
Delta International - - 11.4 11.5 10.7 14.0 4.1 5.0 6.6 9.3 10.0 22.4 
Egyptian Commercial 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3 1.2 0.1 - 0.0 -11.9 
Egyptian Saudi Finance - 14.3 17.8 17.6 25.7 23.4 27.4 22.9 16.6 12.5 17.8 -5.1 
Misr International - 6.4 5.1 4.1 5.8 6.4 4.4 - - - 5.5 -18.9 
National Soc. Gen. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 
Suez Canal 2.5 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 -59.5 
Other Private Banks 
           
Arab Banking Co. - 16.5 5.5 0.0 1.2 8.2 8.9 9.9 3.2 0.0 5.5 -66.7 
Bnp Paribas - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Egyptian Workers - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 0.0 
El Watany B. - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 -97.3 
Islamic International 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - 0.0 0.0 
Societe Arab Int. - - 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
United Bank 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.7 - - - - - - 0.4 941.0 
Table II-13 Lending for the Household Sector by Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Misr Romania - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cairo Far East - - 5.9 2.6 3.1 11.4 - - - - 4.5 20.3 
Commercial International - 6.5 30.2 7.1 7.8 9.5 7.7 9.5 8.7 8.8 8.7 5.8 
Egyptian American - 11.1 15.0 1.0 14.0 51.1 - - - - 14.0 149.8 
Delta International - - 3.2 3.2 3.5 5.0 4.5 10.3 7.5 7.7 4.8 3.5 
Egyptian Commercial 7.2 5.9 5.1 9.2 14.6 19.5 28.7 25.3 28.3 - 14.6 22.8 
Egyptian Saudi Finance - 5.4 4.7 6.8 6.7 7.3 6.9 1.0 12.0 14.4 6.8 3.9 
Misr International - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - 0.0 0.0 
National Soc. Gen. 9.6 10.9 10.4 9.9 11.8 15.7 18.8 20.8 15.7 17.5 13.7 12.0 
Suez Canal 10.3 10.6 8.4 7.9 7.8 5.6 5.1 5.5 5.7 6.6 7.2 -1.3 
Other Private Banks 
           Arab Banking Co. - 4.3 6.7 6.9 5.9 7.4 8.3 10.4 16.9 21.7 7.4 25.7 
Bnp Paribas - 1.7 2.8 6.4 8.1 16.4 22.1 18.8 20.5 24.2 16.4 30.4 
Egyptian Workers - 5.2 12.2 17.4 20.5 19.0 10.5 6.0 - - 12.2 5.3 
El Watany B. - - - - - - - - 24.3 20.8 22.5 -14.3 
Islamic International 8.2 8.7 14.0 13.6 13.8 13.8 - - - - 13.7 1.4 
Societe Arab Int. - - 4.3 2.3 4.1 6.3 11.6 15.4 17.0 13.9 8.9 32.6 
United Bank 10.9 12.8 15.0 10.9 - - - - - - 11.8 17.1 
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Table II-14 The Portion of Credit in a Form of Loans by Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 78.4 81.6 43.4 78.4 -21.4 
Arab African Int. 66.3 67.5 25.3 54.0 36.9 62.7 46.2 77.7 5.4 6.9 50.1 1.7 
Bank of Alex. - - - - - - 54.8 71.4 78.0 76.5 73.9 9.4 
Cairo Barclays - - 76.4 77.0 65.2 65.6 59.8 69.4 68.2 48.9 66.9 -1.7 
Misr Romania 73.9 74.8 71.9 68.5 68.6 49.9 69.0 80.2 70.4 37.6 69.7 -3.9 
Cairo Far East - 48.7 48.7 69.4 71.7 73.2 - - - - 69.4 2.7 
Commercial International 91.5 91.1 86.4 84.9 84.6 84.4 80.5 83.2 64.3 62.9 84.5 -1.8 
Egyptian American 96.9 93.9 68.5 79.3 63.6 60.3 52.4 - - - 68.5 -9.1 
Delta International 85.9 86.6 84.7 84.5 74.2 73.2 42.2 73.4 84.8 90.6 84.6 -0.2 
Egyptian Commercial 86.7 88.0 90.6 85.6 75.4 77.6 93.3 74.2 81.8 77.4 83.7 1.4 
Egyptian Saudi Finance 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -22.8 
Misr International 96.9 94.7 68.9 81.7 81.8 77.8 65.5 - - - 81.7 -3.6 
National Development 77.8 73.6 74.9 74.1 73.2 80.1 92.6 85.9 78.2 69.6 76.4 -1.1 
National Soc. Gen. 87.2 82.9 81.7 77.7 76.2 76.8 64.4 76.7 84.5 68.3 77.3 -2.0 
Suez Canal 93.7 91.6 99.7 97.5 78.8 81.1 84.3 98.5 71.0 70.7 87.9 -0.4 
Other Private Banks 
Arab Banking Co. 98.2 70.0 78.4 85.9 74.4 88.8 89.2 90.5 51.7 53.6 82.1 1.5 
Bnp Paribas - 84.4 83.5 77.4 73.6 79.1 94.1 78.2 80.3 62.0 79.1 -3.0 
Egyptian Gulf 80.0 80.6 70.1 76.9 83.3 92.5 60.6 88.9 95.9 89.9 82.0 7.8 
Egyptian Workers - 81.1 100.0 98.1 95.6 - 92.2 95.2 - - 95.4 0.7 
El Watany B. 89.4 86.4 80.0 90.8 83.4 85.5 92.8 96.8 80.9 67.0 86.0 -3.4 
Hsbc B. 86.9 87.5 90.9 71.7 60.2 72.0 81.6 77.3 70.0 65.3 74.6 -5.3 
Islamic International 90.8 89.3 96.5 96.4 93.7 97.3 - - - - 95.1 -0.1 
Misr Iran 98.1 99.7 98.3 69.0 66.8 53.1 56.3 59.8 52.1 56.4 63.3 -1.4 
Nile B. 96.7 87.1 78.4 82.8 77.1 76.5 - - - - 80.6 -6.8 
Societe Arab Int. 91.8 92.7 93.8 82.2 91.0 72.0 84.2 95.3 62.4 100.0 91.4 1.3 
United Bank 78.5 81.0 74.4 74.2 - - - - - - 76.5 -0.3 
 
Table II-15 The Portion of Credit in a Form of Treasury Bills by Egyptian Banks  
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 5.3 6.1 52.7 6.1 387.7 
Arab African Int. 16.7 16.1 7.6 4.1 61.2 36.5 51.5 20.0 87.5 87.1 28.3 -3.6 
Bank of Alex. - - - - - - 42.3 27.0 21.0 22.9 25.0 -22.4 
Cairo Barclays - - 23.6 23.0 34.8 34.4 40.2 30.6 31.8 51.1 33.1 3.9 
Misr Romania 14.4 14.8 18.8 19.3 18.3 31.3 31.0 16.8 29.6 62.3 19.0 2.7 
Cairo Far East - 48.7 48.7 20.8 18.9 18.6 - - - - 20.8 -5.3 
Commercial International 6.1 6.6 10.5 11.2 14.1 14.5 18.7 16.1 30.4 25.2 14.3 9.4 
Egyptian American 3.0 6.1 31.0 19.9 31.6 37.5 44.8 - - - 31.0 39.2 
Delta International 11.0 10.7 9.8 10.0 18.9 15.8 44.2 15.4 15.1 9.4 13.0 -2.4 
Egyptian Commercial 13.1 11.8 7.7 14.4 22.1 19.5 3.2 23.8 18.2 22.6 16.3 -10.3 
Egyptian Saudi Finance 98.4 99.2 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 100.0 100.0 96.8 100.0 99.9 0.0 
Misr International 2.9 3.5 20.6 8.9 11.4 19.0 33.1 - - - 11.4 47.3 
National Development 0.5 8.0 5.8 8.6 9.4 4.0 6.9 13.5 21.8 30.4 8.3 47.2 
National Soc. Gen. 12.6 13.7 16.7 21.5 21.7 15.9 27.6 9.8 10.1 22.5 16.3 8.9 
Suez Canal 3.1 3.7 0.0 0.7 18.1 16.5 13.6 0.2 27.1 27.9 8.6 -3.1 
Other Private Banks 
Arab Banking Co. 0.8 14.9 21.6 14.1 24.9 10.5 10.7 9.5 48.3 46.4 14.5 1.8 
Bnp Paribas - 15.6 16.5 22.6 26.4 20.9 5.9 21.8 19.7 38.0 20.9 11.4 
Egyptian Gulf 4.2 1.5 18.6 16.7 14.2 5.3 39.4 10.2 4.1 10.1 10.2 -15.1 
Egyptian Workers - 12.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 -100.0 
El Watany B. 10.4 13.5 8.8 4.1 8.0 11.4 6.4 3.2 19.1 33.0 9.6 29.3 
Hsbc B. 5.6 5.6 9.1 28.3 39.8 22.9 18.1 22.6 29.8 34.6 22.8 24.7 
Islamic International 9.2 10.7 3.5 3.6 6.3 2.7 - - - - 4.9 3.5 
Misr Iran 0.0 0.0 0.5 24.5 16.2 3.9 10.2 0.3 7.3 5.6 4.7 -23.2 
Nile B. 3.3 12.9 21.6 17.2 22.9 23.5 - - - - 19.4 32.7 
Societe Arab Int. 8.1 7.3 6.2 17.8 9.0 28.0 15.8 4.7 37.6 0.0 8.5 -15.6 
United Bank 9.5 0.0 9.8 11.7 - - - - - - 9.6 -40.4 
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Table II-16 The Portion of Credit in a Form of Bonds by Egyptian Banks  
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 11.9 8.8 3.9 8.8 -41.0 
Arab African Int. 16.1 15.5 60.2 38.3 1.0 0.2 1.3 1.2 5.8 5.0 5.4 -6.7 
Bank of Alex. - - - - - - 2.4 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 -39.6 
Cairo Barclays - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Misr Romania 11.0 9.8 9.1 12.1 12.8 17.9 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 -7.9 
Cairo Far East - 0.0 0.0 8.4 9.2 0.0 - - - - 0.0 -45.1 
Commercial International 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.1 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.2 4.7 11.5 2.2 -10.9 
Egyptian American 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.9 1.5 - - - 0.1 -72.5 
Delta International 2.8 2.5 4.5 4.4 6.1 10.2 12.5 10.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 10.5 
Egyptian Commercial 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
Egyptian Saudi Finance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Misr International 0.0 1.8 10.5 9.3 6.8 3.2 1.4 - - - 3.2 -18.8 
National Development 20.6 17.6 18.9 16.8 16.9 15.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.1 -10.1 
National Soc. Gen. 0.0 3.2 1.4 0.5 1.7 5.2 6.1 11.9 5.3 9.0 4.2 44.1 
Suez Canal 2.0 1.8 0.0 1.8 3.0 2.2 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.6 1.7 -28.2 
Other Private Banks 
Arab Banking Co. 0.0 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
Bnp Paribas - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Egyptian Gulf 13.7 16.2 11.3 6.4 2.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 -43.3 
Egyptian Workers - 3.8 0.0 0.9 2.5 - 1.7 0.3 - - 1.3 -80.7 
El Watany B. 0.0 0.0 9.3 2.8 8.5 2.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 -69.3 
Hsbc B. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
Islamic International 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - 0.0 0.0 
Misr Iran 0.4 0.3 0.9 6.1 16.3 41.5 31.8 37.6 2.4 2.5 4.3 18.0 
Nile B. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - 0.0 0.0 
Societe Arab Int. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
United Bank 8.3 16.4 15.7 14.1 - - - - - - 14.9 -3.8 
Table II-17 The Portion of Credit in a Form of Securities by Egyptian Banks 
Institutions - (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR 
Privatized Banks 
            Alex. Commercial - - - - - - - 4.3 3.4 0.1 3.4 -59.1 
Arab African Int. 0.9 1.0 6.9 3.6 0.9 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 4.1 
Bank of Alex. - - - - - - 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.3 -43.9 
Cairo Barclays - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Misr Romania 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -33.9 
Cairo Far East - 2.6 2.6 1.4 0.2 8.2 - - - - 2.6 -23.0 
Commercial International 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 45.0 
Egyptian American 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.2 - - - 0.8 38.8 
Delta International 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.8 -5.7 
Egyptian Commercial 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.8 3.5 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -25.6 
Egyptian Saudi Finance 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
Misr International 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - 0.0 -100.0 
National Development 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 -11.9 
National Soc. Gen. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 2.2 1.9 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 -12.2 
Suez Canal 1.2 2.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.4 -14.2 
Other Private Banks 
Arab Banking Co. 1.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 
Bnp Paribas - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Egyptian Gulf 2.1 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -57.9 
Egyptian Workers - 2.3 0.0 1.1 1.9 - 6.1 4.4 - - 2.1 -27.5 
El Watany B. 0.1 0.1 1.9 2.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -55.1 
Hsbc B. 7.5 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -8.3 
Islamic International 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - 0.0 0.0 
Misr Iran 1.5 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.4 1.7 2.3 38.3 35.4 1.4 30.1 
Nile B. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - 0.0 0.0 
Societe Arab Int. 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -78.3 
United Bank 3.7 2.7 0.0 0.0 - - - - - - 1.3 -69.2 
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Table II-18 Return on Assets Ratio of Egyptian Financial Institutions 
Institutions - (%) Sec. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Financial Institutions 
Alex. Commercial Ba 0.00 1.02 1.33 0.40 0.00 0.00 -4.62 2.40 0.99 1.18 0.70 -0.64 
Arab African Int. Ba 1.75 1.19 0.95 1.82 1.61 2.50 1.56 2.30 1.27 1.44 1.59 -0.12 
Bank of Alex. Ba - - - - - - 0.35 1.79 1.31 1.64 1.48 0.25 
Cairo Barclays Ba - - 1.41 2.28 2.58 3.53 1.91 2.48 1.27 1.27 2.10 0.13 
Misr Romania Ba 1.09 0.76 0.08 0.11 0.00 -6.08 1.29 1.75 0.71 0.59 0.65 -0.45 
Cairo Far East Ba - 1.06 0.36 0.00 0.00 -0.18 - - - - 0.00 -0.83 
Commercial Ba - - - 1.72 1.81 2.03 2.29 2.71 2.46 2.66 2.28 0.10 
Credit Agricole Ba - - - 3.42 0.98 1.55 0.13 2.50 2.16 1.65 1.65 -0.19 
Delta International Ba 5.04 4.67 3.72 3.65 3.39 3.76 0.00 0.25 2.51 2.32 3.52 -0.07 
Egyptian American Ba 1.53 0.19 0.68 1.20 2.35 3.19 0.93 - - - 1.20 0.56 
Egyptian Commercial Ba -1.59 2.52 1.84 -0.04 -2.23 -10.27 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.26 0.00 -0.27 
Egyptian Saudi Finance Ba 1.00 0.73 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.14 0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.58 0.05 -0.99 
Misr International Ba 2.11 1.92 0.96 0.84 0.84 -0.15 0.05 - - - 0.84 -0.31 
National Development Ba - - - 0.00 0.01 0.00 -1.70 -3.50 -8.21 -4.58 -1.70 1.05 
National Soc. Gen. Ba - - 2.07 1.84 2.06 2.90 0.38 1.43 2.39 2.26 2.06 0.12 
Suez Canal Ba - - 0.43 0.39 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.33 0.00 -0.84 
El Kahera Housing Fi 2.88 1.45 1.85 2.41 2.57 2.97 2.79 2.44 1.56 5.24 2.51 0.07 
Export Development Fi - - - 0.01 0.55 0.78 - - - - 0.55 27.2
Heliopolis Housing Fi - - 8.00 7.44 7.59 7.62 7.89 11.28 11.1 7.65 7.77 0.00 
Medinet Nasr Hous. Fi 8.56 6.88 6.27 5.71 5.58 6.12 5.63 7.88 8.75 9.74 6.58 -0.02 
T M G Holding Fi - - - - - - - - 2.96 2.04 2.50 -0.31 
United Housing Fi 14.07 13.3 12.8 13.6 13.5 14.04 14.30 14.25 12.7 14.5 13.8 0.00 
Other Private Financial Institutions 
Al Baraka Ba - - 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.02 -0.63 
Arab Banking Co. Ba - - 0.15 0.55 0.61 1.22 1.38 0.69 1.10 - 0.69 0.36 
Bnp Paribas Ba - 0.02 -0.61 -3.57 0.21 0.49 0.33 0.48 1.67 1.09 0.33 0.06 
Egyptian Gulf Ba - - 0.31 0.50 0.66 1.98 1.87 1.38 1.46 0.83 1.10 0.06 
Egyptian Workers Ba - 1.81 0.55 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - - 0.00 -0.85 
El Watany B. Ba - - 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.95 0.95 2.03 2.41 2.72 0.95 0.67 
Faisal B. Ba - - 0.16 0.90 0.45 0.63 0.62 0.71 0.36 0.44 0.54 0.14 
Hsbc B. Ba 1.60 1.42 1.10 1.42 2.20 2.78 3.46 3.43 1.95 2.09 2.02 0.07 
Islamic International Ba -0.51 -0.45 -0.50 0.00 -0.98 -1.75 - - - - -0.51 0.00 
Misr Iran Ba 2.00 1.33 0.00 2.08 2.04 1.89 1.99 3.17 2.30 2.18 2.02 -0.07 
Nile B. Ba 0.32 0.44 0.21 0.78 0.13 0.28 - - - - 0.30 0.37 
Societe Arabe Int. Ba 2.28 2.10 1.89 2.60 2.08 1.72 1.81 1.23 1.33 1.25 1.85 -0.08 
Union National Ba - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.43 1.57 1.49 0.00 -0.20 
United Bank Ba 0.98 0.74 0.00 0.02 - - - - - - 0.38 -0.62 
CIIC Insurance Co. Fi - 9.23 -1.68 1.95 1.50 1.10 - - - - 1.49 -1.00 
Al Ahly For Fi - - - -3.75 -4.75 6.92 2.54 7.54 - 2.02 2.02 -0.90 
Al Ahram Co Stock Fi - - - 3.15 3.20 2.88 12.79 6.92 19.6 - 5.06 0.02 
Al Arafa Investment Fi - - - - - - 5.70 8.56 7.45 - 7.45 0.19 
Arab Gathering Fi - - 3.88 4.93 5.27 7.32 7.61 21.49 11.6 - 7.32 0.17 
Arab Misr Insurance Fi - - 2.50 3.75 4.65 3.29 1.38 1.64 3.15 1.43 2.82 0.19 
Commercial Fi - 1.31 2.74 2.11 4.61 16.53 6.50 21.91 8.56 - 5.56 1.09 
Delta Insurance Fi 2.50 2.64 2.21 2.28 2.21 2.33 2.00 2.07 -0.71 0.09 2.21 -0.03 
Efg Hermes Fi 7.32 1.52 1.15 -7.41 5.75 14.59 7.55 10.00 8.49 5.02 6.54 -0.41 
Egyptian American- Fi - - - - - 4.59 12.12 8.99 7.54 - 8.27 -0.16 
Egyptian Financial Fi 4.72 5.56 6.06 6.49 6.88 8.28 7.86 8.31 11.3 - 6.88 0.08 
Hermes Holding Fi 7.32 1.52 1.15 -7.41 5.75 14.59 7.55 10.00 8.49 - 7.32 -0.36 
Egyptian Kuwaiti Ho. Fi 9.34 9.10 7.53 19.5 10.2 10.66 10.91 10.68 7.04 - 10.2 -0.02 
Egyptians Abroad Fi - 5.76 11.5 3.41 0.21 6.33 5.24 5.98 16.8 - 5.87 0.14 
El Ahli Investment Fi - - -6.49 -3.75 -4.75 6.92 2.54 7.54 - - -3.75 -0.53 
El Kahera El Watania Fi - 3.63 1.97 0.05 -0.77 0.22 0.14 -8.33 -5.98 - 0.10 -0.97 
Sonid Fi -0.34 - 0.74 0.42 2.30 2.43 2.53 4.12 - - 2.30 0.06 
Hermes Co. Fi - - - 2.34 -7.09 61.15 8.37 0.00 - - 2.34 -2.51 
Housing & Development Fi - - 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.74 1.21 1.72 2.07 3.15 0.97 0.42 
Kuwaiti Egyptian Fi - - 0.82 0.61 2.91 8.43 8.52 0.75 - - 1.87 0.01 
Mansour Maghrab Fi - - 1.47 2.03 3.26 18.21 26.03 7.43 10.7 - 7.43 0.44 
Misr Financial Fi - - 2.59 11.0 8.37 13.98 12.83 27.16 -15.2 - 11.0 0.29 
Mohandes Insurance Fi - 3.73 3.90 1.54 1.47 1.45 1.34 1.40 1.04 0.75 1.45 -0.06 
Nile City Investment Fi - - - - 0.00 12.04 2.92 1.12 - - 2.02 -0.69 
Osool Esb Securities Fi - - -4.20 0.38 8.14 7.88 22.11 11.76 7.10 - 7.88 -0.21 
Prime Investments Fi - - - - - - 9.84 47.57 5.09 - 9.84 1.47 
Prime Securities Fi - - - - - 6.36 6.38 12.65 - - 6.38 0.49 
Saudi Egyptian Fi - - 3.17 14.2 3.56 2.36 27.88 4.32 8.00 - 4.32 0.26 
Suez Canal Insurance  Fi - - 16.3 15.9 14.3 14.76 2.62 11.50 7.65 7.13 12.9 -0.07 
Notes: Ba. indicates banks and Fi. indicates financial services excluding banks. 
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Table II-19 Return on Equity Ratio of Egyptian Financial Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Sec 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR 
Privatized Financial Institutions 
Alex. Commercial Ba 0.00 9.63 15.01 5.04 0.00 0.00 36.79 12.21 5.65 8.27 6.96 -0.60 
Arab African Int. Ba 12.11 7.33 6.67 11.75 16.33 29.23 29.61 50.99 20.87 21.83 18.60 0.05 
Bank of Alex. Ba - - - - - - 6.33 28.38 17.68 18.08 17.88 0.02 
Cairo Barclays Ba - - 15.57 32.57 29.35 47.39 42.19 34.70 14.86 14.51 30.96 -0.10 
Misr Romania Ba 9.57 7.18 0.90 1.56 0.00 - 15.42 22.31 6.07 6.29 6.18 -0.49 
Cairo Far East Ba - 5.31 1.26 0.00 0.00 -0.91 - - - - 0.00 -0.88 
Commercial Ba - - - 18.75 21.07 22.60 25.54 29.55 24.14 24.29 24.14 0.10 
Credit Agricole Ba - - - 30.03 12.02 10.81 1.48 27.58 22.64 18.02 18.02 -0.19 
Delta International Ba 21.80 23.51 20.78 22.82 22.44 24.62 0.03 21.91 26.87 22.25 22.35 0.08 
Egyptian American Ba 18.29 2.53 10.85 23.55 32.68 42.03 11.94 - - - 18.29 0.34 
Egy. Com. Ba - 30.90 26.10 -0.57 -39.76 - -0.01 0.01 2.85 2.87 0.00 -0.16 
Egy. Saudi  Ba 13.81 11.50 0.25 0.87 1.26 -1.58 0.59 0.93 -2.08 12.63 0.90 -0.98 
Misr International Ba 26.36 24.01 12.44 12.78 12.33 -1.97 0.69 - - - 12.44 -0.29 
National Ba - - - 0.01 0.17 0.00 -47.32 - - -97.25 -46.35 -0.02 
National Soc. Gen. Ba - - 22.75 23.08 25.15 37.95 5.69 18.22 23.40 21.82 22.92 0.09 
Suez Canal Ba - - 6.68 6.02 1.99 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -10.53 0.00 -0.84 
El Kahera Housing Fi 12.15 3.86 4.44 5.04 5.09 5.44 5.21 5.68 2.28 6.93 5.15 0.07 
Export Development Fi - - - 0.06 5.52 7.02 - - - - 5.52 45.64 
Heliopolis Housing Fi - - 59.92 45.07 39.92 39.72 30.07 38.45 39.08 35.83 39.40 -0.08 
Medinet Nasr Hous. Fi 48.51 26.76 22.57 19.72 20.63 22.92 25.12 31.94 38.34 43.91 25.94 0.10 
T M G Holding Fi - - - - - - - - 7.27 4.78 6.03 -0.34 
United Housing Fi 41.75 36.46 35.07 40.39 38.49 42.05 33.30 33.33 28.13 32.70 35.77 -0.04 
Other Private Financial Institutions 
Al Baraka Ba - - 0.00 0.64 1.01 0.20 0.79 0.00 0.00 9.45 0.42 -0.80 
Arab Banking Co. Ba - - 1.99 6.51 7.07 5.18 6.02 6.84 9.33 - 6.51 0.15 
Bnp Paribas Ba - 0.35 - - 4.96 5.83 6.85 5.28 1.36 9.76 4.96 -0.03 
Egyptian Gulf Ba - - 2.82 4.93 6.09 12.45 13.21 10.11 10.79 5.05 8.10 0.07 
Egyptian Workers Ba - 8.79 3.13 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - - 0.00 -0.82 
El Watany B. Ba - - 0.00 1.20 3.19 14.40 8.60 18.74 19.55 24.03 11.50 0.70 
Faisal B. Ba - - 4.62 22.21 11.69 14.62 15.88 18.91 5.68 7.74 13.15 0.19 
Hsbc B. Ba 23.81 17.40 13.86 25.98 35.71 57.74 42.53 65.17 28.75 32.37 30.56 0.13 
Islamic International Ba - -21.93 - 0.00 - 109.4 - - - - -20.83 -0.44 
Misr Iran Ba 8.42 5.53 0.00 12.94 13.86 16.19 17.08 33.91 16.31 14.81 14.33 -0.02 
Nile B. Ba 4.20 6.72 3.36 12.54 2.52 5.76 - - - - 4.98 0.60 
Societe Arabe Int. Ba 14.08 12.42 10.21 10.95 9.48 8.24 9.77 11.07 12.21 10.04 10.58 -0.12 
Union National Ba - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.04 9.67 9.04 0.00 -0.13 
United Bank Ba 13.68 12.39 0.00 0.41 - - - - - - 6.40 -0.55 
CIIC Insurance Co. Fi  9.55 -2.05 2.55 2.21 1.68     2.21 -1.00 Al Ahly Dev.  Fi - - - -8.34 -9.75 11.10 2.86 12.49 -25.16 3.10 2.86 -0.93 
Al Ahram Exchange Fi - - - 92.03 50.52 71.97 66.17 100.0 100.00 - 82.00 0.00 
Al Arafa Investment Fi - - - - - - 36.24 47.80 37.22 - 37.22 0.05 
Arab Gathering Fi - - 1494 1319. 741.01 91.36 85.15 95.29 35.10 - 95.29 -0.54 
Arab Misr Insurance Fi   6.96 10.49 12.97 8.32 4.34 5.36 10.57 5.39 7.64 0.23 Commercial Fi - 64.41 122.1 46.93 60.79 87.04 20.82 41.46 18.83 - 53.86 0.30 
Delta Insurance Fi 9.24 9.57 8.19 7.99 8.32 8.74 8.09 9.40 -3.40 0.50 8.25 -0.02 
Efg Hermes Fi 15.80 3.20 2.43 - 10.56 41.26 9.62 13.98 11.67 6.34 10.09 -0.46 
Egy. Am. Securities Fi - - - - - 101.4 100.00 100.0 100.01 - 100.01 0.00 
Egyptian Financial Fi - 17.11 9.64 10.53 12.10 16.57 17.66 19.02 31.26 - 16.84 0.09 
Hermes Holding Fi 48.06 15.64 13.03 - 138.15 85.35 64.30 59.55 33.77 - 48.06 -0.41 
Egy.Kuwaiti Ho. Fi 85.68 73.81 66.91 174.8 69.81 79.18 37.27 41.95 21.97 - 69.81 -0.12 
Egyptians Abroad Fi - - 47.93 23.84 3.33 69.31 25.24 13.76 81.80 - 25.24 -0.48 
El Ahli Investment Fi - - 54.35 26.25 21.84 - 67.22 39.22 -101.6 - 26.25 -1.62 
El Kahera El Watania Fi - 99.35 83.55 0.77 -24.26 9.47 5.65 163.7 5.68 - 7.58 -0.97 
Sonid Fi 72.66 - 315.5 68.09 81.64 49.04 36.50 38.29 - - 68.09 -0.26 
Hermes Co. Fi - - - 16.97 -79.14 97.73 11.35 - - - 14.16 -2.23 
Housing Dev. Fi - - 5.72 5.91 6.22 16.80 17.75 24.60 20.49 35.43 17.28 0.06 
Kuwaiti Egyptian Fi - - 17.64 11.41 37.13 56.34 111.11 53.43 - - 45.28 0.52 
Mansour Ma. Fi - - 23.78 24.93 32.03 84.03 67.03 36.97 39.15 - 36.97 0.05 
Misr Financial  Fi - - 56.62 103.9 62.66 80.11 76.06 96.09 110.75 - 80.11 0.21 
Mohand. Insurance Fi  18.48 19.96 9.05 7.91 7.36 6.90 5.75 5.40 4.13 7.36 -0.10 Nile Investment Fi - - - - - 293.9 41.13 - 80.99 - 80.99 -0.86 
Osool Securities Fi - - 21.17 -2.68 337.58 96.71 - 101.2 16688 - 98.99 -0.92 
Prime Investments Fi - - - - - - 94.42 99.52 60.95 - 94.42 -0.17 
Prime Securities Fi - - - - - 99.80 99.07 175.6 - - 99.80 0.38 
Saudi Egy. Finance Fi - - 98.68 97.54 98.45 99.39 99.82 21.85 81.25 - 98.45 0.01 
Suez Chan Fi - - 593.0 462.6 312.53 286.3 14.61 201.6 111.04 111.96 243.99 -0.22 
Notes: Ba. indicates banks and Fi. indicates financial services excluding banks. 
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Table II-20 Debt to Assets Ratio of Egyptian Financial Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Sec. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Financial Institutions 
Alex. Commercial Ba 1.89 8.28 0.49 0.09 0.01 1.24 0.01 0.01 3.82 4.06 0.87 0.00 
Arab African Int. Ba 24.58 30.89 31.73 19.21 9.44 28.90 21.76 40.14 12.18 9.15 23.17 -0.25 
Bank of Alex. Ba - - - - - - 2.14 0.82 0.77 0.53 0.80 -0.32 
Cairo Barclays Ba - - 3.68 2.17 8.36 1.90 41.12 27.21 2.27 3.67 3.68 -0.34 
Misr Romania Ba 20.64 21.05 16.96 9.97 13.45 1.02 1.13 3.18 3.02 0.30 6.58 -0.05 
Cairo Far East Ba - 0.00 0.00 26.09 28.45 0.00 - - - - 0.00 -0.45 
Commercial International Ba - - - 1.13 0.43 0.33 0.26 0.34 0.19 0.15 0.33 -0.24 
Credit Agricole Ba - - - 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 
Delta International Ba 3.50 3.86 11.12 4.64 4.31 0.95 0.01 1.23 7.24 7.39 4.09 0.02 
Egyptian American Ba 4.73 1.87 1.07 2.31 2.40 1.72 11.64 - - - 2.31 -0.12 
Egyptian Commercial Ba 7.60 13.93 7.00 6.80 0.74 8.93 10.77 3.47 8.20 0.41 7.30 -0.03 
Egyptian Saudi Finance Ba 2.20 2.93 1.35 1.54 1.11 0.63 0.52 0.54 1.08 3.13 1.23 0.04 
Misr International Ba 8.86 7.75 6.81 8.09 3.80 1.50 2.45 - - - 6.81 -0.12 
National Development Ba - - - 0.01 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.13 
National Soc. Gen. Ba - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.15 1.77 1.79 1.56 0.78 -0.12 
Suez Canal Ba - - 2.83 2.93 2.24 2.38 1.64 0.05 0.05 0.06 1.94 0.00 
El Kahera Housing Fi 22.62 18.03 16.21 9.77 11.33 10.03 8.21 9.89 3.43 3.05 9.96 -0.11 
Export Development Fi - - - 90.76 89.55 87.75 - - - - 89.55 -0.02 
Heliopolis Housing Fi - 1.17 6.82 9.45 12.09 12.50 11.58 0.35 0.28 4.58 6.82 0.16 
Medinet Nasr Hous. Fi 0.84 0.87 0.85 0.82 0.68 0.61 0.47 0.45 1.33 3.72 0.83 -0.03 
T M G Holding Fi - - - - - - - - 2.61 2.31 2.46 -0.12 
United Housing  Fi 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.16 -0.09 
Other Private Financial Institutions 
Al Baraka Ba - - 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.27 1.29 1.02 0.33 0.08 
Arab Banking Co. Ba - - 92.57 91.44 91.40 76.78 77.54 80.26 87.45 - 87.45 0.00 
Bnp Paribas Ba  7.45 8.55 4.67 5.84 37.67 41.37 37.99 10.45 17.98 10.45 0.12 Egyptian Gulf Ba - - 0.54 0.37 0.95 0.76 0.61 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.45 -0.20 
Egyptian Workers Ba  0.01 2.27 1.21 0.00  0.00 0.00   0.00 -0.47 El Watany B. Ba - - 0.50 0.43 0.24 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 1.48 0.17 -0.43 
Faisal B. Ba 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.29 -0.13 
Hsbc B. Ba 3.86 4.17 0.81 0.53 5.54 5.29 1.08 9.00 7.25 2.38 4.02 -0.19 
Islamic International Ba 3.45 2.08 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.06     0.11 -0.46 Misr Iran Ba 14.26 13.65 12.00 25.29 19.62 14.22 20.56 11.53 11.91 23.07 14.24 -0.04 
Nile B. Ba 0.17 4.66 11.03 7.33 4.11 1.39     4.38 -0.39 Societe Arabe Int. Ba 2.74 2.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.12 1.75 1.80 1.56 1.66 -0.18 
Union National Ba - - - 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.73 
United Bank Ba 11.75 19.16 21.72 24.84       20.44 0.14 CIIC Insurance Co. Fi  1.83 3.68 5.10 7.15 7.16     5.10 0.39 Al Ahly Development  Fi - - - 53.11 48.82 33.22 9.10 16.85 24.10 19.30 24.10 -0.14 
Al Ahram Exchange Fi - - - 38.62 37.85 85.81 60.75 67.65 27.80 - 49.69 -0.02 
Al Arafa Investment Fi - - - - - - 33.83 13.95 10.77 - 13.95 -0.41 
Arab Gathering Fi - - 10.86 9.28 8.98 4.18 5.45 8.53 6.26 - 8.53 -0.09 
Arab Misr Insurance Fi   19.37 14.95 20.74 12.21 15.70 15.51 14.92 9.25 15.23 -0.04 Commercial Investment Fi - 5.81 9.14 5.76 13.72 15.55 13.45 8.68 12.13 - 10.64 0.13 
Delta Insurance Fi 5.07 6.53 6.17 5.10 3.98 5.29 4.56 4.58 5.77 5.07 5.09 -0.06 
Efg Hermes Fi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Egyptian Ame. Securities Fi - - - - - 88.62 58.91 61.17 45.80 - 60.04 -0.25 
Egyptian Financial  Fi 100.00 34.98 36.60 36.87 42.46 49.70 55.74 54.80 57.70 - 49.70 0.05 
Hermes Holding Fi 16.88 17.10 16.40 14.70 27.36 56.52 16.72 26.53 14.04 - 16.88 -0.01 
Egyptian Kuwaiti Ho. Fi 2.15 8.26 6.02 0.71 1.17 19.41 13.98 10.96 19.10 - 8.26 0.22 
Egyptians Abroad Fi - 8.34 5.75 7.27 11.79 30.66 7.10 17.13 4.94 - 7.81 0.26 
El Ahli Investment Fi - - 0.97 1.90 2.51 4.43 2.08 12.56 12.63 - 2.51 0.54 
El Kahera El Watania Fi - 1.05 88.27 39.82 4.42 4.41 4.82 4.55 3.39 - 4.49 -0.06 
Sonid Fi 66.75 - 19.61 19.45 17.44 18.72 16.49 15.43 - - 18.72 -0.06 
Hermes Co. Fi - - - 42.99 49.67 15.20 14.83 68.45 - - 42.99 0.07 
Housing & Development Fi - - 45.90 40.58 30.59 25.53 25.27 19.09 20.62 10.00 25.40 -0.17 
Ku. Egyptian Investment Fi - - 15.13 13.72 12.56 9.41 3.04 1.57 - - 10.99 -0.25 
Mansour  Fi - - 3.13 3.04 4.90 8.11 5.05 23.26 25.19 - 5.05 0.35 
Misr Financial  Fi - - 11.68 17.05 11.28 31.50 26.96 17.97 14.33 - 17.05 -0.17 
Mohandes Insurance Fi  12.12 10.12 12.27 9.24 8.60 8.87 8.15 11.45 11.53 10.12 -0.03 Nile City Investment Fi - - - - - 8.73 4.07 7.05 6.01 - 6.53 -0.15 
Osool Esb Securities Fi - - 23.11 43.45 69.08 84.87 42.75 49.51 30.28 - 43.45 0.19 
Prime Investments Fi - - - - - - 2.85 8.95 2.33 - 2.85 0.70 
Prime Securities Fi - - - - - 90.05 85.95 74.38 - - 85.95 -0.09 
Sau.Egyptian Investment  Fi - - 16.92 10.30 8.92 9.09 7.05 6.36 5.92 - 8.92 -0.12 
Suez Canal Insurance  Fi   4.69 4.65 5.07 5.80 19.32 2.85 2.84 1.21 4.67 0.00 Notes: Ba. indicates banks and Fi. indicates financial services excluding banks. 
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Table II-21 Debt to Equity Ratio of Egyptian Financial Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Sec. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Financial Institutions 
Alex. Commercial Ba 19.04 77.84 5.56 1.09 0.14 14.58 -0.07 0.05 21.77 28.45 10.07 -0.80 
Arab African Int. Ba 170.37 190.55 222.21 124.24 95.62 338.17 413.94 888.15 200.64 139.05 195.60 0.12 
Bank of Alex. Ba - - - - - - 38.98 12.99 10.42 5.80 11.70 -0.44 
Cairo Barclays Ba - - 40.55 30.95 95.03 25.60 907.58 381.39 26.44 42.06 41.31 -0.24 
Misr Romania Ba 181.13 197.62 188.00 145.56 212.19 12.74 13.46 40.50 25.69 3.22 93.03 -0.05 
Cairo Far East Ba - 0.00 0.00 211.13 202.82 0.00 - - - - 0.00 -0.52 
Commercial Int. Ba - - - 12.29 5.04 3.64 2.92 3.67 1.88 1.33 3.64 -0.29 
Credit Agricole Ba - - - 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 
Delta International Ba 15.14 19.44 62.16 28.97 28.54 6.20 0.86 106.33 77.43 70.85 28.76 -0.08 
Egyptian American Ba 56.59 24.77 17.00 45.22 33.35 22.66 149.86 - - - 33.35 -0.29 
Egyptian Com. Ba 85.39 170.71 99.44 105.62 13.25 192.90 112.68 40.05 95.35 4.56 97.40 -0.42 
Egyptian Saudi Fin. Ba 30.50 46.15 33.48 30.76 29.00 7.12 7.17 9.23 22.35 68.37 29.75 0.01 
Misr International Ba 110.56 97.13 88.20 123.19 56.11 20.19 35.95 - - - 88.20 -0.11 
National Dev. Ba - - - 0.23 4.68 4.60 6.63 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.00 
National Soc. Gen. Ba - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.23 22.46 17.48 15.08 7.54 -0.22 
Suez Canal Ba - - 44.32 45.77 36.84 53.78 19.72 0.70 0.64 0.46 28.28 -0.20 
El Kahera Housing Fi 95.34 48.18 38.96 20.42 22.37 18.39 15.33 23.00 5.02 4.04 21.39 -0.19 
Export Development Ba - - - 10.08 8.98 7.88 - - - - 8.98 -0.12 
Heliopolis Housing Fi - 10.55 51.08 57.31 63.59 65.20 44.13 1.20 0.98 21.48 44.13 0.07 
Medinet Nasr Hous. Fi 4.75 3.38 3.05 2.85 2.50 2.28 2.12 1.82 5.84 16.76 2.95 -0.09 
T M G Holding Fi - - - - - - - - 6.41 5.43 5.92 -0.15 
United Housing  Fi 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.45 0.34 0.26 0.21 0.17 0.48 -0.11 
Other Private Financial Institutions 
Al Baraka Ba - - 0.00 0.00 6.52 3.82 5.06 4.62 25.66 21.10 4.84 -0.09 
Arab Banking Co. Ba - - 12.06 10.90 10.63 3.31 3.43 7.96 7.44 - 7.96 -0.05 
Bnp Paribas Ba - 137.07 191.17 103.22 139.32 448.12 854.47 419.23 8.54 161.06 161.06 0.37 
Egyptian Gulf Ba - - 4.89 3.60 8.83 4.81 4.33 2.55 2.52 1.75 3.96 -0.27 
Egyptian Workers Ba - 0.03 12.83 7.61 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - - 0.01 -0.41 
El Watany B. Ba - - 9.09 7.71 3.90 1.37 0.20 0.43 0.20 13.09 2.64 -0.49 
Faisal B. Ba 0.00 0.00 16.06 10.54 9.66 8.77 8.86 7.50 0.00 0.00 8.13 -0.12 
Hsbc B. Ba 57.53 51.04 10.22 9.76 89.98 109.90 13.24 170.94 107.16 36.86 54.28 -0.11 
Islamic International Ba 132.53 101.34 5.77 7.31 93.62 -3.64 - - - - 50.47 -0.24 
Misr Iran Ba 59.92 56.93 55.23 157.59 133.09 121.98 176.30 123.23 84.30 156.75 122.60 -0.05 
Nile B. Ba 2.30 71.71 181.06 117.79 82.87 28.29 - - - - 77.29 -0.30 
Societe Arabe Int. Ba 31.71 26.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.59 22.61 19.27 15.09 17.18 -0.22 
Union National Ba - - - 2.22 1.28 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.73 
United Bank Ba 164.79 319.87 373.60 444.06 - - - - - - 346.73 0.19 
CIIC Insurance Co. Fi - 1.89 4.48 6.68 10.58 10.97 - - - - 6.68 0.49 
Al Ahly Dev. Fi - - - 118.08 100.34 53.28 10.25 27.91 47.55 29.59 47.55 -0.26 
Al Ahram Exchange Fi - - - 11.28 5.98 21.42 3.14 9.77 1.42 - 7.88 -0.47 
Al Arafa Investment Fi - - - - - - 2.15 0.78 0.54 - 0.78 -0.47 
Arab Gathering Fi - - 418.61 24.86 12.63 0.52 0.61 0.38 0.19 - 0.61 -0.50 
Arab Misr Insurance Fi - - 53.94 41.87 57.77 30.87 49.41 50.83 50.12 34.89 49.77 -0.01 
Commercial Inv. Fi - 2.84 3.95 1.27 1.76 0.84 0.43 0.16 0.27 - 1.06 -0.49 
Delta Insurance Fi 18.74 23.72 22.87 17.87 15.01 19.86 18.46 20.78 27.66 26.87 20.32 -0.03 
Egy. Ame. Securities Fi - - - - - 19.59 4.86 6.81 6.07 - 6.44 -0.11 
Egyptian Financial Fi - 53.79 57.73 58.41 73.79 98.80 125.96 121.23 136.41 - 86.30 0.13 
Hermes Holding Fi 1.11 1.72 1.79 7.34 6.57 3.32 1.42 1.66 0.54 - 1.72 -0.03 
Egy.Kuwaiti Ho. Fi 0.20 0.67 0.53 0.06 0.08 1.44 0.48 0.43 0.59 - 0.48 0.11 
Egyptians Abroad Fi - - 0.24 0.51 1.84 3.36 0.34 0.39 0.24 - 0.39 0.49 
El Ahli Investment Fi - - -0.08 -0.13 -0.12 -0.25 0.55 0.65 1.01 - -0.08 0.37 
El Kahera ElWatania Fi - 0.29 37.45 6.29 1.40 1.92 2.01 -0.90 -0.03 - 1.66 -0.78 
Sonid Fi -143.24 - 83.95 31.49 6.20 3.78 2.38 1.43 - - 3.78 -0.40 
Hermes Co. Fi - - - 3.11 5.54 0.24 0.20 3.56 - - 3.11 0.31 
Housing & Dev. Fi - - 974.43 794.23 708.81 580.12 370.80 273.73 203.73 112.50 475.46 -0.26 
Ku. Egyptian. Inv. Fi - - 3.26 2.57 1.60 0.63 0.40 1.12 - - 1.36 -0.37 
Mansour  Fi - - 0.51 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.13 1.16 0.94 - 0.48 -0.21 
Misr Financial Fi - - 2.55 1.61 0.84 1.80 1.60 0.64 -1.02 - 1.60 -0.42 
Mohandes Insurance Fi - 60.02 51.81 71.90 49.57 43.82 45.79 33.51 59.67 63.62 51.81 -0.04 
Nile City Investment Fi - - - - - 2.18 0.57 - 1.51 - 1.51 -0.74 
Osool Esb Securities Fi - - -1.17 -3.06 28.65 10.41 - 4.26 711.35 - 7.34 0.49 
Prime Investments Fi - - - - - - 0.27 0.19 0.28 - 0.27 0.09 
Prime Securities Fi - - - - - 14.12 13.35 10.33 - - 13.35 -0.14 
Sau. Egyptian Inv. Fi - - 5.27 0.70 2.47 3.83 0.25 0.32 0.60 - 0.70 0.42 
Suez Canal Insur. Fi - - 170.43 135.17 110.58 112.38 107.76 50.03 41.28 18.98 109.17 -0.18 
Notes: Ba. indicates banks and Fi. indicates financial services excluding banks. 
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Table II-22 Revenues to Total Assets Ratio of Egyptian Financial Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Sec. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Privatized Financial Institutions 
Alex. Commercial Ba 4.18 3.68 3.18 3.16 2.25 3.03 2.54 4.59 3.23 2.34 3.17 -0.14 
Arab African Int. Ba 5.00 4.16 3.18 4.55 3.16 4.68 2.69 3.69 0.99 1.34 3.44 -0.17 
Bank of Alex. Ba - - - - - - 3.55 6.84 9.03 7.50 7.17 0.32 
Cairo Barclays Ba - - 4.86 5.07 4.80 5.28 3.06 2.24 4.12 3.68 4.46 -0.05 
Misr Romania Ba 4.66 5.03 3.82 4.00 2.59 3.42 4.02 3.06 2.89 1.73 3.62 -0.06 
Cairo Far East Ba - 1.06 4.19 5.37 3.06 3.01 - - - - 3.06 0.13 
Commercial International Ba - - - 5.83 5.71 6.67 6.05 6.25 6.67 6.25 6.25 0.01 
Credit Agricole Ba - - - 5.93 3.98 6.29 5.85 6.19 6.82 6.09 6.09 -0.01 
Delta International Ba 6.86 6.29 5.57 5.76 5.42 5.71 0.53 0.49 3.81 3.70 5.50 -0.06 
Egyptian American Ba 4.79 4.36 4.37 3.98 4.87 5.84 2.12 - - - 4.37 -0.04 
Egyptian Commercial Ba 3.49 2.54 3.15 2.87 2.67 2.77 4.01 2.15 1.99 2.42 2.72 -0.07 
Egyptian Saudi Finance Ba 2.70 3.02 1.71 2.87 2.18 1.97 1.71 2.17 2.44 2.93 2.31 0.12 
Misr International Ba 4.01 3.71 3.40 3.18 3.71 4.38 1.92 - - - 3.71 -0.07 
National Development Ba - - - 6.86 6.71 6.88 6.19 3.69 5.80 5.09 6.19 -0.06 
National Soc. Gen. Ba - - 7.72 6.56 7.25 6.47 6.67 6.38 6.96 6.42 6.62 -0.04 
Suez Canal Ba - - 7.10 5.84 5.29 6.63 6.55 6.34 7.14 5.82 6.44 -0.03 
El Kahera Housing Fi 33.98 17.37 11.14 13.45 6.92 6.15 7.41 8.65 2.86 4.44 8.03 -0.11 
Export Development Fi - - - 1.41 1.78 1.89 - - - - 1.78 0.16 
Heliopolis Housing Fi - - 21.65 15.82 13.42 14.36 16.90 29.22 23.35 11.03 16.36 -0.15 
Medinet Nasr Hous. Fi 8.17 4.03 7.59 6.22 18.11 11.21 18.68 17.22 24.70 45.99 14.21 0.43 
T M G Holding FI - - - - - - - - 10.93 8.89 9.91 -0.19 
United Housing  Fi 17.66 16.85 22.99 19.51 24.05 21.02 19.14 21.92 23.52 20.25 20.64 -0.05 
Other Private Financial Institutions 
Al Baraka Ba - - 7.82 6.90 6.30 6.55 6.32 6.64 7.65 6.90 6.77 -0.04 
Arab Banking Co. Ba - - 2.49 3.31 3.57 4.09 5.34 2.32 3.31 - 3.31 0.23 
Bnp Paribas Ba - 2.81 1.42 2.66 2.31 2.29 2.01 1.71 4.39 0.90 2.29 -0.13 
Egyptian Gulf Ba - - 6.40 4.49 5.37 5.46 6.40 6.18 7.09 6.41 6.29 0.02 
Egyptian Workers Ba - 8.69 5.44 4.36 2.48 - 0.00 0.00 - - 3.42 -0.37 
El Watany B. Ba - - 8.03 7.19 6.63 6.79 9.00 7.94 9.23 7.33 7.64 -0.08 
Faisal B. Ba - - 4.48 3.53 3.38 4.65 4.96 5.45 5.83 4.64 4.64 0.07 
Hsbc B. Ba 4.86 4.29 4.59 4.32 4.46 4.85 5.05 5.01 4.04 5.41 4.72 0.03 
Islamic International Ba 0.38 0.59 0.40 1.74 -0.34 -1.15 - - - - 0.39 0.57 
Misr Iran Ba 6.49 5.55 3.95 6.81 3.85 4.26 3.03 3.77 4.15 2.73 4.05 -0.14 
Nile B. Ba 7.16 6.36 2.13 1.46 1.30 1.03 - - - - 1.79 -0.21 
Societe Arabe Int. Ba 8.06 8.33 7.38 6.79 6.18 6.47 6.59 6.32 8.09 7.52 7.08 -0.04 
Union National Ba - - - 6.82 6.46 6.06 5.45 6.32 6.68 6.21 6.32 -0.06 
United Bank Ba 2.99 2.52 2.38 0.31 - - - - - - 2.45 -0.16 
CIIC Insurance Co. Fi  15.23 -1.12 2.49 2.08 2.62     2.49 -1.00 Al Ahly Development  Fi - - - 2.30 3.35 12.11 6.69 13.11 -7.49 9.56 6.69 0.00 
Al Ahram Co Stock Exchange Fi - - - 12.87 15.69 10.08 32.03 19.37 41.34 - 17.53 0.22 
Al Arafa Investment Fi - - - - - - 120.30 102.33 78.38 - 102.33 -0.19 
Arab Gathering Fi - - 0.60 5.53 2.72 10.44 10.11 3.97 24.39 - 5.53 1.40 
Arab Misr Insurance Fi   0.61 1.36 1.94 2.18 1.94 2.25 4.57 1.09 1.94 0.16 Commercial International  Fi - 6.75 7.32 5.86 11.75 0.26 0.60 0.16 0.11 - 3.23 -0.20 
Delta Insurance Fi 0.20 0.24 0.39 1.01 2.79 2.69 2.94 3.49 -0.39 0.32 0.70 0.19 
Efg Hermes Fi 2.55 1.38 1.35 1.25 0.99 0.78 0.79 2.04 1.91 1.19 1.30 -0.08 
Egyptian American-Securities Fi - - - - - 12.46 29.75 30.05 42.28 - 29.90 0.41 
Egyptian Financial & Industrial Fi 20.37 26.50 28.13 34.61 40.78 37.23 32.93 37.50 46.57 - 34.61 0.16 
Hermes Holding Fi 23.21 10.28 8.21 10.05 20.23 33.22 9.77 13.08 15.45 - 13.08 0.20 
Egyptian Kuwaiti Ho. Fi 0.00 1.30 2.05 3.89 0.34 17.13 12.52 15.84 23.11 - 3.89 0.46 
Egyptians Abroad Fi - 2.72 14.61 6.04 2.94 16.51 1.58 3.36 9.36 - 4.70 1.13 
El Ahli Investment Fi - - 1.71 0.82 2.52 5.98 1.10 2.48 6.17 - 2.48 1.31 
El Kahera El Watania Fi - 1.28 6.68 15.79 0.23 0.97 0.93 1.85 14.37 - 1.57 1.36 
Sonid Fi 1.07 - 2.38 1.48 5.00 4.06 3.41 4.89 - - 3.41 -0.16 
Hermes Co. Fi - - - 70.90 43.12 96.97 69.10 0.00 - - 69.10 -0.34 
Housing & Development Fi - - 8.42 7.85 7.93 8.30 7.83 7.48 8.78 4.86 7.89 -0.05 
Kuwaiti Egyptian Investment Fi - - 0.41 0.30 0.02 0.19 10.49 3.16 - - 0.36 -0.27 
Mansour & Maghrabyent  Fi - - 2.77 0.16 8.00 0.00 0.00 10.39 10.00 - 2.77 -0.49 
Misr Financial Investments Fi - - 1.04 2.81 6.51 17.12 11.45 12.20 16.94 - 11.45 0.85 
Mohandes Insurance Fi  4.53 5.15 1.99 1.83 1.61 1.44 2.30 1.08 0.92 1.83 -0.11 Nile City Investment Fi - - - - 0.00 19.98 18.94 7.71 - - 13.33 -0.32 
Osool Esb Securities Fi - - 17.29 25.05 24.59 14.41 55.36 23.30 48.62 - 24.59 0.22 
Prime Investments Fi - - - - - - 38.26 101.43 115.01 - 101.43 0.89 
Prime Securities Fi - - - - - 11.44 12.64 28.29 - - 12.64 0.67 
Saudi Egyptian Investment  Fi - - 0.00 6.42 6.18 8.25 30.98 5.37 4.07 - 6.18 -0.04 
Suez Canal Insurance  Fi   20.15 20.46 16.04 17.32 2.85 12.06 9.33 8.46 14.05 -0.09 Notes: Ba. indicates banks and Fi. indicates financial services excluding banks. 
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Table II-23 Return on Assets Ratio of Egyptian Privatized Non-Financial Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Se 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Acrow Misr Co 8.12 8.27 7.88 7.49 6.33 12.18 9.95 8.86 12.42 13.29 8.56 -0.05 
Alexandria Co - - - -4.03 5.50 19.41 17.23 14.59 21.79 24.07 17.23 0.00 
El Saeed Co - 1.58 1.44 0.32 -2.86 0.62 1.89 2.27 3.76 11.01 1.58 0.06 
El Shams For Co 4.57 3.78 3.56 4.24 4.37 4.64 5.50 -13.42 5.58 5.27 4.47 -0.06 
Giza General 
Contracting 
Co - - - - 0.39 0.21 0.42 0.49 1.46 2.71 
0.45 0.86 
Misr Beni Suef Co - 3.26 -6.07 2.85 6.70 17.07 23.55 13.80 12.65 19.53 12.65 0.15 
Nasr Co for Civil Co 10.40 9.46 9.57 6.93 6.33 1.98 3.71 4.46 7.63 8.84 7.28 0.01 
Paints Che. Co 11.47 9.02 9.82 12.05 12.41 12.85 14.33 16.43 15.64 12.67 12.54 0.04 
Moukhtar Co 3.08 2.21 2.78 3.14 1.99 3.07 3.01 3.88 3.81 5.26 3.07 0.13 
Suez Cement Co 9.56 2.81 1.83 7.25 11.55 8.45 8.57 10.90 10.75 13.54 9.07 0.02 
Tourah Portland Co 15.41 6.29 0.49 6.33 15.55 47.69 23.85 34.98 23.10 26.29 19.33 0.14 
Telecom Egypt In 6.15 5.00 2.64 3.33 3.03 5.63 6.67 7.14 8.24 9.69 5.89 0.15 
Vodafone Egypt In -2.71 13.70 5.62 10.64 21.15 15.87 22.08 20.83 - - 14.79 -0.06 
Alexandria Mills Ma 5.18 0.35 0.98 0.30 1.73 3.86 4.39 1.88 4.62 3.64 2.76 0.14 
Cairo Oil Ma - - - 9.00 8.25 2.43 -4.67 -16.21 -4.79 2.20 2.20 -0.71 
Delta Sugar Ma 5.56 11.06 16.96 18.74 19.41 20.65 25.24 26.73 16.05 9.29 17.85 0.06 
Egyptian Co. for Ma 22.49 24.70 20.83 16.45 14.16 0.99 11.79 13.40 17.87 11.63 15.30 -0.14 
Egyptian Starch Ma 17.41 17.25 17.01 17.35 12.21 11.23 4.82 3.85 3.53 0.29 11.72 -0.08 
El Nasr 
Transformers 
Ma - - 3.64 3.80 5.35 8.28 11.07 10.60 23.34 10.56 9.42 0.34 
Electro Cable Ma -6.62 -16.79 -6.49 0.57 -0.59 -1.19 -3.34 -3.54 6.18 8.54 -2.26 0.06 
Extracted Oil Ma - 5.82 5.32 6.52 7.26 4.76 -4.75 1.32 4.44 4.22 4.76 -0.07 
Ismailia Misr Ma 0.74 0.84 -8.55 -24.32 0.49 2.04 2.05 -29.48 -27.44 0.87 0.62 -0.07 
Middle -West Ma - 13.21 9.36 8.08 7.52 6.53 10.31 12.91 11.49 9.52 9.52 -0.12 
Middle Egypt Ma - 7.53 10.74 9.14 3.67 5.28 5.58 4.87 5.30 4.14 5.30 -0.03 
Misr.Chemical Ma - - - 3.34 4.68 5.29 3.12 6.58 4.70 11.99 4.70 0.27 
Misr Oils Ma 8.50 8.86 9.19 7.82 6.39 6.89 4.67 5.29 4.56 2.43 6.64 -0.14 
Paper Middle Ma -2.40 -8.03 -2.78 -4.93 0.33 -2.35 -4.49 3.54 1.96 -16.87 -2.59 -0.65 
Sidi Kerir Ma - - - 12.53 26.23 26.49 29.41 35.29 29.41 29.22 29.22 0.06 
Upper Egypt Ma 13.47 11.88 14.67 12.74 11.57 12.92 12.51 13.23 15.84 16.58 13.08 0.05 
Alexandria Re 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.87 4.52 5.10 5.31 6.92 10.15 9.54 4.81 0.21 
Arab Drug Co. Re - - - - 8.06 10.57 13.19 15.34 12.29 8.38 11.43 0.16 
Arabia Cotton 
Ginning 
Re 6.65 4.61 3.20 2.16 3.69 5.68 4.27 10.66 9.15 0.93 4.44 -0.25 
Eastern Company Re 11.57 11.58 12.07 11.37 10.23 12.94 13.03 16.18 13.18 12.21 12.14 0.00 
Egypt Free Shops Re 15.87 15.31 13.92 19.77 14.49 15.75 23.43 33.01 34.31 23.40 17.82 0.04 
El Nasr Clothing Re 2.69 3.33 2.89 4.08 -3.38 -7.57 2.54 0.39 -0.80 -0.55 1.47 -0.30 
General Silos & Re - 6.22 7.54 7.51 7.99 8.38 8.56 5.86 8.80 6.48 7.54 0.03 
Memphis Re - 14.49 14.03 9.59 9.88 9.91 11.61 10.78 9.54 3.87 9.91 -0.05 
Nile for Re - - 14.06 10.58 8.43 9.99 14.30 13.92 14.55 13.68 13.80 -0.03 
Nile Cotton Re - 2.23 -1.06 -1.68 -4.02 2.24 -6.06 0.28 23.07 4.35 0.28 -0.93 
Unirab Polvara Re 1.48 1.54 1.91 2.62 2.69 1.71 1.47 0.11 -5.08 -6.75 1.51 0.03 
Alexandria Ui - - - 0.11 4.53 20.70 27.43 27.98 27.81 16.43 20.70 0.17 
Asec Co. Ui - - 6.05 10.86 15.80 20.16 12.51 12.87 5.82 2.17 11.68 0.03 
Rowad Misr Os - - - - - - 7.56 8.78 9.18 9.51 8.98 0.05 
Semiramis Hotels Os 27.42 25.46 20.86 24.93 27.18 26.51 30.09 28.43 33.46 26.71 26.94 -0.02 
Notes: Co. indicates constructions and materials, In. indicates information and technology, Ma. indicates manufacturing, Re. 
indicates retail trade, Ut. indicates utilities, and OS. indicates other services. 
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Table II-24 Return on Equity Ratio of Egyptian Privatized Non-Financial Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Sec. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR 
Acrow Misr Co 9.65 10.22 10.90 9.89 8.38 19.90 17.91 20.03 26.06 21.61 14.40 0.06 
Alexandria Portland Co - - - -22.12 23.69 46.76 32.09 25.20 28.90 32.58 28.90 -0.04 
El Saeed Contracting Co - 12.30 12.92 2.64 -32.01 7.79 21.39 22.83 4.61 13.22 12.30 -0.37 
El Shams For Housing Co 15.97 12.60 9.85 10.76 10.81 10.85 11.16 -35.95 13.42 12.15 11.00 -0.09 
Giza Contracting Co - - - - 4.36 2.66 4.92 6.24 16.85 30.18 5.58 0.79 
Misr Beni Suef Cement Co - 8.19 -19.79 10.20 19.77 35.37 39.60 27.35 24.07 27.90 24.07 0.00 
Nasr Civil Works Co 43.80 36.64 32.87 21.92 18.64 5.44 10.52 11.44 25.90 29.60 23.91 -0.10 
Paints & Chemical  Co 19.92 13.27 13.81 15.42 15.93 16.63 17.72 20.59 20.91 17.37 17.00 0.04 
Moukhtar Ibrahim Co 32.51 23.31 22.66 23.93 12.53 19.12 24.36 30.08 27.95 35.56 24.14 0.06 
Suez Cement Co 48.84 7.96 4.66 14.50 20.94 16.89 14.06 17.83 16.39 18.57 16.64 -0.08 
Tourah Portland Co 25.07 12.96 0.84 7.86 23.06 54.50 38.97 51.20 35.27 35.92 30.17 0.02 
Telecom Egypt In 8.00 6.36 3.59 4.78 4.35 7.83 9.60 9.62 10.37 11.48 7.91 0.08 
Vodafone Egypt In -6.17 30.83 13.87 23.21 45.83 35.71 51.52 49.02 - - 33.27 -0.05 
Alexandria Mills Ma 22.35 1.97 4.96 1.34 8.22 16.02 16.26 8.08 18.38 11.86 10.04 0.02 
Cairo Oil Ma - - - 21.09 18.03 6.35 -9.33 -45.87 -17.31 7.53 6.35 -0.64 
Delta Sugar Ma 10.84 19.37 26.45 27.07 26.47 30.16 31.77 32.08 19.26 11.11 26.46 0.02 
Egyptian Co. for Foods Ma 39.85 42.06 37.95 23.79 16.79 1.22 13.79 15.73 21.19 17.26 19.22 -0.10 
Egyptian Starch Ma 25.38 25.31 25.34 26.64 23.14 25.17 7.18 6.54 5.47 0.47 24.16 -0.09 
El Nasr Transformers Ma - - 9.75 9.67 13.76 20.54 26.53 24.49 45.21 17.30 18.92 0.29 
Electro Cable Ma -11.16 -33.86 -15.11 1.33 -1.31 -2.78 -8.28 -7.51 7.44 10.20 -5.14 -0.09 
Extracted Oil Ma - 22.54 20.23 22.47 19.10 14.72 -21.16 1.97 6.24 5.22 14.72 -0.16 
Ismailia Misr Poultry Ma 1.18 1.36 -15.96 -70.11 0.74 3.04 3.20 -77.45 -363.62 -97.09 -7.61 0.05 
M&W Delta Mills Ma - 33.58 27.14 22.10 24.32 26.13 27.81 27.84 29.97 24.56 27.14 0.03 
Middle Egypt Mills Ma - 24.53 24.59 22.14 14.12 16.48 13.80 10.31 12.95 9.28 14.12 -0.13 
Misr Chemical  Ma - - - 15.08 22.35 21.56 13.92 26.01 15.21 28.00 21.56 0.22 
Misr Oils Ma 28.29 29.57 30.29 27.91 17.85 20.40 14.79 13.05 10.86 5.72 19.12 -0.12 
Paper Middle East Ma -4.04 -16.57 -5.54 -10.77 0.81 -6.37 -12.95 8.93 4.84 -69.96 -5.95 -0.67 
Sidi Kerir Petro Ma - - - 22.16 40.80 37.84 41.67 46.15 40.00 33.03 40.00 0.01 
Upper Egypt Mills Ma 33.17 30.92 29.61 24.67 23.96 25.32 25.43 27.77 36.86 37.10 28.69 0.00 
Alexandria Medical  Re 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.88 10.22 9.96 10.20 12.72 18.57 16.70 10.08 0.14 
Arab Drug Co. Re - - - - 22.39 19.02 23.27 22.41 17.74 12.04 20.70 -0.15 
Arabia Ginning Re 21.93 25.86 3.94 2.97 4.66 12.28 4.69 12.60 14.65 1.52 8.49 0.16 
Eastern Company Re 33.78 31.30 29.20 26.87 25.57 32.34 26.74 30.26 27.83 26.79 28.51 -0.07 
Egypt Free Shops Re 23.51 23.75 23.45 29.27 34.00 26.51 35.99 41.18 44.03 27.19 28.23 0.07 
El Nasr Clothing Re 3.69 6.51 5.35 7.12 -6.12 -14.05 4.90 0.81 -1.84 -1.40 2.25 -0.24 
General Silos  Re - 13.52 16.62 13.77 18.59 24.48 22.81 17.84 28.05 25.09 18.59 0.08 
Memphis Re - 29.61 31.77 21.31 21.01 23.15 25.90 18.19 19.46 7.97 21.31 0.03 
Nile Pharmaceuticals Re - - 38.82 28.61 23.49 27.93 37.71 30.55 31.64 26.30 29.58 -0.17 
Nile Cotton Ginning Re - 12.18 -2.16 -3.39 -8.05 4.34 -13.10 0.64 33.52 5.54 0.64 -0.94 
Unirab Polvara Re 4.38 2.52 2.88 3.99 3.87 2.41 1.78 0.12 -5.78 -7.68 2.47 -0.26 
Alexandria Oils Ui - - - 0.30 10.78 36.96 41.87 39.43 38.24 23.00 36.96 0.05 
Asec Co. Ui - - 22.45 36.19 41.67 38.70 29.94 17.36 8.44 3.73 26.20 -0.23 
Rowad Misr Os - - - - - - 8.21 9.65 11.35 11.49 10.50 0.18 
Semiramis Hotels Os 31.31 31.64 28.53 33.63 34.60 36.65 41.79 40.24 43.77 32.65 34.12 0.03 
Notes: Co. indicates constructions and materials, In. indicates information and technology, Ma. indicates manufacturing, Re. 
indicates retail trade, Ut. indicates utilities, and OS. indicates other services. 
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Table II-25 Debt to Assets Ratio of Egyptian Privatized Non-Financial Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Sec 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Acrow Misr Co 0.00 0.00 0.37 2.30 0.00 12.06 19.06 36.42 33.64 15.17 7.18 0.25 
Alexandria Portland Co 51.83 39.55 39.61 21.53 30.51 43.29 33.17 23.46 1.14 0.20 31.84 -0.24 
El Saeed Contracting Co - 58.72 64.08 66.10 71.99 78.14 78.69 73.01 10.74 0.00 66.10 0.02 
El Shams For Housing Co 12.21 12.79 13.60 13.10 12.43 11.26 11.01 11.82 11.10 9.34 12.01 -0.04 
Giza General Contracting Co - - - - 54.59 51.51 54.67 51.98 44.22 32.51 51.74 -0.06 
Misr Beni Suef Cement Co - 56.39 59.31 45.54 42.70 25.80 7.66 13.14 3.23 2.54 25.80 -0.22 
Nasr Co for Civil Works Co 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 3.54 5.46 5.67 3.29 2.11 5.87 2.70 0.29 
Paints & Chemical Industries Co 19.68 19.80 14.11 6.19 7.10 5.22 1.08 1.30 6.03 7.32 6.65 0.01 
Moukhtar Ibrahim Co 15.40 16.19 9.58 6.51 13.28 6.27 8.99 1.72 4.18 2.95 7.75 -0.29 
Suez Cement Co 14.11 16.87 8.45 0.94 2.98 8.23 2.58 6.40 1.83 0.34 4.69 -0.50 
Tourah Portland Co 16.49 38.88 24.31 0.86 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 -0.37 
Telecom Egypt In 10.00 8.93 12.16 15.34 14.85 13.36 17.20 9.16 4.73 2.70 11.08 -0.10 
Vodafone Egypt In 42.14 40.04 45.53 31.38 19.43 13.29 5.75 9.17 - - 25.40 -0.31 
Alexandria Flour Mills Ma 24.72 15.17 16.18 21.24 28.65 7.03 8.73 24.24 7.63 6.59 15.67 0.07 
Cairo Oil Ma - - - 32.89 7.73 13.69 33.80 40.36 40.79 41.40 33.80 0.10 
Delta Sugar Ma 38.85 28.84 21.72 18.61 9.79 4.56 2.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.18 -0.49 
Egyptian Co. for Foods Ma 0.00 0.50 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.29 0.00 0.34 
Egyptian Starch Ma 0.83 1.04 0.00 0.00 16.01 27.85 22.62 21.41 27.61 29.38 18.71 0.06 
El Nasr Transformers Ma - - 12.34 14.34 15.07 11.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.85 -0.09 
Electro Cable Ma 28.18 34.59 37.91 40.87 45.41 44.79 46.30 42.01 7.88 3.51 39.39 0.03 
Extracted Oil Ma - 59.07 54.50 53.15 39.30 46.36 47.10 17.07 4.94 0.00 46.36 -0.17 
Ismailia Misr Poultry Ma 2.86 9.23 18.25 32.07 11.36 3.16 3.20 23.63 29.48 22.18 14.80 0.25 
Middle & West Delta Mills Ma - 9.91 24.56 13.34 2.10 1.26 1.23 0.81 0.13 0.00 1.26 -0.43 
Middle Egypt Flour Mills Ma - 12.74 19.63 13.83 32.55 10.94 3.45 14.18 14.49 15.35 14.18 0.04 
Misr Chemical Industries  Ma - - - 63.63 67.45 65.38 70.81 65.01 58.30 31.63 65.01 -0.06 
Misr Oils Ma 36.03 39.57 37.93 41.40 38.17 42.80 39.43 40.94 42.50 23.87 39.50 0.04 
Paper Middle East Ma 20.49 22.30 24.85 28.59 36.42 40.88 42.52 36.89 38.00 48.32 36.66 0.11 
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals Ma - - - 24.24 13.19 11.65 5.25 0.35 0.21 0.17 5.25 -0.43 
Upper Egypt Flour Mills Ma 0.08 0.07 3.94 3.48 1.33 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.11 -0.20 
Alexandria Medical Services Re 5.26 31.64 24.65 20.71 18.29 15.15 6.26 0.81 1.69 0.64 10.70 -0.17 
Arab Drug Co. Re - - - - 10.89 4.67 1.88 4.03 0.82 1.77 2.95 -0.57 
Arabia Cotton Ginning Re 45.51 55.41 9.34 17.47 10.77 6.09 3.19 0.16 12.76 10.86 10.81 -0.38 
Eastern Company Re 2.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.44 9.89 0.00 -1.00 
Egypt Free Shops Re 0.57 0.46 1.55 0.67 2.65 1.95 0.80 0.77 0.99 1.86 0.90 -0.04 
El Nasr Clothing Re 17.18 28.68 27.15 28.32 29.93 28.30 7.81 13.89 17.21 19.36 23.26 0.06 
General Silos & Storage Re - 31.20 29.01 28.54 37.90 29.20 28.75 23.62 18.29 14.33 28.75 -0.12 
Memphis Re - 3.69 3.69 3.69 2.66 1.34 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.34 -0.34 
Nile for Pharmaceuticals Re - - 6.75 6.01 8.15 1.39 0.47 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.93 -0.75 
Nile Cotton Ginning Re - 55.04 26.17 29.86 22.06 32.16 35.51 38.74 1.70 7.64 29.86 0.10 
Unirab Polvara Re 41.11 26.14 14.21 15.48 15.95 16.59 5.85 2.17 2.83 0.89 14.85 -0.36 
Alexandria Mineral Oils Ui - - - 47.83 50.00 32.89 24.49 19.28 14.34 13.47 24.49 -0.23 
Asec Co. Ui - - 19.34 13.91 12.18 2.94 0.82 0.00 16.03 15.32 13.05 -0.50 
Rowad Misr Os - - - - - - 0.00 0.01 0.20 4.52 0.10 24.60 
Semiramis Hotels Os 0.00 0.00 4.75 0.00 0.00 1.15 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.05 0.00 -1.00 
Notes: Co. indicates constructions and materials, In. indicates information and technology, Ma. indicates manufacturing, Re. 
indicates retail trade, Ut. indicates utilities, and OS. indicates other services. 
  
XIX 
 
Table II-26 Debt to Equity Ratio of Egyptian Privatized Non-Financial Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Sec. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Acrow Misr Co 0.00 0.00 0.51 3.04 0.00 19.70 34.32 82.39 70.60 24.67 11.37 0.30 
Alexandria Portland Co 172.84 102.91 180.26 118.22 131.39 104.31 61.77 40.52 1.52 0.27 103.61 -0.34 
El Saeed Contrac. Co - 457.99 574.79 550.01 806.85 980.38 892.94 735.01 13.15 0.00 574.79 -0.07 
El Shams For Ho. Co 42.66 42.67 37.68 33.27 30.74 26.31 22.35 31.66 26.70 21.55 31.20 -0.12 
Giza Contracting Co - - - - 616.62 656.68 644.02 667.06 511.45 362.72 630.32 -0.02 
Misr Beni Suef Ce. Co - 141.63 193.52 163.17 126.07 53.49 12.88 26.06 6.15 3.63 53.49 -0.32 
Nasr Civil Works Co 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 10.42 15.00 16.07 8.43 7.15 19.64 7.79 0.26 
Paints & Chemical  Co 34.20 29.11 19.85 7.93 9.11 6.76 1.33 1.63 8.06 10.04 8.59 -0.15 
Moukhtar Ibrahim Co 162.56 171.12 78.02 49.70 83.76 39.12 72.71 13.32 30.72 19.94 61.21 -0.35 
Suez Cement Co 72.08 47.80 21.52 1.88 5.40 16.46 4.22 10.47 2.79 0.47 7.94 -0.55 
Tourah Portland Co 26.84 80.10 41.39 1.07 1.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 -0.48 
Telecom Egypt In 13.00 11.36 16.58 22.00 21.30 18.59 24.77 12.34 5.95 3.20 14.79 -0.13 
Vodafone Egypt In 95.77 90.08 112.49 68.46 42.09 29.89 13.42 21.57 - - 55.28 -0.29 
Alexandria Mills Ma 106.61 86.86 82.09 96.22 136.48 29.16 32.33 103.97 30.40 21.49 84.48 -0.05 
Cairo Oil Ma - - - 77.02 16.90 35.80 67.60 114.23 147.32 141.59 77.02 0.49 
Delta Sugar Ma 75.76 50.52 33.89 26.88 13.35 6.66 2.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.01 -0.50 
Egyptian Co. Foods Ma 0.00 0.84 2.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.27 0.00 0.44 
Egyptian Starch Ma 1.21 1.53 0.00 0.00 30.33 62.45 33.70 36.37 42.84 48.14 32.01 0.12 
El Nasr Transf. Ma - - 33.04 36.51 38.80 29.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.52 -0.09 
Electro Cable Ma 47.54 69.76 88.25 95.92 101.59 104.88 114.64 89.15 9.48 4.19 88.70 0.06 
Extracted Oil Ma - 228.75 207.11 183.17 103.47 143.44 209.97 25.54 6.95 0.00 143.44 -0.28 
Ismailia Poultry Ma 4.56 14.94 34.07 92.46 17.22 4.71 5.00 62.08 390.68 -2485.05 16.08 1.28 
M&W Delta Mills Ma - 25.17 71.24 36.50 6.79 5.05 3.33 1.75 0.34 0.00 5.05 -0.48 
Middle Flour Mills Ma - 41.50 44.92 33.53 125.24 34.13 8.52 30.01 35.41 34.39 34.39 0.03 
Misr Chemical  Ma - - - 287.56 322.26 266.37 315.64 256.92 188.53 73.87 266.37 -0.18 
Misr Oils Ma 119.95 132.12 125.03 147.84 106.64 126.80 125.02 100.95 101.13 56.27 122.48 -0.01 
Paper Middle East Ma 34.53 46.03 49.48 62.47 90.06 110.81 122.59 92.96 94.03 200.45 91.51 0.23 
Sidi Kerir Petros Ma - - - 42.88 20.52 16.65 7.44 0.45 0.28 0.19 7.44 -0.45 
Upper Egypt Mills Ma 0.19 0.19 7.95 6.74 2.76 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.22 -0.17 
Alexandria Medical Re 18.18 138.90 69.91 54.07 41.32 29.62 12.02 1.49 3.09 1.12 23.90 -0.28 
Arab Drug Co. Re - - - - 30.27 8.40 3.31 5.89 1.18 2.54 4.60 -0.61 
Arabia Cotton  Re 150.00 310.81 11.51 24.00 13.60 13.18 3.51 0.19 20.42 17.71 15.65 -0.13 
Eastern Company Re 8.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.94 21.68 0.00 -1.00 
Egypt Free Shops Re 0.85 0.72 2.61 1.00 6.22 3.28 1.23 0.96 1.28 2.16 1.25 -0.16 
El Nasr Clothing Re 23.60 56.16 50.27 49.41 54.17 52.55 15.07 28.79 39.85 49.18 49.30 0.10 
General Silos  Re - 67.87 63.91 52.36 88.15 85.30 76.63 71.93 58.30 55.47 67.87 -0.06 
Memphis Re - 7.54 8.36 8.20 5.66 3.13 1.78 0.00 0.00 0.07 3.13 -0.37 
Nile Pharma. Re - - 18.65 16.27 22.74 3.88 1.23 0.05 0.00 0.00 2.56 -0.76 
Nile Cotton  Re - 300.61 53.47 60.40 44.20 62.45 76.73 87.28 2.47 9.72 60.40 0.13 
Unirab Polvara Re 121.41 42.84 21.36 23.56 22.98 23.38 7.08 2.45 3.22 1.02 22.17 -0.50 
Alexandria Oils Ui - - - 133.42 119.00 58.73 37.38 27.17 19.72 18.85 37.38 -0.27 
Asec Co. Ui - - 71.71 46.36 32.14 5.65 1.97 0.00 23.24 26.27 24.75 -0.50 
Rowad Misr Os - - - - - - 0.00 0.01 0.25 5.46 0.13 26.12 
Semiramis Hotels Os 0.00 0.00 6.50 0.00 0.00 1.58 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.06 0.00 -1.00 
Notes: Co. indicates constructions and materials, In. indicates information and technology, Ma. indicates manufacturing, Re. 
indicates retail trade, Ut. indicates utilities, and OS. indicates other services. 
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Table II-27 Revenues to Total Assets Ratio of Egyptian Privatized Non-Financial 
Institutions 
Institutions- (%) Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Me. GR. 
Acrow Misr Co 63.35 55.30 65.42 75.98 83.56 96.87 96.86 86.82 113.28 91.44 85.19 0.10 
Alexandria Portland Co - - - 26.83 37.02 41.19 44.85 44.38 76.74 83.25 44.38 0.10 
El Saeed Contrac. Co - 53.02 56.68 40.94 36.84 24.03 43.93 43.52 24.76 38.01 40.94 -0.05 
El Shams For Hous. Co 8.95 5.82 6.81 7.06 10.15 10.76 12.22 13.00 10.63 8.65 9.55 0.06 
Giza Contracting Co - - - - 95.80 92.44 73.76 58.44 82.36 81.58 81.97 -0.04 
Misr BeniSuef Ce. Co - 17.22 15.66 25.26 38.08 52.17 57.66 42.02 41.25 41.78 41.25 0.06 
Nasr Civil Works Co 79.00 61.81 69.40 58.77 61.30 51.94 60.40 53.68 56.86 126.74 60.85 0.04 
Paints & Chemical  Co 38.46 36.14 42.37 54.21 70.53 77.47 84.04 85.05 86.72 89.46 74.00 0.08 
Moukhtar Ibrahim Co 59.84 57.28 75.78 68.93 59.95 78.57 68.75 86.36 95.65 107.69 72.36 0.11 
Suez Cement Co 41.94 32.35 39.29 46.15 51.72 26.09 42.68 46.67 59.14 66.67 44.42 0.13 
Tourah Portland Co 55.77 31.41 41.94 58.74 59.28 44.31 89.95 83.50 91.67 115.39 59.01 0.10 
Telecom Egypt In 21.92 21.79 20.67 21.82 23.33 26.25 26.39 28.57 29.41 31.25 24.79 0.06 
Vodafone Egypt In 37.26 47.22 45.24 45.83 63.46 69.84 76.62 67.50 - - 55.34 0.10 
Alexandria Mills Ma 148.40 109.63 111.57 126.01 125.97 133.19 134.96 178.31 164.67 154.44 134.08 0.01 
Cairo Oil Ma - - - 229.06 202.19 122.67 139.15 151.03 144.88 147.39 147.39 -0.01 
Delta Sugar Ma 36.89 52.98 51.46 51.42 65.86 90.91 76.94 83.33 57.56 90.90 61.71 0.08 
Egyptian Foods Ma 91.10 90.49 95.52 73.76 76.54 41.95 69.54 94.32 128.76 110.48 90.79 0.04 
Egyptian Starch Ma 110.14 110.83 125.33 136.85 132.73 96.32 39.07 49.92 60.29 45.46 103.23 0.01 
El Nasr Transfor. Ma - - 74.62 84.45 79.53 107.70 117.36 117.79 107.95 96.26 101.98 0.00 
Electro Cable Ma 30.75 37.21 37.97 51.71 48.94 42.47 51.25 32.91 69.26 58.58 45.71 0.02 
Extracted Oil Ma - 107.66 114.80 138.51 91.83 83.76 84.74 75.71 100.69 96.95 96.95 -0.01 
Ismailia Poultry Ma 99.71 106.47 96.07 111.84 87.09 89.85 98.17 142.61 54.92 63.53 97.12 0.07 
M&Wt Delta Mills Ma - 202.66 217.23 240.11 236.13 139.61 195.16 298.74 287.09 241.87 236.13 0.03 
Middle Egypt Mills Ma - 135.30 225.72 210.79 160.81 161.63 152.65 148.67 151.40 132.06 152.65 -0.04 
Misr Chemical  Ma - - - 18.72 23.03 24.27 18.72 17.40 23.08 34.88 23.03 0.14 
Misr Oils Ma 180.39 160.38 200.21 180.74 158.17 164.26 123.98 153.14 189.08 163.09 163.67 -0.10 
Paper Middle East Ma 31.51 36.68 34.91 54.20 59.75 63.52 68.42 78.68 92.20 62.58 61.16 0.10 
Sidi Kerir Petro Ma - - - 43.48 60.71 56.67 58.82 61.76 61.76 65.38 60.71 0.04 
Upper Egypt Mills Ma 170.81 167.53 237.25 255.67 260.82 241.30 225.61 231.70 204.79 192.32 228.65 -0.02 
Alexandria Medical  Re 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.16 49.10 51.52 63.84 77.98 88.44 92.77 50.31 0.18 
Arab Drug Co. Re - - - - 78.07 96.85 99.50 111.09 105.36 92.63 98.17 0.03 
Arabia Ginning Re 22.21 57.13 34.49 34.70 49.60 30.72 12.16 3.25 37.50 25.02 32.61 -0.33 
Eastern Company Re 86.96 91.67 95.83 100.00 100.00 97.14 89.74 83.72 66.67 58.82 90.71 -0.03 
Egypt Free Shops Re 122.27 119.61 121.97 124.04 140.74 147.94 146.81 184.38 200.27 129.69 135.22 0.02 
El Nasr Clothing Re 22.62 27.19 30.14 28.22 31.02 24.19 32.35 31.85 14.36 26.20 27.70 0.10 
General Silos  Re - 30.68 39.02 44.10 48.84 51.10 49.52 47.86 83.99 61.58 48.84 0.08 
Memphis Re - 65.61 61.70 61.78 68.43 70.95 77.58 78.92 106.61 179.82 70.95 0.07 
Nile Pharma Re - - 99.64 97.55 92.59 93.71 94.64 91.48 88.15 85.61 93.15 -0.03 
Nile Cotton Ginning Re - 23.53 7.87 6.06 4.18 5.96 4.48 3.79 4.73 2.04 4.73 -0.24 
Unirab Polvara Re 30.88 27.12 36.32 40.87 42.80 38.15 28.10 26.51 28.27 27.33 29.58 -0.03 
Alexandria Oils Ui - - - 11.62 39.49 108.00 137.93 132.26 190.91 167.86 132.26 0.36 
Asec Co. Ui - - 90.58 103.01 144.22 167.15 120.20 93.98 58.06 66.52 98.49 0.14 
Rowad Misr Os - - - - - - 11.74 12.15 11.23 17.80 11.94 0.04 
Semiramis Hotels Os 27.29 29.36 32.93 36.11 41.90 38.66 41.06 38.41 41.95 34.42 37.26 0.08 
Notes: Co. indicates constructions and materials, In. indicates information and technology, Ma. indicates manufacturing, Re. 
indicates retail trade, Ut. indicates utilities, and OS. indicates other services. 
